[
  {
    "startMs": 1309,
    "text": "[music]"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 13280,
    "text": "Great. Thanks everyone for coming. Uh"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 15440,
    "text": "this talk is called Tethered. Our agents"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 17279,
    "text": "are us. I'm Shu Fang from Two Sigma and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 21119,
    "text": "let's get started."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 23199,
    "text": "So just a quick explanation. Two Sigma"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 26480,
    "text": "is a little quant fund. I will also take"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 29039,
    "text": "the opportunity to explain that the name"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 31279,
    "text": "ostensibly is not because we have two"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 33680,
    "text": "co-founders who are very online but"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 36399,
    "text": "because the two sigas are about the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 39600,
    "text": "volatility sigma the small sigma and the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 42399,
    "text": "large sigma sum. So by summing together"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 44879,
    "text": "these individual volatilities we can uh"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 47600,
    "text": "hedge the risk achieve differentiated"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 50239,
    "text": "alpha."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 52559,
    "text": "Now because we are a hedge fund I have"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 54559,
    "text": "to give you all this important legal"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 56399,
    "text": "disclaimer. You don't have to read it."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 57760,
    "text": "It just has to be in this. And the TLDDR"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 60480,
    "text": "is that I'm not trying to sell you on"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 62559,
    "text": "anything. The views are mine and not"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 65040,
    "text": "necessarily the companies. Any logos,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 68000,
    "text": "any other companies I mentioned here are"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 69840,
    "text": "not me endorsing them or telling you to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 72240,
    "text": "buy their stocks or anything. It is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 73920,
    "text": "purely maybe coincidental."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 77840,
    "text": "But that also is meant to segue into the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 80720,
    "text": "fact that we are an old company. We're"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 83040,
    "text": "25 years old and clearly we're a very"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 86000,
    "text": "regulated industry, but we've managed to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 90400,
    "text": "run an ecosystem where everyone at the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 92560,
    "text": "company has a cloud agent. And not only"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 95119,
    "text": "that, but these agents run as their own"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 96960,
    "text": "identity. So, we're going to explain how"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 98960,
    "text": "we got here and why we're actually okay"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 100880,
    "text": "with this."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 104000,
    "text": "So, we're first going to do a little"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 105600,
    "text": "horror movie review. If any of you have"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 107520,
    "text": "seen us, you don't have to pay attention"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 109040,
    "text": "to this. defend if you haven't the TLDDR"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 111520,
    "text": "of the movie is that everyone has these"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 114399,
    "text": "doubles and these doubles are called"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 117280,
    "text": "tethered when the doubles decide to run"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 121119,
    "text": "loose and cause chaos and run around"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 123040,
    "text": "with these golden scissors they're"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 124640,
    "text": "called untetered and this is going to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 126560,
    "text": "somehow relate into my talk"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 130399,
    "text": "so back in June 2025 you know cloud code"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 133840,
    "text": "GA and all that stuff people started"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 135760,
    "text": "using agents through the local computer"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 139040,
    "text": "your local machine and it's very"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 141280,
    "text": "powerful but one it was CLI constrained"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 143200,
    "text": "and two it was localized right we wanted"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 146239,
    "text": "to achieve a world where people could"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 148800,
    "text": "use these agents from wherever they were"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 151200,
    "text": "whether it be mobile through slack"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 153040,
    "text": "through browsers but still have the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 156400,
    "text": "ability to run them remote and this is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 159040,
    "text": "important not just because of the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 160959,
    "text": "capability but many many people"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 164000,
    "text": "technical or not are not comfortable"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 165760,
    "text": "fully operating within a CLI so the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 168319,
    "text": "question became Okay, how do we actually"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 170400,
    "text": "run these in terms of what identity they"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 172720,
    "text": "run as?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 175440,
    "text": "The conventional wisdom is that you run"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 177519,
    "text": "these as some machine identity that is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 180480,
    "text": "attached to your user in some way. You"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 182239,
    "text": "have a shoe and you have a shoe agent."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 185040,
    "text": "But this quickly collapses and we found"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 187519,
    "text": "this collapsed because of all the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 189519,
    "text": "reasons that you can imagine, right?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 190800,
    "text": "It's very hard to keep permissions in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 192239,
    "text": "sync. Anytime you're dealing with"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 193760,
    "text": "software licensing, now you have to deal"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 195440,
    "text": "with two licenses."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 197360,
    "text": "uh there's certain systems that do not"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 199440,
    "text": "support multiple identities interacting"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 201760,
    "text": "with the same underlying data. You know,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 203599,
    "text": "stuff like Google Workspace, your"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 205599,
    "text": "emails, etc. And then how some systems"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 208720,
    "text": "are going to block as a first step. So"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 211519,
    "text": "you have to you're just going over the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 213200,
    "text": "barrier of entry. And then you also have"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 215519,
    "text": "to figure out how you actually manage"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 217599,
    "text": "the public and private boundaries."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 221680,
    "text": "So obviously it's like why don't we just"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 223440,
    "text": "run these as the user, right? How do how"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 225760,
    "text": "do we run these remotely as the exact"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 228560,
    "text": "same user identity? And as a result, all"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 230720,
    "text": "the capabilities, all the access, all"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 232560,
    "text": "those previous constraints are no longer"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 236239,
    "text": "valid."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 239760,
    "text": "And we already had the info for this and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 241920,
    "text": "I imagine a lot of you do too. If you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 243840,
    "text": "don't, I would uh encourage investing in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 246959,
    "text": "it, which is that you know you could"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 249200,
    "text": "have a Kubernetes cluster. You have all"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 251280,
    "text": "all of your clusters, your regions, etc."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 253439,
    "text": "And you have name spaces for"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 255120,
    "text": "individuals, right? And the reason we"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 257600,
    "text": "had this is because we often already"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 259519,
    "text": "needed this capability not for the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 261840,
    "text": "agentic purposes, but for all the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 263840,
    "text": "automated operations that we need to do"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 266560,
    "text": "that did not suit confinement to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 268960,
    "text": "someone's local machine. So we'd run"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 270800,
    "text": "automated jobs, you know, code"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 272400,
    "text": "containers usually operate on this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 273919,
    "text": "principle, research notebooks, etc. And"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 276479,
    "text": "every single user already had these"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 278400,
    "text": "namespaces existing in every single"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 280080,
    "text": "region and everything in it runs as the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 282240,
    "text": "user."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 283919,
    "text": "A very simplistic way of how this works."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 286320,
    "text": "Some trigger is going in to your"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 289360,
    "text": "controller and it's saying, \"Hey, I need"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 291120,
    "text": "to spin up some compute resources. You"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 293600,
    "text": "have a separate identity service that a"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 296000,
    "text": "sidecar in the pod pulls down from to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 299040,
    "text": "allow your actual containers"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 301840,
    "text": "to run and mount that identity and it"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 303919,
    "text": "runs as you."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 307280,
    "text": "So of course there are big dangers with"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 309840,
    "text": "this right and you know the first danger"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 312160,
    "text": "you may imagine is an internal danger."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 314080,
    "text": "How do you actually differentiate who or"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 317280,
    "text": "what took action right? You have you and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 320160,
    "text": "your U agent are now the exact same"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 322479,
    "text": "identity. That's why I grew this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 323919,
    "text": "mustache so you could tell the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 325120,
    "text": "difference between us for now. But uh"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 327680,
    "text": "you really want to know that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 329199,
    "text": "differentiation because certain actions"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 331759,
    "text": "that can be taken. You want to audit,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 334880,
    "text": "you possibly want to block and you want"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 337759,
    "text": "to just have the trace, right? You want"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 340000,
    "text": "to have the attribution to determine,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 341840,
    "text": "hey, was it someone operating as the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 344800,
    "text": "human operating purely human actions or"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 347840,
    "text": "was it the agent identity doing these"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 349520,
    "text": "things?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 353680,
    "text": "Another danger and perhaps a bigger one"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 356080,
    "text": "is we all know that for all of these"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 358160,
    "text": "capabilities and LOMs in general, it's"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 360800,
    "text": "essential you have access to the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 362880,
    "text": "external web. These are point in time"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 364880,
    "text": "mathematical functions that cannot"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 367280,
    "text": "actually update based on current data."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 369759,
    "text": "So it's like open internet access."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 371440,
    "text": "That's why it's a core capability, web"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 373039,
    "text": "search, web fetch tools, right? The"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 375759,
    "text": "problem is once you have that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 377039,
    "text": "capability, you leave yourself open to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 379840,
    "text": "huge vulnerability vectors. One of which"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 382560,
    "text": "is exfiltration risk. This is one we are"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 385440,
    "text": "deeply concerned with in terms of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 386880,
    "text": "possibly losing IP, you know, just"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 388880,
    "text": "exposing our sensitive information. but"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 391440,
    "text": "also certainly the possibility of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 394000,
    "text": "untrusted content flowing back in and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 396880,
    "text": "you know prompt injection just malware"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 399280,
    "text": "and vulnerabilities are all big risks"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 401360,
    "text": "there and then something we separately"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 403360,
    "text": "deal with is just the ability to make"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 405280,
    "text": "sure we don't"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 407680,
    "text": "u use licensed content without the right"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 410000,
    "text": "copyrights or actual licensing right you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 413680,
    "text": "can map this to the golden scissors that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 416160,
    "text": "they use and us so this is kind of our"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 418560,
    "text": "biggest fear to be honest"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 421599,
    "text": "So we are a finance firm and in finance"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 425599,
    "text": "there's a concept of obviously risk and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 427919,
    "text": "return. So when we think about what is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 431919,
    "text": "the positioning on the risk and return"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 433680,
    "text": "graph there's huge value in allowing"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 436000,
    "text": "agents to run you but also there's very"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 438880,
    "text": "high risk. What we generally want to do"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 441759,
    "text": "is make sure we capture as much of the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 443599,
    "text": "value as possible but reduce the risk."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 446080,
    "text": "We're optimizing that ratio of return"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 448319,
    "text": "over risk. Some of you may know the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 450319,
    "text": "sharp ratio. We're looking at that from"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 452400,
    "text": "the perspective of how do we let agents"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 455199,
    "text": "run as users and optimize that return."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 458479,
    "text": "And the ways we need to do this, right,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 460000,
    "text": "are to solve those two critical"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 461759,
    "text": "problems. One, differentiating access"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 464720,
    "text": "attributed to the human versus the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 466479,
    "text": "agent. And two, somehow getting safe web"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 470319,
    "text": "access in place."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 474400,
    "text": "So the first thing we did is this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 476479,
    "text": "attribution step, right?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 478879,
    "text": "And how we did this is we use a header"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 482639,
    "text": "and we make sure that every single agent"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 484639,
    "text": "continues to append to that header. And"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 487039,
    "text": "this is something we've all hopefully"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 490639,
    "text": "done in some way, right? Trace IDs."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 492560,
    "text": "You've you've all done this in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 493759,
    "text": "deterministic code. Making sure that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 495440,
    "text": "your observability stack propagates"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 497120,
    "text": "through a trace ID through disparate"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 499599,
    "text": "systems. How we did it is very similar"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 502560,
    "text": "to how you would do it for trace ID"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 504319,
    "text": "except we are dealing with a certain"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 507599,
    "text": "difference in the control vector which"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 509199,
    "text": "is the agent itself right and you can"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 512719,
    "text": "force you know using certain HP clients"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 515919,
    "text": "using MCPS using skills to make sure"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 518640,
    "text": "that that header initially gets"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 520560,
    "text": "populated and everywhere else along the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 522719,
    "text": "way continues to be populated right you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 524800,
    "text": "have a lot more deterministic control"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 526480,
    "text": "over agents and the harnesses and the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 528399,
    "text": "frameworks than you may ink and you can"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 530880,
    "text": "enforce it with some of the already"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 533360,
    "text": "existing primitives."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 536720,
    "text": "Now this gets very interesting because"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 539279,
    "text": "this is not only giving us the proper"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 542880,
    "text": "identification of who did something"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 545839,
    "text": "right it actually goes beyond that and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 548000,
    "text": "no longer are we confined by just"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 550480,
    "text": "knowing the act identity but we also"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 553600,
    "text": "actually get the full provenence through"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 555600,
    "text": "the system right as we deal with"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 557519,
    "text": "multiple steps in the system we are able"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 560880,
    "text": "to replay the entire chain of actions"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 562480,
    "text": "that actually led to some end result. So"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 565200,
    "text": "the comparison here is if we had used"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 568000,
    "text": "that shoe agent identity we wouldn't"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 570959,
    "text": "have this and we would just know that at"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 572640,
    "text": "some point shoe agent triggered this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 574880,
    "text": "initial flow into the span but we don't"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 577680,
    "text": "actually know hey those subsequent"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 580000,
    "text": "actions how do we properly trace back to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 582480,
    "text": "that origination point with this header"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 586399,
    "text": "this trace ID we get that full"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 588560,
    "text": "propagation and the actor is still me"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 591680,
    "text": "right it's still my identity"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 596320,
    "text": "And the second step that we needed to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 598240,
    "text": "fix is this web access. Right? A lot of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 601519,
    "text": "web access these days uses indexes for"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 605760,
    "text": "search. Right? I think cloud code's"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 607200,
    "text": "native one is Brave web browser and it"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 609760,
    "text": "uses a Brave index. Well, we were like,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 612320,
    "text": "hey, why don't we see what Google has,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 614640,
    "text": "right? Google is at its core hopefully"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 617279,
    "text": "still a search company and they do this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 620000,
    "text": "index generation already. And it turns"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 622079,
    "text": "out they actually do offer something"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 624480,
    "text": "specifically for regulated industries"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 627519,
    "text": "like ours that allows you to use their"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 629680,
    "text": "web index but within your existing VPC"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 632240,
    "text": "your you know network controls right and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 634560,
    "text": "it's called web grounding for"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 636320,
    "text": "enterprise. It basically works like this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 638959,
    "text": "where it's still within the exact same"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 641839,
    "text": "network boundary where you're probably"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 643200,
    "text": "running your cloud agents and stuff like"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 644880,
    "text": "that and offers two core capabilities"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 648240,
    "text": "search and fetch. Right? So the exact"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 650959,
    "text": "capabilities we want to mirror, we"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 653040,
    "text": "leverage that. We have all these"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 654480,
    "text": "guarantees. There's one tiny downside,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 657519,
    "text": "which is the data is obviously not going"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 659920,
    "text": "to be completely fresh, right? And the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 662880,
    "text": "constraints around this last I checked,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 665600,
    "text": "it's fresh within 24 hours. And for more"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 667920,
    "text": "regularly updated websites, it's fresh"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 669519,
    "text": "within 6 hours. But for most use cases"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 672000,
    "text": "that you may have for agents, that's"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 673760,
    "text": "probably more than sufficient and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 675680,
    "text": "completely removes this external egress"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 677920,
    "text": "vulnerability vector."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 681440,
    "text": "Now the second question is how do we"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 683200,
    "text": "actually ensure the agents use web"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 684959,
    "text": "grounding and again this is very"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 688000,
    "text": "simple with the existing primitives"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 689600,
    "text": "right you just need to make sure that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 691680,
    "text": "they don't get confused and you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 694640,
    "text": "certainly block the access itself but"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 696880,
    "text": "just for user experience and stuff like"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 698640,
    "text": "that you need to make sure those tools"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 700560,
    "text": "themselves that are already existing and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 702959,
    "text": "primitive and native to these agent"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 704959,
    "text": "harnesses and frameworks and such are"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 707040,
    "text": "actually blocked right again here's"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 709120,
    "text": "cloud code example. I think every other"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 710640,
    "text": "hotness has the same thing. Web search,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 712560,
    "text": "web fetch. We just deny those tools."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 714640,
    "text": "It's like, hey, you can't even use"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 715600,
    "text": "these. These are not even in your suite"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 717680,
    "text": "of tools available to you. Instead, we"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 720640,
    "text": "use the redirection going through, you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 722720,
    "text": "know, MCP CLI and actual client code"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 726320,
    "text": "using the supported paths, uh, skills,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 728720,
    "text": "whatever to make sure that whenever"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 730720,
    "text": "someone does need the capabilities of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 732399,
    "text": "web access, it goes through that web"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 734720,
    "text": "grounding cache index."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 741279,
    "text": "So takeaways from this talk basically"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 744160,
    "text": "make sure you ted your agents right"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 746560,
    "text": "letting them run around untetered you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 748800,
    "text": "know is very dangerous we want to tar"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 750800,
    "text": "them and it's much safer to do so and in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 752959,
    "text": "fact if we go back to that initial slide"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 754560,
    "text": "of how we consider this relative to the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 756480,
    "text": "risk and expected return because of some"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 760320,
    "text": "of the things we found while doing this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 762560,
    "text": "we actually believe we didn't lose"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 765200,
    "text": "expected value while huge hugely"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 767519,
    "text": "reducing the risk, right? So, the index"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 770800,
    "text": "certainly lags, but we get a ton more"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 772639,
    "text": "observability by just using that tagging"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 775760,
    "text": "primitive versus the actual uh just pure"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 779279,
    "text": "identity verification."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 783920,
    "text": "And I think this is [sighs and gasps]"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 786480,
    "text": "one thing people should really consider,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 788000,
    "text": "especially people working at companies,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 789680,
    "text": "enterprises, which is that there are a"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 792480,
    "text": "ton of things happening in the Genai"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 795600,
    "text": "landscape that are probably scary to us"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 798399,
    "text": "that make your security teams really"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 800240,
    "text": "afraid that feel like, hey, they are too"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 803360,
    "text": "far on the frontier, right? You you're"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 805279,
    "text": "like, I wouldn't run this locally. I"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 806880,
    "text": "wouldn't run a open cloud agent on my"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 810320,
    "text": "local machine with full permissions,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 812160,
    "text": "right? There's all these horror stories"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 814240,
    "text": "and you know various anecdotes about why"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 817120,
    "text": "this is bad. But in an enterprise again"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 821040,
    "text": "you can figure out how to leverage your"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 823200,
    "text": "enterprise resources to actually reduce"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 825600,
    "text": "those risk factors and get the real"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 827920,
    "text": "value out of the capabilities and this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 830079,
    "text": "is where you should be investing that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 831440,
    "text": "time."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 834800,
    "text": "So what we ultimately shipped is this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 837839,
    "text": "entire framework, right? We have the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 839839,
    "text": "ability to run cloud agents as user"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 845120,
    "text": "identities uh because of all of those"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 847760,
    "text": "guard rails and vectors we put in place"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 850639,
    "text": "and using different kind of interface"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 853440,
    "text": "vectors to actually operate with them so"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 855760,
    "text": "that people who are not comfortable with"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 857040,
    "text": "CLIs can leverage them but certainly for"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 858639,
    "text": "other cases as well. And as part of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 860639,
    "text": "that, we made sure to ship out just a"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 862480,
    "text": "managed fleet of cloud, you know,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 865440,
    "text": "whatever agents for every single user in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 868160,
    "text": "this remote fashion that they can"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 870000,
    "text": "already interact with so that we can"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 871760,
    "text": "continue to deploy and improve what is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 874720,
    "text": "actually available to individual users."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 877279,
    "text": "But also the core capability itself of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 879600,
    "text": "being able for every anyone at the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 881760,
    "text": "company to deploy an agent that runs in"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 884000,
    "text": "the cloud remotely with their full"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 886160,
    "text": "identity is there and is something we"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 888079,
    "text": "are comfortable with."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 891920,
    "text": "So to finish up, uh, everything I talked"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 894320,
    "text": "about actually happened last year. So if"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 896720,
    "text": "you are interested at all in wanting to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 899600,
    "text": "build and see what we're working on now,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 901920,
    "text": "or even better, if you're like, that was"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 904880,
    "text": "horrible, we could do so much better. We"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 907839,
    "text": "are hiring and we encourage you to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 909600,
    "text": "apply. If you have any experience in any"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 911920,
    "text": "of these domains,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 913920,
    "text": "you can check that QR code, check that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 916320,
    "text": "link. Yeah, that's it. Any questions?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 920940,
    "text": "[applause]"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 926240,
    "text": ">> What do you think about local connected"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 928720,
    "text": "to agents for enterprises?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 932320,
    "text": ">> Uh, not the views of my company, but"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 936000,
    "text": "personally I I think that is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 938320,
    "text": ">> question."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 939120,
    "text": ">> Yeah, sorry. His question was how do how"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 940959,
    "text": "do I view local LLMs for enterprise"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 943199,
    "text": "usage? And I think local in the sense"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 947360,
    "text": "that we manage ourselves is probably"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 949680,
    "text": "where we eventually want to go for a lot"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 951360,
    "text": "of our token use and inference because"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 954000,
    "text": "of cost because of deprecations because"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 956560,
    "text": "of you know every time Frontier Lab"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 959279,
    "text": "drops a new model you see some"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 960560,
    "text": "degradation. It's just there's too much"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 963680,
    "text": "volatility in that that we don't need to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 966560,
    "text": "risk as the openweight models kind of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 968959,
    "text": "become more advanced and sophisticated."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 982959,
    "text": "request."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 991920,
    "text": ">> Yeah. So as you can see the header is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 993600,
    "text": "not purely differentiating in itself."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 996959,
    "text": "Someone someone could certainly populate"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 998320,
    "text": "that, but the actor the identity itself"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1000320,
    "text": "will not be me, right? So some someone"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1003360,
    "text": "could I guess write in that they're"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1006240,
    "text": "using some agent, but the core previous"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1009680,
    "text": "identity itself is not mimickable, not"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1012959,
    "text": "like actually interceptable, right? So"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1014880,
    "text": "we still we have both we have both the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1017440,
    "text": "originating identity and that you know"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1019680,
    "text": "all of your identity ecosystems and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1021600,
    "text": "chains to ensure that but also the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1023120,
    "text": "header. part of the header."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1025520,
    "text": ">> Yeah, that that that is separate. The"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1026959,
    "text": "header is just XSLm agent and then you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1029919,
    "text": "still have some way you you need some"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1032079,
    "text": "way to actually determine the identity"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1033520,
    "text": "of who's coming."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1046559,
    "text": "Yeah, I you know gen generally all of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1049039,
    "text": "our RPC in some way has an initial entry"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1052000,
    "text": "point that is like"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1054160,
    "text": "populatable with that header and then"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1055919,
    "text": "once it actually goes downstream you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1057280,
    "text": "know you make sure that same with trace"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1059600,
    "text": "ids is part of the span internally"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1061919,
    "text": "within the So"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1065039,
    "text": ">> can you clarify how the use of Google"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1068320,
    "text": "index addresses the prompt injection"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1071200,
    "text": "issue?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1072000,
    "text": ">> Yeah. So the core things about this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1074400,
    "text": "index is not only is it a cached index,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1077360,
    "text": "it is it has a lot of other controls and"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1080559,
    "text": "safety guarantees around it. It is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1081919,
    "text": "specifically made for these curated"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1084559,
    "text": "financial like um highly regulated"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1086480,
    "text": "industries. So they themselves are doing"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1088559,
    "text": "some of their own curation on top of it."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1090960,
    "text": "Now certainly I think that creation"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1092960,
    "text": "could fail. It's probably done using Gen"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1094880,
    "text": "AI but the prompt injection risk is much"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1098320,
    "text": "far reduced because everything still"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1100320,
    "text": "remains internal."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1104960,
    "text": ">> Yep."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1113679,
    "text": ">> Do you mean how they're being used?"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1118400,
    "text": ">> Yeah. I I think it's critical um in the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1120799,
    "text": "sense that that behavioral data is"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1122720,
    "text": "something we can further configure based"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1124799,
    "text": "on right like that we we do try to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1128080,
    "text": "ensure that not everyone at the firm can"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1130960,
    "text": "see what your agents are doing right"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1132640,
    "text": "like there's stuff certainly work-wise"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1134960,
    "text": "but also more sensitive information that"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1136799,
    "text": "might be privileged to you. So your"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1138640,
    "text": "session data is kind of localized. Now"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1140559,
    "text": "that behavioral data in the session data"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1142640,
    "text": "is very powerful because it can define"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1144480,
    "text": "additional configuration that can be"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1146160,
    "text": "applied to these agents for the purposes"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1148160,
    "text": "of making the user experience better. So"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1150080,
    "text": "we we try to leverage that to figure out"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1152640,
    "text": "what to configure further not just based"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1155039,
    "text": "on someone's like hierarchical persona"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1157520,
    "text": "but actually based on their usage to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1159280,
    "text": "make sure that their experience"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1160559,
    "text": "continues to improve actually based on"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1162320,
    "text": "what they're doing."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1166640,
    "text": "Uh we're almost out of time. me and my"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1169679,
    "text": "co sorry I'll take the last question"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1173280,
    "text": "you're saying you have a process for"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1176480,
    "text": "letting individuals create their own"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1178880,
    "text": ">> yep"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1180720,
    "text": "I mean how do you go about like anybody"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1184400,
    "text": "there"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1188080,
    "text": "is a process for like agents across the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1191760,
    "text": "company"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1194799,
    "text": ">> yeah uh for building our own agents you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1197039,
    "text": "know we we use some of the existing"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1199039,
    "text": "frameworks for agent building. Obviously"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1200799,
    "text": "all the genai harnesses are very good at"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1203120,
    "text": "using those frameworks to build agents."
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1204559,
    "text": "So you have a lot of agents"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1205679,
    "text": "proliferating based on that. In terms of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1208000,
    "text": "provision, everything is already"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1209200,
    "text": "provision. All this is every single user"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1211280,
    "text": "at the firm has all the necessary"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1213919,
    "text": "infrastructure in place. So that's not"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1216480,
    "text": "really a worry. They can build an agent,"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1218559,
    "text": "deploy it as necessary into their"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1219760,
    "text": "namespace running as their identity. the"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1221760,
    "text": "the aspect of how do agents then become"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1224799,
    "text": "like a universal companywide or larger"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1227679,
    "text": "beyond a individual users uh agent you"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1231520,
    "text": "know goes through your standard kind of"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1233440,
    "text": "mechanisms right like hey is there going"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1235360,
    "text": "to be proper production support is there"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1237120,
    "text": "the right security it's like any"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1238799,
    "text": "application you might develop"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1241280,
    "text": "uh yeah so me and my colleagues will"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1242960,
    "text": "stick around here if anyone wants to"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1244559,
    "text": "talk further you know I guess if you're"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1246960,
    "text": "sticking around I can also take more"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1248559,
    "text": "questions but thanks for coming to this"
  },
  {
    "startMs": 1251719,
    "text": ">> [applause]"
  }
]