Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma

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Tethered: Running Cloud Agents as Their Users

Shu Fang explains how Two Sigma reused per-user compute infrastructure to give employees remote agents, then added attribution and controlled web access to manage the risks of shared identity.

From a talk by Shu Fang

At a glance

Ideas worth remembering

  • Running agents as users avoided the permission synchronization, licensing, and data-access problems of separate accounts. Existing per-user Kubernetes namespaces and an identity-service sidecar supplied the remote execution mechanism.

  • Authentication and attribution serve different purposes. The underlying identity establishes the user; the propagated header identifies agent activity and connects downstream actions to their origin. The header alone does not authenticate its claims.

  • Controlled web retrieval combines an approved search-and-fetch service with blocked network access and denied native tools. Fang reports index freshness within 24 hours, or 6 hours for frequently updated sites, qualified as his last checked understanding.

  • Fang assesses the controls as retaining expected value while greatly reducing risk, but supplies no numerical validation. Index curation can fail, so the presentation supports a risk-reduction claim rather than elimination of prompt injection.

  • The platform supports both a managed fleet and employee-built agents. Session visibility remains restricted, usage can inform configuration, and expanding an individual agent into a companywide application requires ordinary production support and security.

A remote agent for every employee

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 42 seconds
A remote agent for every employee

Shu Fang opens by introducing Two Sigma as a quantitative fund. He explains its name through two mathematical symbols: the small sigma associated with volatility and the large sigma associated with summation. Combining individual sources of volatility provides the framing for hedging risk and seeking differentiated returns. He also makes clear that the presentation expresses his views and that mentioning other companies does not constitute an endorsement.

The engineering premise is that a 25-year-old company in a highly regulated industry has nevertheless built an ecosystem in which every employee has a cloud agent. Those agents run under their users’ identities. Fang introduces the film Us as a metaphor: its doubles are called the tethered, and danger emerges when they break loose. The technical question behind the metaphor is how to give an agent useful authority while keeping its actions connected to an accountable person and controlled infrastructure.

0:170:23
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0:01 · section reference included

Why a second identity became an obstacle

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 195 seconds
Why a second identity became an obstacle

Fang places the initial push in June 2025, when employees were using powerful agents on their local computers. Local execution imposed two constraints: the agent was tied to that machine, and interaction was largely confined to a command-line interface. The team wanted remote execution that employees could reach through mobile devices, Slack, or browsers. That would also serve people who were uncomfortable operating entirely through a CLI, including some technical users. Moving execution away from the laptop made identity a central design decision.

The conventional approach was to create a machine identity attached to each employee: a person and a separate agent account. Fang says this quickly became cumbersome. Permissions had to remain synchronized between the two accounts, and software licensing could require two licenses. Some systems did not support the desired arrangement of multiple identities accessing the same underlying data; he gives Google Workspace and email as examples. Other systems blocked access at the outset, while the team also inherited the work of managing public and private boundaries.

The alternative was to run the remote agent as the exact same user. That lets it inherit the user’s capabilities and access rather than reconstruct them in a second account. In Fang’s account, this removes the constraints introduced by maintaining two identities. It also means the agent receives the authority of the person it represents, making the choice consequential beyond convenience.

2:102:15
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Reusing per-user Kubernetes infrastructure

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 289 seconds
Reusing per-user Kubernetes infrastructure

Two Sigma already had the infrastructure needed for remote execution under employee identities. Its Kubernetes environment contained a namespace for every user in every region, and workloads in those namespaces ran as the corresponding user. This arrangement predated agents. Automated jobs, code containers, and research notebooks already needed compute that could continue outside the confines of an employee’s local machine. Agents therefore became another workload on an existing foundation.

Fang describes a simplified launch sequence. A trigger reaches a controller requesting compute resources. A sidecar in the resulting pod obtains identity material from a separate identity service and makes that identity available to the application containers through a mount. The containers then run as the user. The account’s authority comes from this identity mechanism; merely placing a workload in a named namespace is not the whole mechanism he describes. He does not specify the credential format, renewal process, or identity-service protocol.

3:594:09
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Shared authority creates two different risks

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 382 seconds
Shared authority creates two different risks

The first danger is internal attribution. If the employee and the agent use the same identity, an identity record alone cannot distinguish a human action from an agent action. Fang jokes that his mustache helps the audience distinguish him from his double, but systems need a more useful distinction. They need to audit actions, potentially block some of them, and preserve traces that establish whether a person acted directly or an agent acted on their behalf.

The second danger concerns the external web. Fang describes models as point-in-time mathematical functions that need retrieval to use current information. Search and fetch tools supply that capability, but open internet access also creates an outbound path for sensitive information and intellectual property. In the opposite direction, fetched material can introduce prompt injection, malware, and other vulnerabilities. A separate concern is obtaining or using licensed content without the necessary rights. These risks involve both what leaves the organization and what enters the agent’s working context.

Fang evaluates the design through a finance-inspired relationship between risk and return. Running agents as users promises substantial value but brings substantial risk. The goal is to retain as much usefulness as possible while reducing exposure. This becomes two concrete engineering objectives: attribute access to the human or the agent, and provide safer web access. The framing is qualitative; he does not present a numerical risk model or a measured return calculation.

5:075:09
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5:07 · section reference included

Propagating attribution through the action chain

The attribution mechanism uses a header that agents populate and continue to append to as activity moves through the system. Fang compares it to propagating trace IDs through an observability stack: context must travel across separate systems rather than remain attached only to the first request. The agent introduces a different control challenge from deterministic application code, but its surrounding harness and framework still offer places to enforce behavior. Client code, MCP interfaces, and skills can establish the header initially and help keep it populated along the path.

The intended result goes beyond classifying an action as human or agent activity. Fang says the propagated context supplies provenance across multiple steps, allowing the team to replay the chain of actions that produced an end result. A separate agent account, by itself, would identify an initiating actor but would not establish how subsequent actions connect back to that origin. The additional value comes from carrying attribution through the chain while the authenticated actor remains the user. The talk does not describe the replay system or claim that rerunning a model would necessarily reproduce identical output.

7:547:56
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Retrieving web information within network controls

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 629 seconds
Retrieving web information within network controls

For web access, the team looked to an existing search index rather than having agents reach arbitrary external sites directly. Fang identifies Google’s web grounding for enterprise as the service they chose. He describes it as making Google’s web index available within the organization’s existing VPC and network controls, alongside the cloud agents. It offers search and fetch, matching the two capabilities the team wanted to preserve while changing the route through which information arrives.

The tradeoff is freshness. According to Fang’s last checked understanding, the information was fresh within 24 hours, or within 6 hours for more regularly updated websites. Those are his reported constraints, rather than a guarantee established in the presentation. He considers that delay sufficient for most agent use cases and argues that the arrangement removes the external egress vulnerability associated with direct web access. A task that depends on changes more recent than the index can supply would still face a substantive limitation.

9:569:58
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Closing the alternate search and fetch paths

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 728 seconds
Closing the alternate search and fetch paths

Providing the grounding service is only part of the design. The agent must also be prevented from using its original web tools. Fang separates blocking access itself from configuring the available tool suite. Network access is blocked, and the native search and fetch tools are denied so the agent does not keep attempting an unavailable path. Removing those tools also makes the intended behavior clearer to the agent and improves the interaction experience.

Replacement interfaces then route requests through the grounding cache and index. Fang lists MCP, CLI access, client code, and skills as supported ways to expose that route. The mechanism preserves the ability to request web information while controlling which implementation fulfills the request. It depends on both an available approved path and the closure of the original paths; simply asking an agent to prefer grounding would not describe the controls he presents.

11:2111:23
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11:21 · section reference included

What the controls bought and what the team shipped

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 853 seconds
What the controls bought and what the team shipped

Fang returns to the idea of keeping agents tethered. His assessment is that the team greatly reduced risk without losing expected value. The index introduces a delay, but attribution tagging adds observability beyond identifying an account. This is an argument about the balance of benefits and costs, not a reported benchmark: he supplies no quantitative validation of either the retained value or the reduction in risk.

His broader enterprise argument is that organizations can use their existing resources to reduce risks associated with powerful agents. Security teams may reasonably be alarmed by agents operating with full permissions, especially on local machines. Fang encourages investment in the surrounding controls that make those capabilities usable within an enterprise. The proposal is to treat infrastructure and operational boundaries as part of delivering the capability.

The shipped system included a framework for cloud agents running under user identities and multiple interfaces for interacting with them. A managed remote fleet gave every user an agent that the team could continue deploying and improving. Separately, the platform made it possible for employees to deploy their own remote agents under their full identities. Fang closes the presentation by saying the work happened the previous year and inviting people to join the team; that relative reference does not establish a precise implementation year.

12:2112:24
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Self-managed inference as a direction

Asked about local LLMs for enterprise use, Fang interprets local as models the organization manages itself. Speaking personally, he sees that as a likely direction for much of its token usage and inference. His reasons include cost, model deprecations, and the instability introduced by changes in externally supplied models. He reports that new releases can bring degradation and argues that increasingly capable open-weight models could reduce exposure to that volatility. This is a preference and possible direction, rather than a claim that the organization has already moved all inference to self-managed models.

15:2615:28
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The header supplements authentication

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 1026 seconds
The header supplements authentication

In a follow-up exchange, Fang clarifies that the header is not sufficient to establish identity. Someone could populate a header claiming agent activity, but doing so would not make their authenticated actor become another employee. The system retains both the originating identity, established through its identity mechanisms, and the additional header. His answer draws a boundary between authentication and attribution metadata: the header carries context about activity, while a separate mechanism must determine who is making the request. He does not describe cryptographic protection for the header itself.

He also explains where propagation enters the internal request flow. RPC entry points generally provide a place to populate the header. As requests move downstream, the context becomes part of the internal span, in the same manner as trace IDs. This places continuity in the request and tracing infrastructure rather than leaving attribution only at the agent’s initial interaction.

16:3116:33
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16:22 · section reference included

Curation reduces risk but can fail

An audience member asks how using Google’s index addresses prompt injection. Fang answers that the service adds controls, safety guarantees, and curation beyond caching, describing it as intended for highly regulated industries. He explicitly acknowledges that the curation could fail. He speculates that generative AI may be involved in that curation, but does not establish how it works. His claim is that prompt-injection risk is substantially reduced, with the internal network boundary contributing to that reduction. The answer does not establish that retrieved content is free of malicious instructions or that remaining internal actions are harmless.

17:4517:48
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Using session behavior while restricting visibility

Fang next discusses behavioral and session data as a basis for improving agent configuration. He says the team tries to prevent everyone at the firm from seeing what an individual’s agents are doing, because sessions can contain sensitive information privileged to that user. Session data is therefore kept localized in the sense he describes, although he does not specify its storage or access-control implementation.

Within those visibility constraints, usage data can inform further configuration. Fang wants the experience to improve based on what employees actually do, rather than relying only on their position in an organizational hierarchy or an assigned persona. The mechanism he proposes is to observe behavior and use it to decide what configuration to apply. He does not provide a concrete adaptation example or describe automatic model training from these sessions.

18:3318:38
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From an individual agent to a supported application

Selected presentation frame from Tethered: Our Agents Are Us — Shu Fang, Two Sigma at 1181 seconds
From an individual agent to a supported application

The final question concerns employees creating agents and the process for broader use. Fang says they build with existing agent frameworks, and generative AI harnesses can help use those frameworks to create more agents. Provisioning is already in place for every employee, so an individual can build an agent and deploy it into their namespace under their identity. The shared infrastructure removes the need to provision a new execution environment for each such project.

Making an agent available beyond its individual creator follows the organization’s ordinary application mechanisms. Fang names proper production support and appropriate security as questions that must be addressed before an agent becomes a larger or companywide service. Individual deployment capability therefore does not, on its own, establish readiness for broad use. The recording ends with his invitation to continue the discussion with him and his colleagues.

19:3319:36
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Read the complete timestamped transcript
  1. 0:01

    [music]

  2. 0:13

    Great. Thanks everyone for coming. Uh

  3. 0:15

    this talk is called Tethered. Our agents

  4. 0:17

    are us. I'm Shu Fang from Two Sigma and

  5. 0:21

    let's get started.

  6. 0:23

    So just a quick explanation. Two Sigma

  7. 0:26

    is a little quant fund. I will also take

  8. 0:29

    the opportunity to explain that the name

  9. 0:31

    ostensibly is not because we have two

  10. 0:33

    co-founders who are very online but

  11. 0:36

    because the two sigas are about the

  12. 0:39

    volatility sigma the small sigma and the

  13. 0:42

    large sigma sum. So by summing together

  14. 0:44

    these individual volatilities we can uh

  15. 0:47

    hedge the risk achieve differentiated

  16. 0:50

    alpha.

  17. 0:52

    Now because we are a hedge fund I have

  18. 0:54

    to give you all this important legal

  19. 0:56

    disclaimer. You don't have to read it.

  20. 0:57

    It just has to be in this. And the TLDDR

  21. 1:00

    is that I'm not trying to sell you on

  22. 1:02

    anything. The views are mine and not

  23. 1:05

    necessarily the companies. Any logos,

  24. 1:08

    any other companies I mentioned here are

  25. 1:09

    not me endorsing them or telling you to

  26. 1:12

    buy their stocks or anything. It is

  27. 1:13

    purely maybe coincidental.

  28. 1:17

    But that also is meant to segue into the

  29. 1:20

    fact that we are an old company. We're

  30. 1:23

    25 years old and clearly we're a very

  31. 1:26

    regulated industry, but we've managed to

  32. 1:30

    run an ecosystem where everyone at the

  33. 1:32

    company has a cloud agent. And not only

  34. 1:35

    that, but these agents run as their own

  35. 1:36

    identity. So, we're going to explain how

  36. 1:38

    we got here and why we're actually okay

  37. 1:40

    with this.

  38. 1:44

    So, we're first going to do a little

  39. 1:45

    horror movie review. If any of you have

  40. 1:47

    seen us, you don't have to pay attention

  41. 1:49

    to this. defend if you haven't the TLDDR

  42. 1:51

    of the movie is that everyone has these

  43. 1:54

    doubles and these doubles are called

  44. 1:57

    tethered when the doubles decide to run

  45. 2:01

    loose and cause chaos and run around

  46. 2:03

    with these golden scissors they're

  47. 2:04

    called untetered and this is going to

  48. 2:06

    somehow relate into my talk

  49. 2:10

    so back in June 2025 you know cloud code

  50. 2:13

    GA and all that stuff people started

  51. 2:15

    using agents through the local computer

  52. 2:19

    your local machine and it's very

  53. 2:21

    powerful but one it was CLI constrained

  54. 2:23

    and two it was localized right we wanted

  55. 2:26

    to achieve a world where people could

  56. 2:28

    use these agents from wherever they were

  57. 2:31

    whether it be mobile through slack

  58. 2:33

    through browsers but still have the

  59. 2:36

    ability to run them remote and this is

  60. 2:39

    important not just because of the

  61. 2:40

    capability but many many people

  62. 2:44

    technical or not are not comfortable

  63. 2:45

    fully operating within a CLI so the

  64. 2:48

    question became Okay, how do we actually

  65. 2:50

    run these in terms of what identity they

  66. 2:52

    run as?

  67. 2:55

    The conventional wisdom is that you run

  68. 2:57

    these as some machine identity that is

  69. 3:00

    attached to your user in some way. You

  70. 3:02

    have a shoe and you have a shoe agent.

  71. 3:05

    But this quickly collapses and we found

  72. 3:07

    this collapsed because of all the

  73. 3:09

    reasons that you can imagine, right?

  74. 3:10

    It's very hard to keep permissions in

  75. 3:12

    sync. Anytime you're dealing with

  76. 3:13

    software licensing, now you have to deal

  77. 3:15

    with two licenses.

  78. 3:17

    uh there's certain systems that do not

  79. 3:19

    support multiple identities interacting

  80. 3:21

    with the same underlying data. You know,

  81. 3:23

    stuff like Google Workspace, your

  82. 3:25

    emails, etc. And then how some systems

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    are going to block as a first step. So

  84. 3:31

    you have to you're just going over the

  85. 3:33

    barrier of entry. And then you also have

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    to figure out how you actually manage

  87. 3:37

    the public and private boundaries.

  88. 3:41

    So obviously it's like why don't we just

  89. 3:43

    run these as the user, right? How do how

  90. 3:45

    do we run these remotely as the exact

  91. 3:48

    same user identity? And as a result, all

  92. 3:50

    the capabilities, all the access, all

  93. 3:52

    those previous constraints are no longer

  94. 3:56

    valid.

  95. 3:59

    And we already had the info for this and

  96. 4:01

    I imagine a lot of you do too. If you

  97. 4:03

    don't, I would uh encourage investing in

  98. 4:06

    it, which is that you know you could

  99. 4:09

    have a Kubernetes cluster. You have all

  100. 4:11

    all of your clusters, your regions, etc.

  101. 4:13

    And you have name spaces for

  102. 4:15

    individuals, right? And the reason we

  103. 4:17

    had this is because we often already

  104. 4:19

    needed this capability not for the

  105. 4:21

    agentic purposes, but for all the

  106. 4:23

    automated operations that we need to do

  107. 4:26

    that did not suit confinement to

  108. 4:28

    someone's local machine. So we'd run

  109. 4:30

    automated jobs, you know, code

  110. 4:32

    containers usually operate on this

  111. 4:33

    principle, research notebooks, etc. And

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    every single user already had these

  113. 4:38

    namespaces existing in every single

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    region and everything in it runs as the

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    user.

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    A very simplistic way of how this works.

  117. 4:46

    Some trigger is going in to your

  118. 4:49

    controller and it's saying, "Hey, I need

  119. 4:51

    to spin up some compute resources. You

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    have a separate identity service that a

  121. 4:56

    sidecar in the pod pulls down from to

  122. 4:59

    allow your actual containers

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    to run and mount that identity and it

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    runs as you.

  125. 5:07

    So of course there are big dangers with

  126. 5:09

    this right and you know the first danger

  127. 5:12

    you may imagine is an internal danger.

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    How do you actually differentiate who or

  129. 5:17

    what took action right? You have you and

  130. 5:20

    your U agent are now the exact same

  131. 5:22

    identity. That's why I grew this

  132. 5:23

    mustache so you could tell the

  133. 5:25

    difference between us for now. But uh

  134. 5:27

    you really want to know that

  135. 5:29

    differentiation because certain actions

  136. 5:31

    that can be taken. You want to audit,

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    you possibly want to block and you want

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    to just have the trace, right? You want

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    to have the attribution to determine,

  140. 5:41

    hey, was it someone operating as the

  141. 5:44

    human operating purely human actions or

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    was it the agent identity doing these

  143. 5:49

    things?

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    Another danger and perhaps a bigger one

  145. 5:56

    is we all know that for all of these

  146. 5:58

    capabilities and LOMs in general, it's

  147. 6:00

    essential you have access to the

  148. 6:02

    external web. These are point in time

  149. 6:04

    mathematical functions that cannot

  150. 6:07

    actually update based on current data.

  151. 6:09

    So it's like open internet access.

  152. 6:11

    That's why it's a core capability, web

  153. 6:13

    search, web fetch tools, right? The

  154. 6:15

    problem is once you have that

  155. 6:17

    capability, you leave yourself open to

  156. 6:19

    huge vulnerability vectors. One of which

  157. 6:22

    is exfiltration risk. This is one we are

  158. 6:25

    deeply concerned with in terms of

  159. 6:26

    possibly losing IP, you know, just

  160. 6:28

    exposing our sensitive information. but

  161. 6:31

    also certainly the possibility of

  162. 6:34

    untrusted content flowing back in and

  163. 6:36

    you know prompt injection just malware

  164. 6:39

    and vulnerabilities are all big risks

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    there and then something we separately

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    deal with is just the ability to make

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    sure we don't

  168. 6:47

    u use licensed content without the right

  169. 6:50

    copyrights or actual licensing right you

  170. 6:53

    can map this to the golden scissors that

  171. 6:56

    they use and us so this is kind of our

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    biggest fear to be honest

  173. 7:01

    So we are a finance firm and in finance

  174. 7:05

    there's a concept of obviously risk and

  175. 7:07

    return. So when we think about what is

  176. 7:11

    the positioning on the risk and return

  177. 7:13

    graph there's huge value in allowing

  178. 7:16

    agents to run you but also there's very

  179. 7:18

    high risk. What we generally want to do

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    is make sure we capture as much of the

  181. 7:23

    value as possible but reduce the risk.

  182. 7:26

    We're optimizing that ratio of return

  183. 7:28

    over risk. Some of you may know the

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    sharp ratio. We're looking at that from

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    the perspective of how do we let agents

  186. 7:35

    run as users and optimize that return.

  187. 7:38

    And the ways we need to do this, right,

  188. 7:40

    are to solve those two critical

  189. 7:41

    problems. One, differentiating access

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    attributed to the human versus the

  191. 7:46

    agent. And two, somehow getting safe web

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    access in place.

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    So the first thing we did is this

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    attribution step, right?

  195. 7:58

    And how we did this is we use a header

  196. 8:02

    and we make sure that every single agent

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    continues to append to that header. And

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    this is something we've all hopefully

  199. 8:10

    done in some way, right? Trace IDs.

  200. 8:12

    You've you've all done this in

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    deterministic code. Making sure that

  202. 8:15

    your observability stack propagates

  203. 8:17

    through a trace ID through disparate

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    systems. How we did it is very similar

  205. 8:22

    to how you would do it for trace ID

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    except we are dealing with a certain

  207. 8:27

    difference in the control vector which

  208. 8:29

    is the agent itself right and you can

  209. 8:32

    force you know using certain HP clients

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    using MCPS using skills to make sure

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    that that header initially gets

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    populated and everywhere else along the

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    way continues to be populated right you

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    have a lot more deterministic control

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    over agents and the harnesses and the

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    frameworks than you may ink and you can

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    enforce it with some of the already

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    existing primitives.

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    Now this gets very interesting because

  220. 8:59

    this is not only giving us the proper

  221. 9:02

    identification of who did something

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    right it actually goes beyond that and

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    no longer are we confined by just

  224. 9:10

    knowing the act identity but we also

  225. 9:13

    actually get the full provenence through

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    the system right as we deal with

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    multiple steps in the system we are able

  228. 9:20

    to replay the entire chain of actions

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    that actually led to some end result. So

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    the comparison here is if we had used

  231. 9:28

    that shoe agent identity we wouldn't

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    have this and we would just know that at

  233. 9:32

    some point shoe agent triggered this

  234. 9:34

    initial flow into the span but we don't

  235. 9:37

    actually know hey those subsequent

  236. 9:40

    actions how do we properly trace back to

  237. 9:42

    that origination point with this header

  238. 9:46

    this trace ID we get that full

  239. 9:48

    propagation and the actor is still me

  240. 9:51

    right it's still my identity

  241. 9:56

    And the second step that we needed to

  242. 9:58

    fix is this web access. Right? A lot of

  243. 10:01

    web access these days uses indexes for

  244. 10:05

    search. Right? I think cloud code's

  245. 10:07

    native one is Brave web browser and it

  246. 10:09

    uses a Brave index. Well, we were like,

  247. 10:12

    hey, why don't we see what Google has,

  248. 10:14

    right? Google is at its core hopefully

  249. 10:17

    still a search company and they do this

  250. 10:20

    index generation already. And it turns

  251. 10:22

    out they actually do offer something

  252. 10:24

    specifically for regulated industries

  253. 10:27

    like ours that allows you to use their

  254. 10:29

    web index but within your existing VPC

  255. 10:32

    your you know network controls right and

  256. 10:34

    it's called web grounding for

  257. 10:36

    enterprise. It basically works like this

  258. 10:38

    where it's still within the exact same

  259. 10:41

    network boundary where you're probably

  260. 10:43

    running your cloud agents and stuff like

  261. 10:44

    that and offers two core capabilities

  262. 10:48

    search and fetch. Right? So the exact

  263. 10:50

    capabilities we want to mirror, we

  264. 10:53

    leverage that. We have all these

  265. 10:54

    guarantees. There's one tiny downside,

  266. 10:57

    which is the data is obviously not going

  267. 10:59

    to be completely fresh, right? And the

  268. 11:02

    constraints around this last I checked,

  269. 11:05

    it's fresh within 24 hours. And for more

  270. 11:07

    regularly updated websites, it's fresh

  271. 11:09

    within 6 hours. But for most use cases

  272. 11:12

    that you may have for agents, that's

  273. 11:13

    probably more than sufficient and

  274. 11:15

    completely removes this external egress

  275. 11:17

    vulnerability vector.

  276. 11:21

    Now the second question is how do we

  277. 11:23

    actually ensure the agents use web

  278. 11:24

    grounding and again this is very

  279. 11:28

    simple with the existing primitives

  280. 11:29

    right you just need to make sure that

  281. 11:31

    they don't get confused and you

  282. 11:34

    certainly block the access itself but

  283. 11:36

    just for user experience and stuff like

  284. 11:38

    that you need to make sure those tools

  285. 11:40

    themselves that are already existing and

  286. 11:42

    primitive and native to these agent

  287. 11:44

    harnesses and frameworks and such are

  288. 11:47

    actually blocked right again here's

  289. 11:49

    cloud code example. I think every other

  290. 11:50

    hotness has the same thing. Web search,

  291. 11:52

    web fetch. We just deny those tools.

  292. 11:54

    It's like, hey, you can't even use

  293. 11:55

    these. These are not even in your suite

  294. 11:57

    of tools available to you. Instead, we

  295. 12:00

    use the redirection going through, you

  296. 12:02

    know, MCP CLI and actual client code

  297. 12:06

    using the supported paths, uh, skills,

  298. 12:08

    whatever to make sure that whenever

  299. 12:10

    someone does need the capabilities of

  300. 12:12

    web access, it goes through that web

  301. 12:14

    grounding cache index.

  302. 12:21

    So takeaways from this talk basically

  303. 12:24

    make sure you ted your agents right

  304. 12:26

    letting them run around untetered you

  305. 12:28

    know is very dangerous we want to tar

  306. 12:30

    them and it's much safer to do so and in

  307. 12:32

    fact if we go back to that initial slide

  308. 12:34

    of how we consider this relative to the

  309. 12:36

    risk and expected return because of some

  310. 12:40

    of the things we found while doing this

  311. 12:42

    we actually believe we didn't lose

  312. 12:45

    expected value while huge hugely

  313. 12:47

    reducing the risk, right? So, the index

  314. 12:50

    certainly lags, but we get a ton more

  315. 12:52

    observability by just using that tagging

  316. 12:55

    primitive versus the actual uh just pure

  317. 12:59

    identity verification.

  318. 13:03

    And I think this is [sighs and gasps]

  319. 13:06

    one thing people should really consider,

  320. 13:08

    especially people working at companies,

  321. 13:09

    enterprises, which is that there are a

  322. 13:12

    ton of things happening in the Genai

  323. 13:15

    landscape that are probably scary to us

  324. 13:18

    that make your security teams really

  325. 13:20

    afraid that feel like, hey, they are too

  326. 13:23

    far on the frontier, right? You you're

  327. 13:25

    like, I wouldn't run this locally. I

  328. 13:26

    wouldn't run a open cloud agent on my

  329. 13:30

    local machine with full permissions,

  330. 13:32

    right? There's all these horror stories

  331. 13:34

    and you know various anecdotes about why

  332. 13:37

    this is bad. But in an enterprise again

  333. 13:41

    you can figure out how to leverage your

  334. 13:43

    enterprise resources to actually reduce

  335. 13:45

    those risk factors and get the real

  336. 13:47

    value out of the capabilities and this

  337. 13:50

    is where you should be investing that

  338. 13:51

    time.

  339. 13:54

    So what we ultimately shipped is this

  340. 13:57

    entire framework, right? We have the

  341. 13:59

    ability to run cloud agents as user

  342. 14:05

    identities uh because of all of those

  343. 14:07

    guard rails and vectors we put in place

  344. 14:10

    and using different kind of interface

  345. 14:13

    vectors to actually operate with them so

  346. 14:15

    that people who are not comfortable with

  347. 14:17

    CLIs can leverage them but certainly for

  348. 14:18

    other cases as well. And as part of

  349. 14:20

    that, we made sure to ship out just a

  350. 14:22

    managed fleet of cloud, you know,

  351. 14:25

    whatever agents for every single user in

  352. 14:28

    this remote fashion that they can

  353. 14:30

    already interact with so that we can

  354. 14:31

    continue to deploy and improve what is

  355. 14:34

    actually available to individual users.

  356. 14:37

    But also the core capability itself of

  357. 14:39

    being able for every anyone at the

  358. 14:41

    company to deploy an agent that runs in

  359. 14:44

    the cloud remotely with their full

  360. 14:46

    identity is there and is something we

  361. 14:48

    are comfortable with.

  362. 14:51

    So to finish up, uh, everything I talked

  363. 14:54

    about actually happened last year. So if

  364. 14:56

    you are interested at all in wanting to

  365. 14:59

    build and see what we're working on now,

  366. 15:01

    or even better, if you're like, that was

  367. 15:04

    horrible, we could do so much better. We

  368. 15:07

    are hiring and we encourage you to

  369. 15:09

    apply. If you have any experience in any

  370. 15:11

    of these domains,

  371. 15:13

    you can check that QR code, check that

  372. 15:16

    link. Yeah, that's it. Any questions?

  373. 15:20

    [applause]

  374. 15:26

    >> What do you think about local connected

  375. 15:28

    to agents for enterprises?

  376. 15:32

    >> Uh, not the views of my company, but

  377. 15:36

    personally I I think that is

  378. 15:38

    >> question.

  379. 15:39

    >> Yeah, sorry. His question was how do how

  380. 15:40

    do I view local LLMs for enterprise

  381. 15:43

    usage? And I think local in the sense

  382. 15:47

    that we manage ourselves is probably

  383. 15:49

    where we eventually want to go for a lot

  384. 15:51

    of our token use and inference because

  385. 15:54

    of cost because of deprecations because

  386. 15:56

    of you know every time Frontier Lab

  387. 15:59

    drops a new model you see some

  388. 16:00

    degradation. It's just there's too much

  389. 16:03

    volatility in that that we don't need to

  390. 16:06

    risk as the openweight models kind of

  391. 16:08

    become more advanced and sophisticated.

  392. 16:22

    request.

  393. 16:31

    >> Yeah. So as you can see the header is

  394. 16:33

    not purely differentiating in itself.

  395. 16:36

    Someone someone could certainly populate

  396. 16:38

    that, but the actor the identity itself

  397. 16:40

    will not be me, right? So some someone

  398. 16:43

    could I guess write in that they're

  399. 16:46

    using some agent, but the core previous

  400. 16:49

    identity itself is not mimickable, not

  401. 16:52

    like actually interceptable, right? So

  402. 16:54

    we still we have both we have both the

  403. 16:57

    originating identity and that you know

  404. 16:59

    all of your identity ecosystems and

  405. 17:01

    chains to ensure that but also the

  406. 17:03

    header. part of the header.

  407. 17:05

    >> Yeah, that that that is separate. The

  408. 17:06

    header is just XSLm agent and then you

  409. 17:09

    still have some way you you need some

  410. 17:12

    way to actually determine the identity

  411. 17:13

    of who's coming.

  412. 17:26

    Yeah, I you know gen generally all of

  413. 17:29

    our RPC in some way has an initial entry

  414. 17:32

    point that is like

  415. 17:34

    populatable with that header and then

  416. 17:35

    once it actually goes downstream you

  417. 17:37

    know you make sure that same with trace

  418. 17:39

    ids is part of the span internally

  419. 17:41

    within the So

  420. 17:45

    >> can you clarify how the use of Google

  421. 17:48

    index addresses the prompt injection

  422. 17:51

    issue?

  423. 17:52

    >> Yeah. So the core things about this

  424. 17:54

    index is not only is it a cached index,

  425. 17:57

    it is it has a lot of other controls and

  426. 18:00

    safety guarantees around it. It is

  427. 18:01

    specifically made for these curated

  428. 18:04

    financial like um highly regulated

  429. 18:06

    industries. So they themselves are doing

  430. 18:08

    some of their own curation on top of it.

  431. 18:10

    Now certainly I think that creation

  432. 18:12

    could fail. It's probably done using Gen

  433. 18:14

    AI but the prompt injection risk is much

  434. 18:18

    far reduced because everything still

  435. 18:20

    remains internal.

  436. 18:24

    >> Yep.

  437. 18:33

    >> Do you mean how they're being used?

  438. 18:38

    >> Yeah. I I think it's critical um in the

  439. 18:40

    sense that that behavioral data is

  440. 18:42

    something we can further configure based

  441. 18:44

    on right like that we we do try to

  442. 18:48

    ensure that not everyone at the firm can

  443. 18:50

    see what your agents are doing right

  444. 18:52

    like there's stuff certainly work-wise

  445. 18:54

    but also more sensitive information that

  446. 18:56

    might be privileged to you. So your

  447. 18:58

    session data is kind of localized. Now

  448. 19:00

    that behavioral data in the session data

  449. 19:02

    is very powerful because it can define

  450. 19:04

    additional configuration that can be

  451. 19:06

    applied to these agents for the purposes

  452. 19:08

    of making the user experience better. So

  453. 19:10

    we we try to leverage that to figure out

  454. 19:12

    what to configure further not just based

  455. 19:15

    on someone's like hierarchical persona

  456. 19:17

    but actually based on their usage to

  457. 19:19

    make sure that their experience

  458. 19:20

    continues to improve actually based on

  459. 19:22

    what they're doing.

  460. 19:26

    Uh we're almost out of time. me and my

  461. 19:29

    co sorry I'll take the last question

  462. 19:33

    you're saying you have a process for

  463. 19:36

    letting individuals create their own

  464. 19:38

    >> yep

  465. 19:40

    I mean how do you go about like anybody

  466. 19:44

    there

  467. 19:48

    is a process for like agents across the

  468. 19:51

    company

  469. 19:54

    >> yeah uh for building our own agents you

  470. 19:57

    know we we use some of the existing

  471. 19:59

    frameworks for agent building. Obviously

  472. 20:00

    all the genai harnesses are very good at

  473. 20:03

    using those frameworks to build agents.

  474. 20:04

    So you have a lot of agents

  475. 20:05

    proliferating based on that. In terms of

  476. 20:08

    provision, everything is already

  477. 20:09

    provision. All this is every single user

  478. 20:11

    at the firm has all the necessary

  479. 20:13

    infrastructure in place. So that's not

  480. 20:16

    really a worry. They can build an agent,

  481. 20:18

    deploy it as necessary into their

  482. 20:19

    namespace running as their identity. the

  483. 20:21

    the aspect of how do agents then become

  484. 20:24

    like a universal companywide or larger

  485. 20:27

    beyond a individual users uh agent you

  486. 20:31

    know goes through your standard kind of

  487. 20:33

    mechanisms right like hey is there going

  488. 20:35

    to be proper production support is there

  489. 20:37

    the right security it's like any

  490. 20:38

    application you might develop

  491. 20:41

    uh yeah so me and my colleagues will

  492. 20:42

    stick around here if anyone wants to

  493. 20:44

    talk further you know I guess if you're

  494. 20:46

    sticking around I can also take more

  495. 20:48

    questions but thanks for coming to this

  496. 20:51

    >> [applause]