Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma
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Tethered: Running Cloud Agents as Their Users
Shu Fang explains how Two Sigma reused per-user compute infrastructure to give employees remote agents, then added attribution and controlled web access to manage the risks of shared identity.
From a talk by Shu Fang
At a glance
Ideas worth remembering
Running agents as users avoided the permission synchronization, licensing, and data-access problems of separate accounts. Existing per-user Kubernetes namespaces and an identity-service sidecar supplied the remote execution mechanism.
Authentication and attribution serve different purposes. The underlying identity establishes the user; the propagated header identifies agent activity and connects downstream actions to their origin. The header alone does not authenticate its claims.
Controlled web retrieval combines an approved search-and-fetch service with blocked network access and denied native tools. Fang reports index freshness within 24 hours, or 6 hours for frequently updated sites, qualified as his last checked understanding.
Fang assesses the controls as retaining expected value while greatly reducing risk, but supplies no numerical validation. Index curation can fail, so the presentation supports a risk-reduction claim rather than elimination of prompt injection.
The platform supports both a managed fleet and employee-built agents. Session visibility remains restricted, usage can inform configuration, and expanding an individual agent into a companywide application requires ordinary production support and security.
A remote agent for every employee
Shu Fang opens by introducing Two Sigma as a quantitative fund. He explains its name through two mathematical symbols: the small sigma associated with volatility and the large sigma associated with summation. Combining individual sources of volatility provides the framing for hedging risk and seeking differentiated returns. He also makes clear that the presentation expresses his views and that mentioning other companies does not constitute an endorsement.
The engineering premise is that a 25-year-old company in a highly regulated industry has nevertheless built an ecosystem in which every employee has a cloud agent. Those agents run under their users’ identities. Fang introduces the film Us as a metaphor: its doubles are called the tethered, and danger emerges when they break loose. The technical question behind the metaphor is how to give an agent useful authority while keeping its actions connected to an accountable person and controlled infrastructure.
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Why a second identity became an obstacle
Fang places the initial push in June 2025, when employees were using powerful agents on their local computers. Local execution imposed two constraints: the agent was tied to that machine, and interaction was largely confined to a command-line interface. The team wanted remote execution that employees could reach through mobile devices, Slack, or browsers. That would also serve people who were uncomfortable operating entirely through a CLI, including some technical users. Moving execution away from the laptop made identity a central design decision.
The conventional approach was to create a machine identity attached to each employee: a person and a separate agent account. Fang says this quickly became cumbersome. Permissions had to remain synchronized between the two accounts, and software licensing could require two licenses. Some systems did not support the desired arrangement of multiple identities accessing the same underlying data; he gives Google Workspace and email as examples. Other systems blocked access at the outset, while the team also inherited the work of managing public and private boundaries.
The alternative was to run the remote agent as the exact same user. That lets it inherit the user’s capabilities and access rather than reconstruct them in a second account. In Fang’s account, this removes the constraints introduced by maintaining two identities. It also means the agent receives the authority of the person it represents, making the choice consequential beyond convenience.
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Reusing per-user Kubernetes infrastructure
Two Sigma already had the infrastructure needed for remote execution under employee identities. Its Kubernetes environment contained a namespace for every user in every region, and workloads in those namespaces ran as the corresponding user. This arrangement predated agents. Automated jobs, code containers, and research notebooks already needed compute that could continue outside the confines of an employee’s local machine. Agents therefore became another workload on an existing foundation.
Fang describes a simplified launch sequence. A trigger reaches a controller requesting compute resources. A sidecar in the resulting pod obtains identity material from a separate identity service and makes that identity available to the application containers through a mount. The containers then run as the user. The account’s authority comes from this identity mechanism; merely placing a workload in a named namespace is not the whole mechanism he describes. He does not specify the credential format, renewal process, or identity-service protocol.
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Shared authority creates two different risks
The first danger is internal attribution. If the employee and the agent use the same identity, an identity record alone cannot distinguish a human action from an agent action. Fang jokes that his mustache helps the audience distinguish him from his double, but systems need a more useful distinction. They need to audit actions, potentially block some of them, and preserve traces that establish whether a person acted directly or an agent acted on their behalf.
The second danger concerns the external web. Fang describes models as point-in-time mathematical functions that need retrieval to use current information. Search and fetch tools supply that capability, but open internet access also creates an outbound path for sensitive information and intellectual property. In the opposite direction, fetched material can introduce prompt injection, malware, and other vulnerabilities. A separate concern is obtaining or using licensed content without the necessary rights. These risks involve both what leaves the organization and what enters the agent’s working context.
Fang evaluates the design through a finance-inspired relationship between risk and return. Running agents as users promises substantial value but brings substantial risk. The goal is to retain as much usefulness as possible while reducing exposure. This becomes two concrete engineering objectives: attribute access to the human or the agent, and provide safer web access. The framing is qualitative; he does not present a numerical risk model or a measured return calculation.
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Propagating attribution through the action chain
The attribution mechanism uses a header that agents populate and continue to append to as activity moves through the system. Fang compares it to propagating trace IDs through an observability stack: context must travel across separate systems rather than remain attached only to the first request. The agent introduces a different control challenge from deterministic application code, but its surrounding harness and framework still offer places to enforce behavior. Client code, MCP interfaces, and skills can establish the header initially and help keep it populated along the path.
The intended result goes beyond classifying an action as human or agent activity. Fang says the propagated context supplies provenance across multiple steps, allowing the team to replay the chain of actions that produced an end result. A separate agent account, by itself, would identify an initiating actor but would not establish how subsequent actions connect back to that origin. The additional value comes from carrying attribution through the chain while the authenticated actor remains the user. The talk does not describe the replay system or claim that rerunning a model would necessarily reproduce identical output.
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Retrieving web information within network controls
For web access, the team looked to an existing search index rather than having agents reach arbitrary external sites directly. Fang identifies Google’s web grounding for enterprise as the service they chose. He describes it as making Google’s web index available within the organization’s existing VPC and network controls, alongside the cloud agents. It offers search and fetch, matching the two capabilities the team wanted to preserve while changing the route through which information arrives.
The tradeoff is freshness. According to Fang’s last checked understanding, the information was fresh within 24 hours, or within 6 hours for more regularly updated websites. Those are his reported constraints, rather than a guarantee established in the presentation. He considers that delay sufficient for most agent use cases and argues that the arrangement removes the external egress vulnerability associated with direct web access. A task that depends on changes more recent than the index can supply would still face a substantive limitation.
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Closing the alternate search and fetch paths
Providing the grounding service is only part of the design. The agent must also be prevented from using its original web tools. Fang separates blocking access itself from configuring the available tool suite. Network access is blocked, and the native search and fetch tools are denied so the agent does not keep attempting an unavailable path. Removing those tools also makes the intended behavior clearer to the agent and improves the interaction experience.
Replacement interfaces then route requests through the grounding cache and index. Fang lists MCP, CLI access, client code, and skills as supported ways to expose that route. The mechanism preserves the ability to request web information while controlling which implementation fulfills the request. It depends on both an available approved path and the closure of the original paths; simply asking an agent to prefer grounding would not describe the controls he presents.
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What the controls bought and what the team shipped
Fang returns to the idea of keeping agents tethered. His assessment is that the team greatly reduced risk without losing expected value. The index introduces a delay, but attribution tagging adds observability beyond identifying an account. This is an argument about the balance of benefits and costs, not a reported benchmark: he supplies no quantitative validation of either the retained value or the reduction in risk.
His broader enterprise argument is that organizations can use their existing resources to reduce risks associated with powerful agents. Security teams may reasonably be alarmed by agents operating with full permissions, especially on local machines. Fang encourages investment in the surrounding controls that make those capabilities usable within an enterprise. The proposal is to treat infrastructure and operational boundaries as part of delivering the capability.
The shipped system included a framework for cloud agents running under user identities and multiple interfaces for interacting with them. A managed remote fleet gave every user an agent that the team could continue deploying and improving. Separately, the platform made it possible for employees to deploy their own remote agents under their full identities. Fang closes the presentation by saying the work happened the previous year and inviting people to join the team; that relative reference does not establish a precise implementation year.
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Self-managed inference as a direction
Asked about local LLMs for enterprise use, Fang interprets local as models the organization manages itself. Speaking personally, he sees that as a likely direction for much of its token usage and inference. His reasons include cost, model deprecations, and the instability introduced by changes in externally supplied models. He reports that new releases can bring degradation and argues that increasingly capable open-weight models could reduce exposure to that volatility. This is a preference and possible direction, rather than a claim that the organization has already moved all inference to self-managed models.
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The header supplements authentication
In a follow-up exchange, Fang clarifies that the header is not sufficient to establish identity. Someone could populate a header claiming agent activity, but doing so would not make their authenticated actor become another employee. The system retains both the originating identity, established through its identity mechanisms, and the additional header. His answer draws a boundary between authentication and attribution metadata: the header carries context about activity, while a separate mechanism must determine who is making the request. He does not describe cryptographic protection for the header itself.
He also explains where propagation enters the internal request flow. RPC entry points generally provide a place to populate the header. As requests move downstream, the context becomes part of the internal span, in the same manner as trace IDs. This places continuity in the request and tracing infrastructure rather than leaving attribution only at the agent’s initial interaction.
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Curation reduces risk but can fail
An audience member asks how using Google’s index addresses prompt injection. Fang answers that the service adds controls, safety guarantees, and curation beyond caching, describing it as intended for highly regulated industries. He explicitly acknowledges that the curation could fail. He speculates that generative AI may be involved in that curation, but does not establish how it works. His claim is that prompt-injection risk is substantially reduced, with the internal network boundary contributing to that reduction. The answer does not establish that retrieved content is free of malicious instructions or that remaining internal actions are harmless.
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Using session behavior while restricting visibility
Fang next discusses behavioral and session data as a basis for improving agent configuration. He says the team tries to prevent everyone at the firm from seeing what an individual’s agents are doing, because sessions can contain sensitive information privileged to that user. Session data is therefore kept localized in the sense he describes, although he does not specify its storage or access-control implementation.
Within those visibility constraints, usage data can inform further configuration. Fang wants the experience to improve based on what employees actually do, rather than relying only on their position in an organizational hierarchy or an assigned persona. The mechanism he proposes is to observe behavior and use it to decide what configuration to apply. He does not provide a concrete adaptation example or describe automatic model training from these sessions.
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From an individual agent to a supported application
The final question concerns employees creating agents and the process for broader use. Fang says they build with existing agent frameworks, and generative AI harnesses can help use those frameworks to create more agents. Provisioning is already in place for every employee, so an individual can build an agent and deploy it into their namespace under their identity. The shared infrastructure removes the need to provision a new execution environment for each such project.
Making an agent available beyond its individual creator follows the organization’s ordinary application mechanisms. Fang names proper production support and appropriate security as questions that must be addressed before an agent becomes a larger or companywide service. Individual deployment capability therefore does not, on its own, establish readiness for broad use. The recording ends with his invitation to continue the discussion with him and his colleagues.
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Read the complete timestamped transcript
- 0:01
[music]
- 0:13
Great. Thanks everyone for coming. Uh
- 0:15
this talk is called Tethered. Our agents
- 0:17
are us. I'm Shu Fang from Two Sigma and
- 0:21
let's get started.
- 0:23
So just a quick explanation. Two Sigma
- 0:26
is a little quant fund. I will also take
- 0:29
the opportunity to explain that the name
- 0:31
ostensibly is not because we have two
- 0:33
co-founders who are very online but
- 0:36
because the two sigas are about the
- 0:39
volatility sigma the small sigma and the
- 0:42
large sigma sum. So by summing together
- 0:44
these individual volatilities we can uh
- 0:47
hedge the risk achieve differentiated
- 0:50
alpha.
- 0:52
Now because we are a hedge fund I have
- 0:54
to give you all this important legal
- 0:56
disclaimer. You don't have to read it.
- 0:57
It just has to be in this. And the TLDDR
- 1:00
is that I'm not trying to sell you on
- 1:02
anything. The views are mine and not
- 1:05
necessarily the companies. Any logos,
- 1:08
any other companies I mentioned here are
- 1:09
not me endorsing them or telling you to
- 1:12
buy their stocks or anything. It is
- 1:13
purely maybe coincidental.
- 1:17
But that also is meant to segue into the
- 1:20
fact that we are an old company. We're
- 1:23
25 years old and clearly we're a very
- 1:26
regulated industry, but we've managed to
- 1:30
run an ecosystem where everyone at the
- 1:32
company has a cloud agent. And not only
- 1:35
that, but these agents run as their own
- 1:36
identity. So, we're going to explain how
- 1:38
we got here and why we're actually okay
- 1:40
with this.
- 1:44
So, we're first going to do a little
- 1:45
horror movie review. If any of you have
- 1:47
seen us, you don't have to pay attention
- 1:49
to this. defend if you haven't the TLDDR
- 1:51
of the movie is that everyone has these
- 1:54
doubles and these doubles are called
- 1:57
tethered when the doubles decide to run
- 2:01
loose and cause chaos and run around
- 2:03
with these golden scissors they're
- 2:04
called untetered and this is going to
- 2:06
somehow relate into my talk
- 2:10
so back in June 2025 you know cloud code
- 2:13
GA and all that stuff people started
- 2:15
using agents through the local computer
- 2:19
your local machine and it's very
- 2:21
powerful but one it was CLI constrained
- 2:23
and two it was localized right we wanted
- 2:26
to achieve a world where people could
- 2:28
use these agents from wherever they were
- 2:31
whether it be mobile through slack
- 2:33
through browsers but still have the
- 2:36
ability to run them remote and this is
- 2:39
important not just because of the
- 2:40
capability but many many people
- 2:44
technical or not are not comfortable
- 2:45
fully operating within a CLI so the
- 2:48
question became Okay, how do we actually
- 2:50
run these in terms of what identity they
- 2:52
run as?
- 2:55
The conventional wisdom is that you run
- 2:57
these as some machine identity that is
- 3:00
attached to your user in some way. You
- 3:02
have a shoe and you have a shoe agent.
- 3:05
But this quickly collapses and we found
- 3:07
this collapsed because of all the
- 3:09
reasons that you can imagine, right?
- 3:10
It's very hard to keep permissions in
- 3:12
sync. Anytime you're dealing with
- 3:13
software licensing, now you have to deal
- 3:15
with two licenses.
- 3:17
uh there's certain systems that do not
- 3:19
support multiple identities interacting
- 3:21
with the same underlying data. You know,
- 3:23
stuff like Google Workspace, your
- 3:25
emails, etc. And then how some systems
- 3:28
are going to block as a first step. So
- 3:31
you have to you're just going over the
- 3:33
barrier of entry. And then you also have
- 3:35
to figure out how you actually manage
- 3:37
the public and private boundaries.
- 3:41
So obviously it's like why don't we just
- 3:43
run these as the user, right? How do how
- 3:45
do we run these remotely as the exact
- 3:48
same user identity? And as a result, all
- 3:50
the capabilities, all the access, all
- 3:52
those previous constraints are no longer
- 3:56
valid.
- 3:59
And we already had the info for this and
- 4:01
I imagine a lot of you do too. If you
- 4:03
don't, I would uh encourage investing in
- 4:06
it, which is that you know you could
- 4:09
have a Kubernetes cluster. You have all
- 4:11
all of your clusters, your regions, etc.
- 4:13
And you have name spaces for
- 4:15
individuals, right? And the reason we
- 4:17
had this is because we often already
- 4:19
needed this capability not for the
- 4:21
agentic purposes, but for all the
- 4:23
automated operations that we need to do
- 4:26
that did not suit confinement to
- 4:28
someone's local machine. So we'd run
- 4:30
automated jobs, you know, code
- 4:32
containers usually operate on this
- 4:33
principle, research notebooks, etc. And
- 4:36
every single user already had these
- 4:38
namespaces existing in every single
- 4:40
region and everything in it runs as the
- 4:42
user.
- 4:43
A very simplistic way of how this works.
- 4:46
Some trigger is going in to your
- 4:49
controller and it's saying, "Hey, I need
- 4:51
to spin up some compute resources. You
- 4:53
have a separate identity service that a
- 4:56
sidecar in the pod pulls down from to
- 4:59
allow your actual containers
- 5:01
to run and mount that identity and it
- 5:03
runs as you.
- 5:07
So of course there are big dangers with
- 5:09
this right and you know the first danger
- 5:12
you may imagine is an internal danger.
- 5:14
How do you actually differentiate who or
- 5:17
what took action right? You have you and
- 5:20
your U agent are now the exact same
- 5:22
identity. That's why I grew this
- 5:23
mustache so you could tell the
- 5:25
difference between us for now. But uh
- 5:27
you really want to know that
- 5:29
differentiation because certain actions
- 5:31
that can be taken. You want to audit,
- 5:34
you possibly want to block and you want
- 5:37
to just have the trace, right? You want
- 5:40
to have the attribution to determine,
- 5:41
hey, was it someone operating as the
- 5:44
human operating purely human actions or
- 5:47
was it the agent identity doing these
- 5:49
things?
- 5:53
Another danger and perhaps a bigger one
- 5:56
is we all know that for all of these
- 5:58
capabilities and LOMs in general, it's
- 6:00
essential you have access to the
- 6:02
external web. These are point in time
- 6:04
mathematical functions that cannot
- 6:07
actually update based on current data.
- 6:09
So it's like open internet access.
- 6:11
That's why it's a core capability, web
- 6:13
search, web fetch tools, right? The
- 6:15
problem is once you have that
- 6:17
capability, you leave yourself open to
- 6:19
huge vulnerability vectors. One of which
- 6:22
is exfiltration risk. This is one we are
- 6:25
deeply concerned with in terms of
- 6:26
possibly losing IP, you know, just
- 6:28
exposing our sensitive information. but
- 6:31
also certainly the possibility of
- 6:34
untrusted content flowing back in and
- 6:36
you know prompt injection just malware
- 6:39
and vulnerabilities are all big risks
- 6:41
there and then something we separately
- 6:43
deal with is just the ability to make
- 6:45
sure we don't
- 6:47
u use licensed content without the right
- 6:50
copyrights or actual licensing right you
- 6:53
can map this to the golden scissors that
- 6:56
they use and us so this is kind of our
- 6:58
biggest fear to be honest
- 7:01
So we are a finance firm and in finance
- 7:05
there's a concept of obviously risk and
- 7:07
return. So when we think about what is
- 7:11
the positioning on the risk and return
- 7:13
graph there's huge value in allowing
- 7:16
agents to run you but also there's very
- 7:18
high risk. What we generally want to do
- 7:21
is make sure we capture as much of the
- 7:23
value as possible but reduce the risk.
- 7:26
We're optimizing that ratio of return
- 7:28
over risk. Some of you may know the
- 7:30
sharp ratio. We're looking at that from
- 7:32
the perspective of how do we let agents
- 7:35
run as users and optimize that return.
- 7:38
And the ways we need to do this, right,
- 7:40
are to solve those two critical
- 7:41
problems. One, differentiating access
- 7:44
attributed to the human versus the
- 7:46
agent. And two, somehow getting safe web
- 7:50
access in place.
- 7:54
So the first thing we did is this
- 7:56
attribution step, right?
- 7:58
And how we did this is we use a header
- 8:02
and we make sure that every single agent
- 8:04
continues to append to that header. And
- 8:07
this is something we've all hopefully
- 8:10
done in some way, right? Trace IDs.
- 8:12
You've you've all done this in
- 8:13
deterministic code. Making sure that
- 8:15
your observability stack propagates
- 8:17
through a trace ID through disparate
- 8:19
systems. How we did it is very similar
- 8:22
to how you would do it for trace ID
- 8:24
except we are dealing with a certain
- 8:27
difference in the control vector which
- 8:29
is the agent itself right and you can
- 8:32
force you know using certain HP clients
- 8:35
using MCPS using skills to make sure
- 8:38
that that header initially gets
- 8:40
populated and everywhere else along the
- 8:42
way continues to be populated right you
- 8:44
have a lot more deterministic control
- 8:46
over agents and the harnesses and the
- 8:48
frameworks than you may ink and you can
- 8:50
enforce it with some of the already
- 8:53
existing primitives.
- 8:56
Now this gets very interesting because
- 8:59
this is not only giving us the proper
- 9:02
identification of who did something
- 9:05
right it actually goes beyond that and
- 9:08
no longer are we confined by just
- 9:10
knowing the act identity but we also
- 9:13
actually get the full provenence through
- 9:15
the system right as we deal with
- 9:17
multiple steps in the system we are able
- 9:20
to replay the entire chain of actions
- 9:22
that actually led to some end result. So
- 9:25
the comparison here is if we had used
- 9:28
that shoe agent identity we wouldn't
- 9:30
have this and we would just know that at
- 9:32
some point shoe agent triggered this
- 9:34
initial flow into the span but we don't
- 9:37
actually know hey those subsequent
- 9:40
actions how do we properly trace back to
- 9:42
that origination point with this header
- 9:46
this trace ID we get that full
- 9:48
propagation and the actor is still me
- 9:51
right it's still my identity
- 9:56
And the second step that we needed to
- 9:58
fix is this web access. Right? A lot of
- 10:01
web access these days uses indexes for
- 10:05
search. Right? I think cloud code's
- 10:07
native one is Brave web browser and it
- 10:09
uses a Brave index. Well, we were like,
- 10:12
hey, why don't we see what Google has,
- 10:14
right? Google is at its core hopefully
- 10:17
still a search company and they do this
- 10:20
index generation already. And it turns
- 10:22
out they actually do offer something
- 10:24
specifically for regulated industries
- 10:27
like ours that allows you to use their
- 10:29
web index but within your existing VPC
- 10:32
your you know network controls right and
- 10:34
it's called web grounding for
- 10:36
enterprise. It basically works like this
- 10:38
where it's still within the exact same
- 10:41
network boundary where you're probably
- 10:43
running your cloud agents and stuff like
- 10:44
that and offers two core capabilities
- 10:48
search and fetch. Right? So the exact
- 10:50
capabilities we want to mirror, we
- 10:53
leverage that. We have all these
- 10:54
guarantees. There's one tiny downside,
- 10:57
which is the data is obviously not going
- 10:59
to be completely fresh, right? And the
- 11:02
constraints around this last I checked,
- 11:05
it's fresh within 24 hours. And for more
- 11:07
regularly updated websites, it's fresh
- 11:09
within 6 hours. But for most use cases
- 11:12
that you may have for agents, that's
- 11:13
probably more than sufficient and
- 11:15
completely removes this external egress
- 11:17
vulnerability vector.
- 11:21
Now the second question is how do we
- 11:23
actually ensure the agents use web
- 11:24
grounding and again this is very
- 11:28
simple with the existing primitives
- 11:29
right you just need to make sure that
- 11:31
they don't get confused and you
- 11:34
certainly block the access itself but
- 11:36
just for user experience and stuff like
- 11:38
that you need to make sure those tools
- 11:40
themselves that are already existing and
- 11:42
primitive and native to these agent
- 11:44
harnesses and frameworks and such are
- 11:47
actually blocked right again here's
- 11:49
cloud code example. I think every other
- 11:50
hotness has the same thing. Web search,
- 11:52
web fetch. We just deny those tools.
- 11:54
It's like, hey, you can't even use
- 11:55
these. These are not even in your suite
- 11:57
of tools available to you. Instead, we
- 12:00
use the redirection going through, you
- 12:02
know, MCP CLI and actual client code
- 12:06
using the supported paths, uh, skills,
- 12:08
whatever to make sure that whenever
- 12:10
someone does need the capabilities of
- 12:12
web access, it goes through that web
- 12:14
grounding cache index.
- 12:21
So takeaways from this talk basically
- 12:24
make sure you ted your agents right
- 12:26
letting them run around untetered you
- 12:28
know is very dangerous we want to tar
- 12:30
them and it's much safer to do so and in
- 12:32
fact if we go back to that initial slide
- 12:34
of how we consider this relative to the
- 12:36
risk and expected return because of some
- 12:40
of the things we found while doing this
- 12:42
we actually believe we didn't lose
- 12:45
expected value while huge hugely
- 12:47
reducing the risk, right? So, the index
- 12:50
certainly lags, but we get a ton more
- 12:52
observability by just using that tagging
- 12:55
primitive versus the actual uh just pure
- 12:59
identity verification.
- 13:03
And I think this is [sighs and gasps]
- 13:06
one thing people should really consider,
- 13:08
especially people working at companies,
- 13:09
enterprises, which is that there are a
- 13:12
ton of things happening in the Genai
- 13:15
landscape that are probably scary to us
- 13:18
that make your security teams really
- 13:20
afraid that feel like, hey, they are too
- 13:23
far on the frontier, right? You you're
- 13:25
like, I wouldn't run this locally. I
- 13:26
wouldn't run a open cloud agent on my
- 13:30
local machine with full permissions,
- 13:32
right? There's all these horror stories
- 13:34
and you know various anecdotes about why
- 13:37
this is bad. But in an enterprise again
- 13:41
you can figure out how to leverage your
- 13:43
enterprise resources to actually reduce
- 13:45
those risk factors and get the real
- 13:47
value out of the capabilities and this
- 13:50
is where you should be investing that
- 13:51
time.
- 13:54
So what we ultimately shipped is this
- 13:57
entire framework, right? We have the
- 13:59
ability to run cloud agents as user
- 14:05
identities uh because of all of those
- 14:07
guard rails and vectors we put in place
- 14:10
and using different kind of interface
- 14:13
vectors to actually operate with them so
- 14:15
that people who are not comfortable with
- 14:17
CLIs can leverage them but certainly for
- 14:18
other cases as well. And as part of
- 14:20
that, we made sure to ship out just a
- 14:22
managed fleet of cloud, you know,
- 14:25
whatever agents for every single user in
- 14:28
this remote fashion that they can
- 14:30
already interact with so that we can
- 14:31
continue to deploy and improve what is
- 14:34
actually available to individual users.
- 14:37
But also the core capability itself of
- 14:39
being able for every anyone at the
- 14:41
company to deploy an agent that runs in
- 14:44
the cloud remotely with their full
- 14:46
identity is there and is something we
- 14:48
are comfortable with.
- 14:51
So to finish up, uh, everything I talked
- 14:54
about actually happened last year. So if
- 14:56
you are interested at all in wanting to
- 14:59
build and see what we're working on now,
- 15:01
or even better, if you're like, that was
- 15:04
horrible, we could do so much better. We
- 15:07
are hiring and we encourage you to
- 15:09
apply. If you have any experience in any
- 15:11
of these domains,
- 15:13
you can check that QR code, check that
- 15:16
link. Yeah, that's it. Any questions?
- 15:20
[applause]
- 15:26
>> What do you think about local connected
- 15:28
to agents for enterprises?
- 15:32
>> Uh, not the views of my company, but
- 15:36
personally I I think that is
- 15:38
>> question.
- 15:39
>> Yeah, sorry. His question was how do how
- 15:40
do I view local LLMs for enterprise
- 15:43
usage? And I think local in the sense
- 15:47
that we manage ourselves is probably
- 15:49
where we eventually want to go for a lot
- 15:51
of our token use and inference because
- 15:54
of cost because of deprecations because
- 15:56
of you know every time Frontier Lab
- 15:59
drops a new model you see some
- 16:00
degradation. It's just there's too much
- 16:03
volatility in that that we don't need to
- 16:06
risk as the openweight models kind of
- 16:08
become more advanced and sophisticated.
- 16:22
request.
- 16:31
>> Yeah. So as you can see the header is
- 16:33
not purely differentiating in itself.
- 16:36
Someone someone could certainly populate
- 16:38
that, but the actor the identity itself
- 16:40
will not be me, right? So some someone
- 16:43
could I guess write in that they're
- 16:46
using some agent, but the core previous
- 16:49
identity itself is not mimickable, not
- 16:52
like actually interceptable, right? So
- 16:54
we still we have both we have both the
- 16:57
originating identity and that you know
- 16:59
all of your identity ecosystems and
- 17:01
chains to ensure that but also the
- 17:03
header. part of the header.
- 17:05
>> Yeah, that that that is separate. The
- 17:06
header is just XSLm agent and then you
- 17:09
still have some way you you need some
- 17:12
way to actually determine the identity
- 17:13
of who's coming.
- 17:26
Yeah, I you know gen generally all of
- 17:29
our RPC in some way has an initial entry
- 17:32
point that is like
- 17:34
populatable with that header and then
- 17:35
once it actually goes downstream you
- 17:37
know you make sure that same with trace
- 17:39
ids is part of the span internally
- 17:41
within the So
- 17:45
>> can you clarify how the use of Google
- 17:48
index addresses the prompt injection
- 17:51
issue?
- 17:52
>> Yeah. So the core things about this
- 17:54
index is not only is it a cached index,
- 17:57
it is it has a lot of other controls and
- 18:00
safety guarantees around it. It is
- 18:01
specifically made for these curated
- 18:04
financial like um highly regulated
- 18:06
industries. So they themselves are doing
- 18:08
some of their own curation on top of it.
- 18:10
Now certainly I think that creation
- 18:12
could fail. It's probably done using Gen
- 18:14
AI but the prompt injection risk is much
- 18:18
far reduced because everything still
- 18:20
remains internal.
- 18:24
>> Yep.
- 18:33
>> Do you mean how they're being used?
- 18:38
>> Yeah. I I think it's critical um in the
- 18:40
sense that that behavioral data is
- 18:42
something we can further configure based
- 18:44
on right like that we we do try to
- 18:48
ensure that not everyone at the firm can
- 18:50
see what your agents are doing right
- 18:52
like there's stuff certainly work-wise
- 18:54
but also more sensitive information that
- 18:56
might be privileged to you. So your
- 18:58
session data is kind of localized. Now
- 19:00
that behavioral data in the session data
- 19:02
is very powerful because it can define
- 19:04
additional configuration that can be
- 19:06
applied to these agents for the purposes
- 19:08
of making the user experience better. So
- 19:10
we we try to leverage that to figure out
- 19:12
what to configure further not just based
- 19:15
on someone's like hierarchical persona
- 19:17
but actually based on their usage to
- 19:19
make sure that their experience
- 19:20
continues to improve actually based on
- 19:22
what they're doing.
- 19:26
Uh we're almost out of time. me and my
- 19:29
co sorry I'll take the last question
- 19:33
you're saying you have a process for
- 19:36
letting individuals create their own
- 19:38
>> yep
- 19:40
I mean how do you go about like anybody
- 19:44
there
- 19:48
is a process for like agents across the
- 19:51
company
- 19:54
>> yeah uh for building our own agents you
- 19:57
know we we use some of the existing
- 19:59
frameworks for agent building. Obviously
- 20:00
all the genai harnesses are very good at
- 20:03
using those frameworks to build agents.
- 20:04
So you have a lot of agents
- 20:05
proliferating based on that. In terms of
- 20:08
provision, everything is already
- 20:09
provision. All this is every single user
- 20:11
at the firm has all the necessary
- 20:13
infrastructure in place. So that's not
- 20:16
really a worry. They can build an agent,
- 20:18
deploy it as necessary into their
- 20:19
namespace running as their identity. the
- 20:21
the aspect of how do agents then become
- 20:24
like a universal companywide or larger
- 20:27
beyond a individual users uh agent you
- 20:31
know goes through your standard kind of
- 20:33
mechanisms right like hey is there going
- 20:35
to be proper production support is there
- 20:37
the right security it's like any
- 20:38
application you might develop
- 20:41
uh yeah so me and my colleagues will
- 20:42
stick around here if anyone wants to
- 20:44
talk further you know I guess if you're
- 20:46
sticking around I can also take more
- 20:48
questions but thanks for coming to this
- 20:51
>> [applause]