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AI Engineer World's Fair 2025

The Geopolitics of AI Infrastructure

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The Geopolitics of AI Infrastructure

Huawei’s optical accelerator systems, Gulf investment deals and America’s electricity constraints show why usable AI compute depends on much more than the chip.

From a talk by Dylan Patel

Before you start: Familiarity with GPUs and data centers is helpful; HBM, interconnect choices and cluster-financing mechanics are explained as they arise.

Huawei trades power and optics for system scale

How do you assemble a competitive AI system when your individual accelerators are not the most efficient available? Huawei’s answer is to connect more of them. Its Ascend 910B and 910C chips introduce the hardware story; CloudMatrix 384 turns that story into a system architecture. NVIDIA’s Blackwell GB200 NVL72 connects 72 GPUs through NVLink within one rack. Huawei connects 384 accelerators across multiple racks using optical links. Patel describes roughly twelve racks; the SemiAnalysis companion analysis clarifies that these are twelve compute racks, supplemented by four switch racks.

Rack photograph labeled with Ascend servers, a super node network switch, optical fibers, memory pooling and unified addressing.
Huawei Ascend 910C CM384 hardware with annotated servers and interconnections.

The surprising comparison is with an earlier NVIDIA design. In Patel’s account, DGX H100 Ranger would have connected 256 GPUs in one optical NVLink network, but cost, power consumption and reliability prevented it from reaching production. Blackwell took a different physical approach: concentrate the system into a rack so its high-bandwidth connections can remain copper. Instead of distributing the system across servers drawing roughly 10–20 kW each, the rack becomes an approximately 120 kW machine.

SystemConnected acceleratorsPhysical approach
Blackwell NVL7272 GPUsCopper within one rack
DGX H100 Ranger, as described by Patel256 GPUsOptical NVLink across the system
Huawei CloudMatrix 384384 acceleratorsOptical links across racks

A larger interconnect domain can compensate for weaker individual chips, but it carries its own costs. Huawei accepts greater power consumption and extensive optical connectivity. Patel credits Chinese manufacturing economics with making this more affordable, while explicitly saying that reliability data is unavailable. Building the architecture and establishing its reliability at scale are separate achievements.

0:360:51
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0:36 · section reference included

Foreign inputs complicate export controls

The next constraint is obtaining the components. Huawei faces entity restrictions, and China faces targeted semiconductor export controls—not a comprehensive embargo. Patel alleges that Huawei obtained TSMC fabrication through SOPHGO, a cryptocurrency-mining company acting as an intermediary. His account then follows the rest of the supply chain: high-bandwidth memory, or HBM, from Samsung and SK Hynix in Korea, and packaging equipment from the United States, the Netherlands and Japan. A nominally domestic accelerator can still depend on several foreign industrial systems.

Patel treats these routes as evidence of weak enforcement. SemiAnalysis estimates that Huawei obtained 2.9 million TSMC dies, rather than 2.9 million finished accelerators; Patel says that supply route had allegedly stopped. He also claims that TSMC received a roughly $1 billion fine against approximately $500 million of revenue, figures that should remain his account rather than an established enforcement outcome. Alongside the imported supply, he introduces SMIC as a prospective domestic fabrication route.

2:362:49
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2:36 · section reference included

The claimed packaged-memory route

HBM creates another potential bottleneck because an accelerator needs memory as well as a compute die. The December 2024 US controls cover HBM under specified jurisdictional and authorization conditions. Patel describes an alleged route that changes the form in which the memory crosses the border:

  1. Samsung sells HBM to CoAsia in Taiwan.
  2. CoAsia passes it to Faraday, which packages it alongside a chip Patel describes as nonfunctional.
  3. The package ships to China.
  4. The HBM is removed and repackaged onto an Ascend accelerator.

The mechanism is physical repackaging: the desired memory arrives attached to another device, then becomes an input to the final accelerator.

Patel characterizes this route as legal circumvention and estimates that Huawei had stockpiled roughly 13 million HBM stacks, with shipments continuing. Both the transaction-specific legality and the stockpile remain claims in his account. The larger manufacturing question then changes: how long must imported inventories bridge the gap before domestic production can supply the required components?

3:433:54
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3:43 · section reference included

A process node is not yet an accelerator supply

Patel estimates that SMIC has tools sufficient for 50,000 wafers per month, while describing its observed seven-nanometer output at the time as smartphone chips. That distinction matters because die size and yield determine how much useful output a manufacturing process produces. Small phone chips are easier to manufacture successfully than large AI accelerators; demonstrating a process on one does not immediately establish economical production of the other.

His analogy is the gap between the iPhone’s 2020 move to a newer process generation and NVIDIA’s later H100 generation. The useful comparison is the sequence—small consumer dies first, large accelerator dies later—rather than treating the rounded process-node labels as exact specifications. Patel expects SMIC to follow that sequence into high-volume seven-nanometer AI-chip production during the year of the talk. His expectation of millions of chips depends on the yields it achieves.

The resulting compute need not consist of individually identical chips to become substantial in aggregate. Patel points to reported DeepSeek plans to use Huawei hardware for next-generation training as a possible demand source. This remains an anticipated training deployment, not evidence that the next model had already been trained on those systems.

4:384:50
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4:38 · section reference included

Restrictions still remove substantial supply

Circumvention does not mean that restrictions have no effect. NVIDIA’s H20, described here as a reduced-capability H100/H200 offering for China, provides the counterexample. Patel rounds the financial impact to a $5 billion inventory write-down. NVIDIA’s reported Q1 FY2026 result gives the more precise accounting: a $4.5 billion charge covering excess H20 inventory and purchase obligations following the April 2025 licensing requirement.

Patel also paraphrases CFO Colette Kress as saying NVIDIA could have sold $50 billion of GPUs to China that year without restrictions. The earnings-call transcript instead describes nearly $50 billion as a future Chinese AI-accelerator market opportunity, not assured NVIDIA annual sales. Patel separately estimates that the restriction blocked about one million GPUs. His discussion therefore contains both effects: alternative supply routes can survive controls, while a particular restriction can still withhold a large amount of compute.

5:385:52
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5:38 · section reference included

The UAE bargain: GPU access and US investment

The Middle East agreements introduce a different policy instrument: allowing access in exchange for allocation and investment commitments. Following Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Patel turns to G42’s UAE construction. He describes an annual allowance of 500,000 GPUs, with 20% retained by G42 and 80% assigned to US hyperscalers, cloud providers and AI companies. These are the deal terms as he presents them, not operating capacity already delivered.

Patel describes a five-gigawatt campus ambition, with the satellite photograph showing initial portions of a one-gigawatt development. His contemporaneous comparison puts xAI at roughly 200 MW, infrastructure behind released OpenAI models at 200 MW or less, and the initial Stargate portions at 1.2 GW. The comparison is about the enormous scale of the proposed build; planned campus capacity should not be confused with a cluster already drawing that power.

Microsoft appears as both an investor in G42 and a likely large customer. Patel connects OpenAI’s anticipated Middle East cluster to Sam Altman’s earlier multitrillion-dollar infrastructure ambitions. The public record includes OpenAI’s May 22, 2025 Stargate UAE announcement, so the cluster should not be treated as permanently undisclosed simply because the talk calls it not publicly stated. It is a planned deployment.

The other side of the bargain is investment in America. Patel describes dollar-for-dollar matching: UAE spending on domestic AI infrastructure would be accompanied by equivalent investment in the United States. He cites G42 sites in Kentucky and New York as early examples, while leaving fulfillment of the full commitments conditional. Together with the proposed allocation to US companies, this is the political case for permitting the exports: overseas construction could also finance and serve the American AI ecosystem.

6:176:26
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6:17 · section reference included

Inference capacity can feed training

An audience question asks whether the UAE infrastructure is intended for inference or training. The distinction is less stable than those labels suggest. Patel describes US inference clusters using spare nighttime capacity for reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards: generate trajectories, evaluate their results and retain useful tokens for the training workflow.

A cluster serving users during busy periods can therefore contribute training data when demand falls. This does not mean every inference deployment becomes a full training system; it means that generating model outputs is itself part of some training workflows. A campus at the proposed UAE scale could support training, but its power rating alone does not determine which workloads it will run.

8:468:57
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8:46 · section reference included

Saudi construction and the supplier ecosystem

Saudi Arabia supplies the next example. Patel introduces DataVolt through the wider development story around The Line, describing a two-gigawatt data center as having broken ground. The NEOM project announcement identifies a different precise scope: a planned 1.5 GW campus in Oxagon, rather than The Line, with phased development rather than verified groundbreaking. The distinction matters when judging how much capacity is committed, under construction or operating.

Using his two-gigawatt description, Patel compares the project with xAI’s then roughly 200 MW training infrastructure: ten times the power scale of a build he says had already cost more than $10 billion. He also reports a $20 billion DataVolt commitment to US data centers and an approximately $80 billion broader investment total including American companies. These are separate project and investment claims in his account, not interchangeable measures of delivered compute.

Patel describes DataVolt as providing infrastructure for HUMAIN, the cloud-facing part of this ecosystem, and connects HUMAIN with Aramco Digital personnel. The supplier mix he outlines includes custom Qualcomm CPUs and both AMD and NVIDIA GPUs. He infers likely Groq participation from its Aramco Digital relationship; his estimate of more than 90% shifts between revenue and money received, so it does not establish a precise revenue concentration. AWS participation adds another route for American technology companies into the Saudi buildout.

9:359:45
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9:35 · section reference included

What export agreements must actually control

The objections to these deals concern more than where a data center stands. Patel distinguishes several risks:

  • Physical diversion: GPUs could be smuggled onward to China.
  • Remote access: hardware could remain in the Middle East while Chinese customers rent its compute.
  • Domestic opportunity cost: critics argue that the same GPUs could have served US deployments.
  • Political power: greater AI capability strengthens authoritarian monarchies as well as their commercial partners.

Patel sees Saudi Arabia and the UAE as balancing relationships with multiple powers, and he doubts that US enforcement can reliably police every condition. Preventing a shipment from moving again does not, by itself, control who ultimately uses the machines.

11:3311:44
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Who pays before the rental revenue arrives?

The supporting case begins with demand from American AI companies. Patel links part of the Microsoft–OpenAI tension to OpenAI wanting more GPUs than Microsoft was willing to finance. A lab can promise to rent capacity, but somebody else must first build the data center and purchase the hardware. The provider carries that initial cash requirement.

Patel’s illustrative economics put recovery of the cluster investment two to three years into a roughly five-year rental contract. His hypothetical Microsoft example makes the exposure concrete: build a $100 billion data center for OpenAI, then depend on OpenAI raising $150 billion to pay for its commitments. Those are teaching figures, not a disclosed contract. Expected profit over the contract’s life does not eliminate the risk that the customer cannot fund the intervening payments. If demand disappoints, finding another customer for such a large specialized cluster may also be difficult.

External capital can increase compute access by accepting construction and customer-payment risk. After joking about investor judgment, Patel says he considers the deals worthwhile: SoftBank and Middle Eastern investors can fund the buildings and GPUs against promised rental demand. OpenAI obtains access without supplying all the construction capital itself, and the same arrangement can benefit other Western labs. His forecast is that these deals leave OpenAI with more compute in 2027–2028 than it would otherwise have had.

12:5313:09
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12:53 · section reference included

US electricity supply limits what capital can build

Financing is only one reason overseas capacity might be additional rather than a relocation of US construction. The other is electricity. Patel expects roughly four gigawatts of Middle East capacity by 2030, below the five-gigawatt promise he discussed earlier. The US faces a much larger mismatch between proposed data centers and available power.

Patel reports a projected US power shortfall of 63 GW, based on his team’s tracking of data centers under construction. The method follows individual sites and buildings through satellite imagery, permits and regulatory filings. It attempts to ground demand in physical development rather than relying solely on company announcements.

On the supply side, his model assumes strong additions from renewables and batteries, new single-cycle and combined-cycle gas generation, and retention of almost all coal capacity otherwise scheduled to retire. He separately cites 44 GW of power additions against 100 GW of data-center capacity additions. These figures are not a simple subtraction that reproduces the 63 GW estimate; their common horizon and accounting basis are not established in the discussion. The substantive point is that even favorable supply assumptions leave a large gap.

Slide titled “U.S. Power Supply and Demand,” with a supply waterfall chart beside demand and supply lines and annotated shortfalls.
U.S. power supply additions and projected demand growth.

Closing that gap requires more than ordering generators. Skilled labor constrains construction; state and local approvals can delay projects; regulated utilities control critical parts of power delivery. Patel is especially critical of the utility structure, but the practical consequence is broader: an investor may have the money and the GPUs without being able to secure an energized site on the required schedule.

14:3014:41
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Electricity changes the value of chip efficiency

Patel contrasts America’s difficulty expanding electricity supply with China’s recent construction pace, which he characterizes as adding the equivalent of an entire US grid in seven years. That is his scale comparison, not a conversion between the chart’s energy quantities and data-center power ratings. His underlying concern is that the United States has not sustained comparable expansion for decades.

Stargate provides the visible construction example. Patel describes roughly 220 MW building groupings, two nearly complete, with additional construction underway, and gives 1.2 GW as the overall total. The groupings and total are his descriptions, not enough to reconstruct an exact building-by-building capacity ledger. For each successful headline project, he says, many others fail to obtain the power they need. His anecdote about an Ohio coal-stock recommendation tripling illustrates how he sees electricity scarcity affecting investment opportunities; it is not proof of the cause of that return.

Slide with project bullets and two dated aerial construction images; yellow rectangles mark additional building areas in the lower image.
“For every Stargate…” pairs construction imagery with data-center expansion plans.

The deployment comparison returns to Huawei’s opening tradeoff. Less efficient chips require more electricity, but abundant electricity can make that disadvantage manageable. More efficient chips still cannot run without power. The policy question is therefore whether Middle East construction enables useful compute that US infrastructure cannot deliver on the same schedule, despite the security and political risks of building it overseas.

16:4216:52
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16:42 · section reference included

Imported tools also help develop domestic substitutes

The final audience question asks whether SMIC remains dependent on ASML or is developing an entirely domestic alternative. Patel describes SMIC as wholly dependent on foreign tools at the time, while emphasizing that numerous Chinese equipment companies are working on substitutes. Purchases of American, Japanese and Dutch equipment—including ASML systems—therefore coexist with domestic tool development.

The learning mechanism is concrete. Place an imported tool beside a domestic one, run wafers through both, compare the results and use the differences to improve the domestic process. Patel adds teardown and reverse engineering as another route. In his account, imported manufacturing equipment is both an immediate production dependency and a reference against which future substitutes can be developed.

17:4918:06
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Resources

From the talk

Read the complete timestamped transcript
  1. 0:00

    [on-hold music] So gonna talk about China, US Middle East, um, and then US infrastructure.

  2. 0:21

    Um, and then a bit of a Q&A if we have time. I don't know. I, I yap a lot, so it's gonna be hard. Um, so s- Twenty minutes.

  3. 0:26

    Yeah, yeah, yeah. Twenty minutes. Oh, I got twenty. I got twenty. That's plenty. Um- It's eleven now. Nine good to go. [laughs] Ti-time's ticking. Time's ticking. Should I just, should I just stall so I don't have Q&A?

  4. 0:36

    Crowd's tough. Um, so, so wanted to talk about, like, Huawei's chips, right? 'Cause we never get to talk about them. Uh, their... Huawei is, is really, really cracked. Um, they absolutely destroyed everyone in 5G and telecom, um, by just engineering better.

  5. 0:51

    Um, and now they've done something that's, that's super interesting. Um, so they have the Ascend 910B and C, which you may have heard of, which are chips that they make.

  6. 1:01

    Um, and then they've turned it into this, like, really cool system architecture, right? Uh, you know, NVIDIA talks a lot about Blackwell NVL 72. It's one rack with seventy-two GPUs, um, connected together in NVLink.

  7. 1:13

    Um, Huawei's done something similar. It's called the CloudMatrix 384. Three hundred and eighty-four of their ch-chips, right, connected together in not one rack, but, like, twelve. Um, and there's a ton of optics and power connecting them all.

  8. 1:26

    What's interesting is that their architecture is actually one that NVIDIA tried to deploy and they failed at. Um, and that was called, uh, DGX H100 Ranger, right? Which was two hundred and fifty-six NVIDIA GPUs connected together in one NVLink network, uh, with optics.

  9. 1:41

    Um, they, they tried, and it did not work. They could not bring it to production because it was expensive, power-hungry, and unreliable. Um, and, and that sort of was the impetus for why Blackwell, they instead stopped going, you know, hey, ten, twenty kilowatts per server to a hundred and twenty kilowatts in one server that is effectively one

  10. 1:57

    whole rack because they wanted to keep it all in copper, right? Whereas DGX H100 Ranger, and also the Huawei system, uses optics to connect all the GPUs at super high bandwidth in the high bandwidth, you know, NVLink or, uh, a s- I can't remember what the, uh, uh, Ascend CloudMatrix pod is called, their, their scale-up network.

  11. 2:15

    But it's quite interesting that Huawei was able to engineer something that NVIDIA effectively failed at, right? Um, now obviously this, this is, um, way more, you know, power hungry, of course.

  12. 2:26

    Um, potentially unreliable. There's no data. Um, and it would be expensive except for the fact that, like, you know, China's really good at making things cheap, right? So th-that's, that's something interesting about the Huawei system.

  13. 2:36

    Um, what's interesting about the geopolitics of this is that despite the fact that Huawei is a sanctioned entity, China is a sanctioned country, they're still a-- they were still able to actually access, uh, TSMC to manufacture these chips, right?

  14. 2:49

    Um, the, the chip is manufactured through, uh, at TSMC through SoFGO, uh, which is a Bitcoin cryptocurrency mining company, uh, that pretended to not be attached to Huawei and just bought these chips.

  15. 3:01

    Um, and then there's, you know, HBM, which is high-bandwidth memory from Samsung and Hynix in Korea. Um, and then all the equi-- all the equipment to package it together is from the US, Netherlands, and Japan.

  16. 3:13

    So it's funny that sanctions are completely useless because they're still able to access this stuff. Um, and what's interesting is, you know, what, what I'm showing on the right is that they ca-- they've made, you know...

  17. 3:22

    They have roughly three million chips worth. They have two point nine million chips worth, uh, from TSMC. That's allegedly stopped now, right? The US gave TSMC, like, a billion dollar fine, uh, for five hundred million dollars of revenue that they made.

  18. 3:34

    Uh, which, which doesn't... s-seems like a slap on the wrist, honestly. Um, but you know, SMIC is also gonna s-- which is Ch-China's TSMC, is gonna start making it as well.

  19. 3:43

    Um, the other thing I would say is, what's funny is that HBM was also banned to China entirely. But instead of just, like, "Hey, H-HBM's banned," Ch- there's, there's cool ways to circumvent this, right?

  20. 3:54

    Which is, uh, Samsung sells to this company called CoAsia in Taiwan, and then CoAsia sells to this company called Faraday, which packages it into a chip. Like, there's a fake chip, basically, right?

  21. 4:04

    A chip that does literally nothing, and it has HBM packaged on it. Then they ship it to China, and then they take the HBM off of that chip and then put it on the Ascend.

  22. 4:12

    Um, and this actually circumvents all the rules and regulations, so this is completely legal, um, which I think is, like, very funny. Um, and so Huawei has stockpiled roughly thirteen million HBM stacks, um, you know, already.

  23. 4:26

    Um, and they're continuing to receive more shipments, uh, which is fun. Uh, very, very interesting that, you know, that's kinda possible. The other thing is, um, you know, domestically, they have not been able to manufacture in the past, but now they're able to, right?

  24. 4:38

    Um, China's, uh, SMIC, right, their TSMC, uh, has enough tools for fifty thousand wafers a month. Today, the only seven-nanometer chip that anyone's found from SMIC is their smartphone chip, right?

  25. 4:50

    Smartphone chips are smaller, easier to make. Um, they yield better than large AI chips. Um, so when you look at, like, hey, five nanometer, the first five nanometer chip was an iPhone chip in twenty-twenty, but NVIDIA didn't release a five nanometer GPU until, uh, twenty-twenty-two, twenty-twenty-three with the H100, right?

  26. 5:06

    Uh, and so likewise, right, SMIC is making seven nanometer for phones. Uh, they're going to get to the point where they can start making seven nanometer for AI chips, likely in very high volumes this year.

  27. 5:16

    Um, and based on the yields, they can actually get, like, you know, millions and millions, right? So it's, it's, uh... You know, the, the thought that China will not have equivalent compute is, like, kind of wrong.

  28. 5:26

    They will, they will have a lot of compute, right? Um, which is, which, which will be interesting, right? Because, uh, you know, there's already, like, big announcements from DeepSeek that they're gonna work and use, use Huawei chips, uh, to try and train their next generation models.

  29. 5:38

    Um, and so that, that'll be really interesting. Um, the other thing that's interesting is, um, you know, recently NVIDIA got banned from selling their H20. This is like a cut down H100 or H200 to China.

  30. 5:52

    Um, they wrote down five billion dollars worth of inventory, and on the earnings call, Colette, the CFO, said, "If we didn't have export restrictions, we would've sold fifty billion dollars worth of GPUs to China this year," which I thought was, like, a very interesting comment.

  31. 6:04

    Um, but, uh, the, the ban stopped about a million GPUs, and, um, if you... Yeah, it, it, it's, it's, it's, it's quite interesting that, like, you know- That amount of compute was also blocked.

  32. 6:17

    Um, I think the other sort of geopolitical thing that everyone's talking about besides China is the Middle East, right? Um, so recently there was a deal in the Middle East.

  33. 6:26

    Uh, you know, Trump went to the Middle East. He didn't go to Israel. He only went to Saudi and UAE, which I thought was quite interesting. Um, you know, not to get political, but, you know, that's, that's interesting.

  34. 6:35

    Um, [laughs] no, no more, no more, no more. [laughs]

  35. 6:41

    Um, so the, the details of the deal are quite, uh, are cool, right? So on the right is a satellite photo of a data center complex in the UAE, uh, that G42 is making.

  36. 6:49

    Um, and the deal is basically that G42 can buy five hundred thousand GPUs a year, um, and they get to keep twenty percent of them to do whatever they want.

  37. 6:58

    The other eighty percent have to go to, uh, US hyperscalers and cloud companies and AI companies, right? And so, uh, G42 is building a five gigawatt data center campus.

  38. 7:09

    The one photo-- pictured is the first parts of a gigawatt data center campus, right? Um, that is, that is absolutely ridiculously big, right? xAI's, uh, data center is like two hundred megawatts, right?

  39. 7:21

    Um, you know, OpenAI and all these other guys are two hundred or less megawatts for the models they've released. So these are absolutely ginormous, right? Stargate, the first, uh, first six parts of it in total is one point two gigawatts, right?

  40. 7:34

    So like this is a, this is a massive, um, data center that they're building. Um, G42 has a large customer and investor, Microsoft, and so Microsoft is going to be a big one.

  41. 7:46

    But if everyone remembers back like in twenty twenty-three, Sam was always like, "Hey, seven trillion dollars," right? You know, as he's throwing this crazy-ass number out or everyone kept reporting about it.

  42. 7:55

    Um, the interesting thing is that part of this was that, um, OpenAI wanted to build GPU clusters in the Middle East, right? Um, and so, uh, not, not like publicly stated, but it's like, it's like OpenAI is gonna have a cluster in the Middle East, right?

  43. 8:11

    Um, and so that's a big part of this deal as well. Um, and, and in, in concession, right, the US gets a couple benefits, right? Uh, UAE is, uh, providing matching investments to, uh, US, right?

  44. 8:24

    For any dollars they spend in UAE-- the UAE spends in UAE on AI infrastructure, they're also gonna spend in the US. Um, and so that's already started, right? G42 has sites in like Kentucky and New York, um, that they're spending in.

  45. 8:38

    Nothing that's five gigawatts, but I'm sure they'll, they'll get something. Uh, we'll see if this like all follows through. Uh, the other thing is that most of the compute goes to, uh, US companies, right?

  46. 8:46

    Eighty percent of it. Is this intended for inference or training? Like what's the goal of this data center? Um, I think, you know, you, you could spin it any way you want, right?

  47. 8:57

    Um, but the lines are also blurring, right? Um, people today now, uh, in their inference clusters at night in the US are just running reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards, generating, you know, trajectories and then, you know, keeping the good tokens, uh, when there's low utilization, right?

  48. 9:11

    So like inference clusters are now also training clusters, right? So I think, I think the- there's like the lines are blurring between what is an inference and training cluster.

  49. 9:17

    But also this is a five gigawatt data center. Like that's, that's, that's big. Um, you could do training for sure. Let's, let-- Can we keep questions? Yeah, sure, sure, sure, sure.

  50. 9:26

    Yeah. We can actually do questions in this round, but come up to him afterwards. Sorry. Um, no worries, no worries. Uh, the other one, the other one is, uh...

  51. 9:35

    I, I, I think, I think if we want to, we can yell questions, you know. Shh. [laughs] Um, the other one is, uh, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Um, Data Vault is a company there.

  52. 9:45

    Uh, if you've heard of The Line, uh, in Saudi Arabia, it's an absolutely ridiculous project. It's actually really cool. They're building a city that's a straight up line, and on both sides they have like huge sets of like mirrors so they don't have a ton of sun like making the city way too hot and it's clean and

  53. 10:00

    whatever, right? Like it's a really interesting thing. There's a lot of YouTube slop videos that you could watch that show how cool it is. Um, but anyways, part of that, uh, Line project is also Data Vault who's making a data center.

  54. 10:12

    And this is real and this is definitely happening. They've already b- struck, uh, broke ground on like a two gigawatt data center. Um, and again, like for context, xAI's entire training infrastructure at, today is two hundred megawatts, right?

  55. 10:25

    Uh, and they've spent like ten plus billion dollars on it, right? Like you gotta, you gotta rationalize these numbers. Uh, it's like ten X more, right? Um, so, so Data Vault's gonna invest twenty billion dollars in US data centers in addition to building a bunch in, um, the Middle East.

  56. 10:40

    Um, and then, and then a bunch of American companies are gonna invest as well. Uh, so total investment number's like eighty billion dollars. Uh, Data Vault is the data center company for Humane, which is, uh, sort of the clou- neo cloud for the data center company, right?

  57. 10:55

    Um, and so Humane, uh, they've signed deals to like get custom CPUs from Qualcomm and buy a bunch of AMD GPUs as well as NVIDIA GPUs. Uh, Humane is actually the Aramco, uh, folks, the Aramco, Aramco Digital folks, which is the vast majority of Groq's revenue as well.

  58. 11:12

    So there's, uh, likely Groq stuff in there. Um, I think like ninety plus percent of Groq's revenue or, or s-- uh, they've got fun- money from them is coming, coming from, uh, from, from the s- Aramco Digital folks.

  59. 11:24

    Um, likewise, um, the, the, you know, there-- And then there's also an AWS thing, right? So there's all, all these American companies are also like coming together with the Middle East.

  60. 11:33

    So the question is like, you know, why the heck are we sending all these GPUs to the Middle East? Is what like the EAs would say. And then the like capitalists will be like, "Fuck yeah, GPUs and money," right?

  61. 11:44

    So like it depends on what side of the fence you're on. Um, and I like to think, you know, I'm, uh, I'm on one side of the fence. I won't tell you which side. [laughs]

  62. 11:52

    Uh, you could guess. You could guess. Um, so you know, there, there are real criticisms, right? Like what if these GPUs get smuggled, right? To China. Um, 'cause it's not like Saudi Arabia and, and the UAE are allies.

  63. 12:03

    Um, they are, uh, they, they conveniently play both sides, right? Um, and, and always have. So there, there's always that risk. There's all these security requirements like, okay, what if-- Okay, they're not-- Maybe the GPUs don't get smuggled there.

  64. 12:16

    Maybe they get rented to China, right? Um- You know, there's the argument that these GPUs would've been used in the US anyways. Um, and so, and, and, and, and we know that export restrictions and things like that, the enforcement of them sucks.

  65. 12:28

    So it's not like w- the US government apparatus is gonna actually be able to effectively enforce this, right? So there's, there are real risks here. Um, and, and also, like, giving power to authoritarian count- countries and, that have, like, you know, kingdoms, right?

  66. 12:42

    It's, it's kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It's princes, right? You know, it's a little bit odd. Um, so, so that's sort of the arguments against it. Um, and then, and then the supporter are obviously, right, like, "Yes, more GPUs."

  67. 12:53

    Most of these GPUs go to American companies, right? Like, an easy example is OpenAI, right? Uh, they, they, they want a lot, lot more GPUs. Uh, Microsoft-OpenAI deal sort of split up partially because OpenAI wanted so many GPUs, and Microsoft was like, "No, you're crazy.

  68. 13:09

    Like, that's way too much. Like, you don't have revenue." Um, and OpenAI's like, "But we can convince someone to build it for us," right? 'Cause OpenAI's really nice, right?

  69. 13:17

    Like, they get to rent the GPUs. Uh, and so, like, but the thing is, their provider has to build the data center and buy all the GPUs, and then they don't get payback for two or three years, right, of renting GPUs, even though the contract is for, like, five years.

  70. 13:29

    So yeah, there's all this theoretical profit, but you don't actually get the money back on the cluster until year two or three. So if Microsoft now builds a $100 billion data center for OpenAI, and then OpenAI doesn't raise $150 billion to pay for it, um, then, then, you know, Microsoft is just left holding the bag.

  71. 13:47

    And who wants that big of a data center, right? So unless you believe, like, AI's demand is, like, unlimited, then, you know, you kind of... There's a big risk here.

  72. 13:53

    And the nice thing is, like, you know, fools are easily parted with their money, um, and SoftBank and the Middle East are the i- most stupid investors in the world potentially. [audience laughing]

  73. 14:02

    Um, and so, you know, I actually, I think they're fine. I think they're fine. I think these are good deals. But, like, you know, [laughs]

  74. 14:08

    um, you know, OpenAI gets to have someone pay for the cluster, um, buy all these GPUs, build all the data centers, and then, like, with the promise they're gonna rent them, right?

  75. 14:16

    And the same applies to all the other AI labs across the, uh, West, right? Um, and so the argument that, like, I would make is that, you know, OpenAI, it, because of this, will have more compute in 2027 or 2028 than they would've had without it, right?

  76. 14:30

    It wouldn't have been built in the US. Also, there's big problems with America in terms of being able to build GPUs, right? Um, and that is that there is a massive deficit of power, right?

  77. 14:41

    Um, so, uh, uh, there's no axis on the chart on the left for a reason, all right, for people taking a picture. Um, but on the right, you know, M- Middle East is building, you know, by 2030, like four gigawatts, right?

  78. 14:51

    Uh, uh, I said they promised five, but, like, from what we see, they'll have, like, four by 2030. Um,

  79. 14:57

    the US has a humongous, humongous deficit on, um, power. Um, I will skip forward a bit. Um, power, China's good at making power. US is not, right? This is an interesting one, right?

  80. 15:08

    Um, so presented to this to, uh, to the Secretary Wright and Bergman in February, um, i, i- in, in DC, and it's a really interesting chart, right? It's like, so on the right is, like, sort of our data center data, right?

  81. 15:21

    It's saying there is a 63 gigawatt da- uh, shortfall of power in the US, right, based on the data centers that we see under construction. And we're tracking every single one site by site, et cetera, building by building, um, with satellite photos, permits, regulatory filings, all this stuff, right?

  82. 15:35

    And on the left is the US power grid, right? Um, so you, you can have a lot of, like, strong assumptions about renewables, about batteries, um, and then all of the single cycle and dual cycle gas reactors that are being installed.

  83. 15:47

    And then you say, "Hey, actually, almost none of the coal's gonna turn off that is planned to turn off." And you still have this massive, mass... You have 44 gigawatts being added, but you have a hun- um, on, on the power side, um, and that's, that's assuming, you know, w- with the fluctuations and all that, right?

  84. 16:02

    Uh, whereas you're adding 100 gigawatts of data center capacity. So the US simply just doesn't have enough power unless we do something. And so the argument sort of is like, well, geopolitically, the US can't build, um, enough data centers, can't build enough power, whether it's for the lack of skilled labor, whether it's for the lack of, you

  85. 16:18

    know, regulatory regulators holding stuff up. Um, federal, not as much anymore, but local, state, and a- also in America, we have this beautiful thing called utility companies that are regulated monopolies that get to do whatever they want, right?

  86. 16:31

    If anyone has a power bill in California, they understand that the utilities fucking suck. Um, anyways, um, there, the, there's all these issues with building power in the US, right?

  87. 16:42

    And if we go back, China has no problem, right? They added an entire US grid in seven years, right? Um, and so, and we're talking about adding, you know, you see four terawatt hours on the, on the right graph.

  88. 16:52

    I'm talking about adding 100 gigawatts as a problem, right? Um, because the US just doesn't know how to,

  89. 16:58

    uh, or rather hasn't done it in, in, like, four decades. Um, and so that's the big sort of, uh, challenge. So for every Stargate that's out there, right, um, you know, 220 megawatts for these four building, like, things, and there's f- two of them already com- almost completed, and then there's another six going up.

  90. 17:14

    Uh, that's 1.2 gigawatts total for Stargate. Um, for every one of these that's happening, there's so many projects that are failing, right? Like, I've literally pitched a coal stock to my clients in Ohio, and the stock's 3X because there's power issues.

  91. 17:26

    Like, like, it's, it's crazy how, um, how power constrained America is, right? And so the geopolitics here is like, do you build in the Middle East or not? Uh, China's got p- no pro- power problems, even if their chips are less efficient, doesn't really matter, right?

  92. 17:40

    Like, I think the AI race is a very geopolitical and interesting one. Um, and so I'll sort of leave it there. I know there's, there's, there's a couple more slides, but yeah.

  93. 17:49

    Couple questions, two minutes. [audience applauding] Is SMIC dependent on ASML or are you working on an all- SMIC, SMIC, China's TSMC, is, uh, dependent entirely on Western tools today. Uh, but there are s- many, uh, Chinese tool companies.

  94. 18:06

    What's interesting is they'll buy billions of dollars of, uh, American, Japanese, and Dutch equipment, including ASML, but then they'll put it next to their domestic tool, and then they'll run, uh, wafers through both, and then they'll just, like, learn how to improve it.

  95. 18:18

    They'll also tear them down and reverse engineer them. Um, yeah, so it's cool. [upbeat music]