AI Engineer World's Fair 2026
Reverse-Engineering the AI Buyer — Aliisa Rosenthal, Acrew Capital
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Reverse-Engineering the AI Buyer
Aliisa Rosenthal draws on enterprise growth at OpenAI to explain how self-service, automation, pricing and selective human support shape the buying process—and why the first design partners need a different approach.
From a talk by Aliisa Rosenthal
At a glance
Ideas worth remembering
Sequence the work by stage: collaborate closely with initial design partners, establish some product-market fit, then automate the repeatable sales process and hire people at demonstrated bottlenecks.
Use self-service demand to discover what an enterprise tier should add. Building for the loudest large customers first can create an expensive offering that later competes with a more accessible version.
Preserve buyer momentum through timely acknowledgments, assisted integrations and accessible security documentation. Each removes a different source of waiting in the purchase process.
Limit pilots that commit sales and engineering services. Ordinary self-service trials can remain available with consumption, time or feature limits; larger evaluations can use references, narrow data tests or contractual opt-outs.
A lower base fee plus usage can broaden adoption, but buyers need controls for variable costs. Rosenthal's account supports the adoption mechanism without quantifying the resulting revenue or profitability change.
Human work remains valuable where it builds trust, explains buyer outcomes or makes an integration succeed. Balance those benefits against enterprise resource demands and the cost of specialized staff.
Build the sales process before staffing it
Aliisa Rosenthal begins with the distance OpenAI traveled during her time there. When she joined, she says, revenue was a couple of million dollars, and developers could start building through a self-service API by entering a credit card. Over the following years, she helped grow the organization to several hundred people and enterprise revenue to several billion dollars. That experience informs her central question: which parts of bringing AI into organizations actually require people?
The conventional sequence is to hire salespeople, revenue operations staff and sales engineers, then add automation wherever the growing organization encounters bottlenecks. Rosenthal reverses that sequence. Start by automating the work that tools can handle, observe where the process breaks, and hire people to resolve those specific failures. The hiring plan then follows demonstrated needs instead of reproducing a large sales organization by default.
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How enterprise demand distorted the launch sequence
When ChatGPT launched at the end of 2022, organizations immediately wanted practical purchasing and administration features: single sign-on, a nondisclosure agreement and an invoice. Rosenthal had none to offer. She describes spending nine months asking for an enterprise version before receiving approval. During that interval, the largest enterprises were the companies most able to reach her, so their demands became the strongest input into the product.
The resulting offering went aggressively upmarket: many features, very fast performance and a high price. Rosenthal says it performed well, but that success concealed demand for a simpler purchase. OpenAI introduced a self-service offering in January 2024, about four months after the enterprise version. In her account, it grew much faster, particularly among small and midsize businesses, and cannibalized enterprise sales. Some customers preferred the cheaper option and wanted to avoid a salesperson, leaving representatives competing with their own company's self-service funnel.
Her preferred sequence makes self-service a way to learn what an enterprise product should contain. Launch the accessible version first, discover what customers cannot accomplish with it, build a more expensive offering around those gaps, and then hire the team needed to sell it. Rosenthal says that lesson shaped subsequent OpenAI product launches: start with self-service and add people where experience reveals a need.
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Capture demand and acknowledge it
Rosenthal describes an extreme capacity mismatch: she and four sales representatives were receiving roughly 10,000 inbound inquiries a day. OpenAI used Clay, which she found useful, but catching up with automation exposed an earlier omission. The signup process had collected too little information for effective follow-up. She recommends more detailed sales forms, with optional fields such as phone number, so willing prospects can provide information the team may need later.
An acknowledgment also matters before the product is ready. An automated email could explain that enterprise features are still being built, confirm a place on the waitlist and ask what the company needs. Rosenthal regrets leaving that communication undone. When the enterprise offering finally launched nine months later, she recalls almost every company she approached saying it had received no response and had bought Microsoft Copilot. Her lesson is that demand can disappear while a vendor is still preparing to serve it.
For outbound, she identifies research, sequencing and dialing as work to automate so representatives can concentrate on qualified leads and valuable conversations. She mentions Clay again and says she has heard positive reports about Nooks; that is a different level of endorsement from her direct experience using Clay at OpenAI.
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Help buyers complete the next step
Rosenthal's strongest operational advice is to make buying easy. Sending a prospect away to complete a form, integrate a product or consult another person leaves progress dependent on the prospect returning. The seller loses control of the timing, and the cycle stretches. Instead, do as much of the work alongside the buyer as possible: run an in-person hackathon, visit the office or complete the integration together over Zoom.
The same principle applies to commercial administration. Offer fewer pricing choices, make paperwork quick to complete and keep approval flows manageable. Investing in self-service up front removes steps that would otherwise consume both buyer attention and sales capacity.
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Avoid selling the same deal twice
Pilots can create two sales processes around one purchase. First, the vendor sells the pilot and invests heavily in supporting it. Even if the evaluation succeeds, the team may then have to begin another sales process to secure the actual contract. Rosenthal therefore reserves pilots for the largest, highest-paying opportunities, where the potential revenue can justify the work, rather than making them the standard entry point.
A request for a proof of concept usually contains a concrete concern: will the product work in the customer's environment and meet its needs? Rosenthal suggests addressing that concern with a narrower intervention. Introduce another customer for a reference, evaluate a portion of the buyer's data, or demonstrate the product with custom data over Zoom. These approaches provide evidence without immediately handing over access and committing the team to an extended evaluation.
Contract structure offers another route. A startup can propose a signed agreement with 90 days to opt out if the product fails to meet the customer's needs. That changes the default: the customer must validate the product before the opt-out window closes, giving the evaluation a deadline. She also suggests offering a one-year proof of concept against a normal three-year contract. These are negotiating options for reducing an open-ended pilot commitment; she explicitly presents the opt-out approach as more feasible for a startup than a giant company.
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Make routine security review self-service
Security review is another place where Rosenthal sees deals stall. A trust portal can let a prospective customer sign an NDA and retrieve penetration-test reports and security documentation without waiting for a meeting. AI tools can also fill out security questionnaires. The mechanism is to make routine information available when the buyer needs it, reducing repeated coordination around the same materials.
She recommends pushing back when a company immediately requests a two-hour security call. Direct it to the portal first, then ask which questions the materials did not answer and why a conversation is necessary. Human support remains available for unresolved issues, while standard document requests no longer determine the meeting schedule.
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Lower the entry price, then manage usage risk
Rosenthal reports that ChatGPT Enterprise initially cost $60 per user per month. With little market guidance, OpenAI priced largely around its cost to serve the product. She says lower-priced offerings from Copilot, Gemini and Anthropic subsequently made the price look too high. The consequence was a limit on deployment: buyers would purchase for a subset of employees, such as developers or investors, rather than the whole company.
The revised model combined a lower base license fee with usage charges. Rosenthal says that lowering the initial commitment brought in more companies and contracts, broadened access within organizations and allowed usage to grow over time. Her account describes an adoption mechanism rather than a quantified pricing experiment: an expensive seat requires a buyer to decide in advance who deserves access, while a lower entry fee makes broader deployment easier.
Usage pricing introduces its own objection: costs can rise unpredictably. Rosenthal proposes a dashboard with monthly spending caps and limits for individual employees. She says companies often value knowing those controls exist even when they do not use them. The aim is to preserve easy access while giving buyers a way to contain exposure. Her argument assumes that greater usage ideally reflects greater value; usage alone does not establish that value.
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Hire for trust and choose enterprise customers carefully
The signal to hire a salesperson is repeated demand for something the existing process cannot provide: a conversation, a demo or the confidence of meeting a person. Rosenthal expects this to become more common as a company moves upmarket. But she warns against letting a prospective million-dollar or $10 million customer redirect the whole business. Large accounts can consume legal, security, product, engineering and sales capacity, so the first enterprise relationships require careful selection.
She recommends hiring sellers who use AI themselves, understand it and can credibly explain its value. They should work efficiently with the same technology they sell and fit the organization's culture. Their role also includes creating personal contact: as outbound, demos and security checklists become automated, she sees more appetite for conversations at conferences, booths and dinners with customers and prospects.
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Pay for performance and sell the buyer's outcome
OpenAI went a long way without sales commission plans, Rosenthal says, partly because she kept postponing their introduction. She cautions against treating that history as a general model. Equity packages and the company's increasing value made the arrangement unusually workable; most companies will struggle to recruit strong enterprise sellers without variable compensation. Her expectation that OpenAI was about to introduce commissions is presented as an expectation, not a completed change.
The first two or three sales hires may be different. They may join to build the company, contribute broadly and participate through equity, making commission less central to their decision. Later hiring is more likely to include enterprise sellers strongly motivated by cash compensation. Rosenthal's guidance is to keep the eventual compensation plan simple while preserving upside for people who outperform.
She closes the presentation with the purpose of those human conversations: explain what the product does for the buyer or internal champion. Value selling connects the tool to an outcome that matters to the person choosing it. Rosenthal believes humans still have an advantage at this work and that AI has further to go, which helps explain her continuing emphasis on relationships before opening the discussion to questions.
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Self-service access is different from a staffed pilot
The first audience question identifies a tension: if customers should start through self-service, why discourage pilots, especially when users need help to succeed? Rosenthal clarifies that her warning concerns a contracted evaluation period with dedicated services, support and supervision from a salesperson or sales engineer. That commitment is materially different from people arriving and using the product through a product-led growth funnel.
Self-service access can still have boundaries. Consumption limits, time limits and feature gates are all valid ways to let users experience the product while controlling what they receive. The distinction is therefore the resources committed to the evaluation, rather than simply whether someone can try the software before making a larger purchase.
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Forward deployed engineers trade cost for deeper integration
Asked where forward deployed engineers fit into sales, Rosenthal describes a tradeoff. Ideally, a product would work without that intervention; she hopes continual learning might eventually help models understand an organization's internal context more readily. For now, she considers these engineers expensive and difficult to hire. She gives an explicitly approximate estimate of 55,000 job openings against about 5,000 people who know how to do the job, using it to illustrate scarcity rather than presenting a documented labor-market count.
The benefit is retention through a tailored integration. When someone helps embed the product into a customer's work, the customer receives a tool that feels customized to its organization and becomes less likely to leave. Rosenthal would prefer a product that succeeds without scarce engineering support, but she sees substantial returns from good forward deployed engineers when their work creates a durable customer relationship.
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The first ten customers need a different approach
The final question asks whether a startup should use automated outbound through a tool such as Clay to find its first ten customers. Rosenthal says those customers are a different category: they are design partners who need much more direct support. Her automation advice applies after those initial relationships, when the company has some product-market fit and is beginning to scale.
Choose those partners carefully. They gain a scarce opportunity to influence the product, while the startup needs useful feedback and a cooperative relationship. A suitable partner understands the product's actual maturity, including the limits of its enterprise features. That shared understanding makes early experiments possible without expecting a finished enterprise offering.
One tactic is to work with a recognizable company on an internal product or another application outside its main production system. Rosenthal suggests that such a project can give the customer more room to accept risk and may let it bypass some security processes. The startup gains a recognizable customer reference and a possible path to a larger agreement. The scope matters: the opportunity comes from a less critical initial project, not from assuming the customer will immediately accept the product in its core production environment.
Her last qualification concerns where these relationships come from. Previous customers or colleagues, investor introductions and friends at companies are preferable starting points because the early work should be friendly and experimental. The first customers help the startup learn what to build through close collaboration; scaling that acquisition process comes later.
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Read the complete timestamped transcript
- 0:01
[music]
- 0:13
>> Hi everyone. My name is Alyssa and I
- 0:16
joined a little research lab called
- 0:18
OpenAI a little over four years ago.
- 0:21
When I joined it was
- 0:23
you know a couple million in revenue. We
- 0:25
had a self-serve API. We had some
- 0:27
developers who found it and swiped a
- 0:29
credit card and started building.
- 0:33
Over the next few years I helped grow
- 0:34
the organization to several hundred
- 0:36
people, grow our revenue to several
- 0:38
billion on the enterprise side and and
- 0:39
launched multiple products. So I really
- 0:41
had the opportunity to be at the
- 0:43
bleeding edge of bringing this somewhat
- 0:45
alien technology to organizations from
- 0:48
startups to massive enterprises and I'm
- 0:50
going to share a little bit about what I
- 0:52
learned along the way.
- 0:55
So I think most organizations typically
- 0:58
have said okay, I'm ready to build out
- 0:59
my go-to-market organization. I'm going
- 1:01
to hire a bunch of sales people. I'm
- 1:02
going to hire RevOps. I'm going to hire
- 1:04
sales engineers and I'm going to build
- 1:06
out my sales organization and then I'm
- 1:08
going to figure out where the
- 1:10
bottlenecks are and I'm going to add AI
- 1:12
or I'm going to add automation to figure
- 1:13
out how to scale this thing.
- 1:15
My current advice to founders is do the
- 1:17
opposite. So start with what you can
- 1:19
automate. Start with there's so many
- 1:21
tools available now in 2026 for a modern
- 1:24
go-to-market or sales organization that
- 1:26
have never been available before which
- 1:28
really turns the entire playbook on its
- 1:30
head. And you'll find that a lot of
- 1:31
traditional sales leaders are very used
- 1:33
to coming in and hiring a really big
- 1:35
team and augmenting everything with
- 1:37
humans, bringing in sales operations,
- 1:40
sales engineers, lots of sales people,
- 1:42
BDRs, SDRs. You can do so much of this
- 1:45
through an automated approach now. So my
- 1:47
my advice to founders is build the
- 1:49
machine first before you build the team.
- 1:52
Figure out what you can automate. Figure
- 1:54
out where the bottlenecks are and what's
- 1:55
broken and then add humans on top of
- 1:57
that to get through those bottlenecks.
- 2:00
So, just a story about how this played
- 2:02
out at OpenAI. So, we launched ChatGPT
- 2:05
in the end of 2022. When we launched it,
- 2:07
we had no enterprise features
- 2:09
whatsoever. And I got bombarded with
- 2:10
organizations saying, "Hey, everyone in
- 2:12
my company is using ChatGPT. Can I get
- 2:14
SSO? Can I get an NDA? Can I get an
- 2:16
invoice?" I had none of these things. I
- 2:18
had no enterprise features whatsoever.
- 2:21
Uh so, over the next few months, I
- 2:22
begged and begged and begged our
- 2:24
technical team, "Can we build an
- 2:25
enterprise version of this product and
- 2:27
we build some enterprise features?" And
- 2:29
finally, 9 months later, we got
- 2:30
approval. Now, over that 9-month time,
- 2:33
the companies that had been the loudest,
- 2:34
the companies that had gotten to me,
- 2:36
were the bigger companies, were the
- 2:37
large enterprises. So, I thought, "Okay,
- 2:39
we should go out and build a really
- 2:41
high-end product for all these
- 2:43
enterprises that want to use us." So, we
- 2:45
added every bell and whistle. We made it
- 2:47
lightning fast. It was a very expensive
- 2:49
product that we shipped. We went up
- 2:51
market. We went way up market right out
- 2:53
the gate. And, you know, we did fine. We
- 2:56
We did pretty well. Um, you know, and
- 2:58
and I think for most companies we did
- 2:59
great. Uh but after about a quarter, we
- 3:02
said, "Well, we should probably also
- 3:03
offer a self-serve version. Not everyone
- 3:06
wants to opt into this heavy sales
- 3:07
process and start with these really high
- 3:09
price points." So, then we released our
- 3:11
self-serve motion in January of 2024, so
- 3:15
about
- 3:16
4 months after our enterprise version,
- 3:18
and it just completely cannibalized our
- 3:20
enterprise business. Uh it grew so much
- 3:22
faster. It turns out most people just
- 3:24
didn't want to talk to a salesperson,
- 3:26
and our mid-market SMB sort of
- 3:28
self-serve business was much higher
- 3:30
growth than our and then our heavy
- 3:31
enterprise business. So, it frustrated
- 3:33
the sales reps cuz now they had to
- 3:34
compete with self-serve. It sort of
- 3:35
cannibalized the customer base. They
- 3:37
sometimes they preferred to just
- 3:40
move into the cheaper self-serve option.
- 3:42
And so, that was a really valuable
- 3:44
lesson. We should have launched with
- 3:45
self-serve first, listen to feedback
- 3:48
from our customers and what we they
- 3:49
weren't getting from the self-serve
- 3:51
product, and then figured out how to add
- 3:53
build a more expensive enterprise
- 3:54
offering, and then hire the team to sell
- 3:57
it. So, we did it all backwards. Was a
- 3:58
really really valuable learning
- 4:00
experience, and from there we decided
- 4:02
not to do that again. For every other
- 4:03
product we launched at OpenAI, we made
- 4:05
sure to to do it self-serve first, learn
- 4:07
where we needed to tack on humans and
- 4:09
add them.
- 4:12
Uh the other thing I'll mention, and uh
- 4:14
you know, uh if Everett's still here,
- 4:16
nice uh shout-out to him. We used Clay
- 4:18
at OpenAI, and it was really really
- 4:20
useful for us. So, in the beginning, we
- 4:22
were just completely overwhelmed with
- 4:24
inbound, which I know sounds like such a
- 4:26
champagne problem, but it was me and
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four sales sales reps, and we were
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getting, you know, 10,000 inbound a day.
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I mean, it was just the most staggering
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problem to deal with this tidal wave of
- 4:35
inbound. And, you know, if I could go
- 4:37
back in time, there's so much I would
- 4:38
have done differently. I would have,
- 4:40
first of all, added way more fields to
- 4:42
our sign-up form, like phone number,
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because eventually when we did catch up
- 4:46
and we built all the automation and we
- 4:47
figured out how to handle these leads, I
- 4:49
didn't have a lot of information to go
- 4:50
follow up with people. So, add a very
- 4:53
in-depth sales form. It can be optional,
- 4:55
but if people are willing to give you
- 4:56
their phone number, you should get it,
- 4:58
cuz at some point you might want to call
- 4:59
them or have AI call them. Um so, gather
- 5:01
as much info as you can. Try to respond
- 5:04
to everyone, and I I you know, I wish I
- 5:06
would have done this, at least just sent
- 5:07
some email out saying, "Hey, we hear
- 5:09
you. We don't have our enterprise
- 5:10
product ready yet. You're on our
- 5:12
waitlist. You're on our list. Tell us
- 5:14
XYZ about what you're looking for." Just
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some sort of automated email campaign to
- 5:18
make them feel like we cared. Because
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when we finally did launch our
- 5:21
enterprise product 9 months later,
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almost every company went out and talked
- 5:24
to you said, "Well, you never got back
- 5:25
to me." And I went out and I brought
- 5:26
Microsoft Copilot. Um so, that was a
- 5:29
that was a really hard lesson.
- 5:31
Um and then similarly on outbound, uh
- 5:33
you know, there's lots of great tools
- 5:35
out there now. Clay is one of them. I
- 5:36
hear really great things about Nooks. Uh
- 5:38
there are really wonderful tools to
- 5:40
start researching, sequencing, dialing,
- 5:42
and automate as much as the outbound
- 5:44
pipeline gen as you can, so your reps
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can focus on the qualified leads and the
- 5:48
high value conversations.
- 5:52
So, this is my biggest advice to any
- 5:54
company starting to build their
- 5:56
go-to-market motion is just make it easy
- 5:58
on your buyers.
- 5:59
Uh don't give them homework. Don't make
- 6:01
them go and fill out a form or if you
- 6:04
can avoid it, integrate something
- 6:06
without you hand-holding them through
- 6:07
that. Never say, "Hey, go do these five
- 6:09
things and then come back to me." or "Go
- 6:11
ask this person about this and come back
- 6:12
to me." You do as much of the work for
- 6:14
them. You hand-hold them through that.
- 6:15
Maybe that means you have to set up
- 6:17
hackathons and come in their office and
- 6:19
do it with them in person. Um maybe that
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means you have to set up some sort of
- 6:23
Zoom session and do it live with them.
- 6:25
But, whatever you do, don't send your
- 6:26
buyer away to do something and wait for
- 6:27
them to come back because you lose total
- 6:29
control of the sales cycle and it makes
- 6:31
everything take longer.
- 6:33
Secondly, remove as much friction as you
- 6:34
can in the buying process. Fewer options
- 6:37
is better on pricing. Make the paperwork
- 6:39
easy and fast. Make the approval flow as
- 6:42
manageable as possible. We've already
- 6:44
talked about investing in self-service,
- 6:45
doing that up front before you add on
- 6:47
humans. And the other thing I'll hammer
- 6:48
home is to avoid pilots at all cost. Um
- 6:51
and this is something that comes up when
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I talk to founders a lot is they say,
- 6:54
"We are stuck in pilot hell. We've got
- 6:57
all of these pilots going on. None of
- 6:59
them are converting. They're so much
- 7:00
work." Or if they do convert, it just I
- 7:02
have to run an entire sales process all
- 7:04
over again. I sell the pilot. I invest
- 7:06
really heavily in managing the pilot.
- 7:09
And then I have to start all over again
- 7:10
from scratch once the pilot I get a yes
- 7:12
to move forward on the sales cycle. So,
- 7:14
use pilots sparingly. They should be not
- 7:17
the default, but the option for your
- 7:19
most valuable,
- 7:21
uh highest paying, biggest revenue
- 7:23
opportunities. Now, how do you get out
- 7:25
of a pilot? Because every customer will
- 7:27
ask you for one. They'll say, "I need to
- 7:28
try this out. I need a POC. It's part of
- 7:30
our process. I need to validate this
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works in my environment. It meets my
- 7:35
needs. We have, you know, all of these
- 7:37
things we need to validate and check
- 7:38
on." Just remember, as soon as you give
- 7:40
someone access to your product, you're
- 7:41
giving away a lot of power and leverage
- 7:43
in the deal cycle. So, there's lots of
- 7:45
ways to get around these objections
- 7:47
without a pilot. You can introduce them
- 7:49
to another customer. You can do an eval
- 7:51
on on part of their data. You can do a
- 7:53
demo with their custom data and you do
- 7:55
it over Zoom rather than handing them
- 7:56
access to it. You can give them an
- 7:58
opt-out clause. It's not something you
- 7:59
do when you're a giant company, but when
- 8:01
you're a startup, you can get away with
- 8:02
these things. So, sign a contract, you
- 8:04
have 90 days to opt out if it doesn't
- 8:05
meet your needs, and that shifts the
- 8:07
onus of trying out the product and
- 8:09
validating it uh onto them cuz the the
- 8:12
clock is ticking on them now. Uh so, it
- 8:14
gives you a lot more control over the
- 8:15
deal. And then another one I like to do
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is I say, "Well, our normal uh contracts
- 8:19
are 3 years, but we'll do a 1-year POC
- 8:20
with you." So, there's all kinds of ways
- 8:22
to sort of negotiate your way around a
- 8:24
POC without putting tons of resources
- 8:27
and getting stuck in them.
- 8:30
The other thing is security. Security is
- 8:32
where deals tend to stall out and die
- 8:33
over time. Uh there's a lot you can
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automate now. There's so many wonderful
- 8:36
tools on the market to build these trust
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portals where, you know, companies can
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come in and they can auto sign an NDA.
- 8:43
They can self-serve for your pen test
- 8:45
and security documentation. There's AI
- 8:47
products that can auto fill out your
- 8:49
security questionnaires. So, automate a
- 8:51
as much as the security as you can, and
- 8:53
most companies will tell you, "Oh, I
- 8:54
need to get on a call. I need to talk
- 8:56
for 2 hours." Push back on that. You
- 8:58
know, push them towards your trust
- 8:59
portal and then make them come to you
- 9:01
and say, "Here, you know, here's what I
- 9:03
couldn't find. Here's what wasn't
- 9:04
available. Here's why I need a call."
- 9:06
And try to automate security because a
- 9:07
lot of it really can be automated now,
- 9:09
which is really really uh speeds up the
- 9:11
sales cycle.
- 9:16
Um so, another thing we learned, another
- 9:17
expensive story, and this goes back to
- 9:19
sort of building the Porsche before the
- 9:21
Prius, is we built this this really
- 9:23
high-end product, this enterprise
- 9:25
product, and we set the price really
- 9:27
high. We set it initially ChatGPT
- 9:29
Enterprise was $60 per user per month.
- 9:31
Now, we were really the first ones on
- 9:33
the market, and we didn't know what
- 9:34
pricing was going going
- 9:35
Uh so, we we basically priced it
- 9:37
according to how expensive it was for us
- 9:39
to serve it. And then all the other
- 9:40
products came out on the market, Copilot
- 9:42
and Gemini and Anthropic at a much lower
- 9:44
price point. And we realized we had set
- 9:46
the price too high.
- 9:48
So, we eventually went and we did lower
- 9:50
the price. And what we did, we changed
- 9:52
the model to basically a license fee a
- 9:55
bare fee to use the product and then
- 9:56
move to usage base. And then we just saw
- 9:59
a the barrier to entry went down. So, we
- 10:00
had so many more companies signing
- 10:02
licenses and signing contracts with us.
- 10:04
And then usage went up over time as more
- 10:06
as we started the barrier to entry went
- 10:08
down. Because when it was $60 per month,
- 10:10
organizations would come in and say,
- 10:11
well, I'm only buying this for a subset
- 10:13
of my team or only for my developers or
- 10:16
only for my investors. I'm not going to
- 10:18
buy buy it for my whole company. It's
- 10:19
too expensive. But once we lowered the
- 10:21
threshold, it spread like wildfire.
- 10:23
Everyone started using it and it was a
- 10:25
much better pricing model that we
- 10:26
learned the hard way. I know over time
- 10:28
now seats are out. This this has become
- 10:30
common knowledge. We learned it the hard
- 10:31
way. And I also know that now usage is
- 10:34
also getting pushed back as company push
- 10:35
back on as companies are seeing cost of
- 10:38
usage skyrocket. There's easy ways
- 10:40
around this. So, you could for example,
- 10:41
cap. You can say, hey, we have a
- 10:43
dashboard. You can cap your spend per
- 10:44
month. Most companies don't end up using
- 10:46
that, but they like to know that it's
- 10:47
there. You can cap certain employees
- 10:49
spend. But people like the idea that
- 10:51
it's a low barrier to entry. People can
- 10:53
use it. If they're using it, ideally
- 10:54
they're getting value out of it. And
- 10:56
then there's ways to handle the
- 10:57
objections of what if the cost spirals
- 10:59
out of control.
- 11:02
All right. So, we've talked about
- 11:03
building the machine. When do you hire
- 11:05
the humans? When do you start bringing
- 11:06
on sales people? Sales people are
- 11:08
expensive.
- 11:09
You know, they're that's a big hire.
- 11:11
They're they're you know, how do you
- 11:12
know when the time is right? It's
- 11:13
basically when you're starting to hit
- 11:15
you've gone as far as you can in your
- 11:17
sales process and you're really having a
- 11:20
lot of companies saying, I just need to
- 11:21
talk to somebody whether it's I need a
- 11:23
demo. I just need to look someone in the
- 11:25
eye and build the trust here. And you're
- 11:27
going to have that as you start to move
- 11:29
up market naturally. Bigger companies
- 11:30
are going to want to look shake the
- 11:32
hands of a human and have a conversation
- 11:34
with them. On that note, I will say
- 11:36
avoid the pull-up market as long as you
- 11:38
can resist it because once you get a big
- 11:40
customer, they'll come and they'll say,
- 11:41
"I can spend a million dollars, 10
- 11:43
million dollars with you." And it's very
- 11:44
tempting to want orient your whole
- 11:46
business around that. They will take so
- 11:48
many of your resources. As soon as you
- 11:49
have this enterprise customer, they will
- 11:51
take so many of your legal, security,
- 11:53
product, engineering, sales resources.
- 11:56
So, you want to be really, really picky
- 11:57
about who those first big enterprise
- 11:59
partners are. Eventually, you're going
- 12:01
to need, most likely, not everyone, but
- 12:03
eventually you most likely are going to
- 12:04
need some humans to help have these
- 12:06
conversations.
- 12:08
So, who do you hire? You hire someone
- 12:09
who is AI native, who really gets AI,
- 12:12
who lives it, who can authentically sell
- 12:14
it because they're really bought into
- 12:15
it. This is not a reseller right now,
- 12:17
but this is more and more becoming the
- 12:18
norm with sellers, with account
- 12:19
executives. Uh you want them to practice
- 12:21
what they preach, you want them to be
- 12:22
efficient, you want them to be bought
- 12:24
into the culture of your organization.
- 12:26
Why do you need them? I'm calling this
- 12:28
the revenge of the steak dinner. As more
- 12:30
and more of this becomes automated, as
- 12:32
you have the automated outbound, the
- 12:33
automated demo, the automated security
- 12:35
checklist, more and more companies are
- 12:37
craving in-person times with humans. So,
- 12:39
conferences, conference booths work
- 12:41
really well, dinners work really well.
- 12:43
And they're, by the way, not that
- 12:44
expensive to set up a dinner with some
- 12:46
buyers, some customers, some prospects.
- 12:47
It's a very effective tool, and you do
- 12:50
still at this at this moment in time
- 12:52
need humans to run those dinners.
- 12:55
Uh so, let's talk a little bit about
- 12:56
hiring sales people and how you pay
- 12:58
them. Um this comes up a lot at OpenAI.
- 13:00
We were notorious because we still have
- 13:01
not given out comp plans. Um it was not
- 13:05
necessarily my intention to wait this
- 13:07
long. I just kind of kept kicking the
- 13:08
can down the road and saying,
- 13:09
"Eventually, I'll pay commission." And
- 13:11
then we just the team got bigger and it
- 13:12
got harder and harder. I do think OpenAI
- 13:14
is finally about to put in commission.
- 13:16
Uh but we we made a we made it really
- 13:18
far without any comp plans. I would not
- 13:20
necessarily say that is the right path
- 13:21
for every company to follow. I think
- 13:23
OpenAI could get away with that because
- 13:24
of the equity packages and the way the
- 13:25
company was increasing in value, but in
- 13:27
general, it's really hard to hire the
- 13:29
best enterprise sellers in the market if
- 13:31
you don't pay a variable. That said, you
- 13:33
can get away with it for your first few
- 13:35
hires. Those first few sales hires are
- 13:37
usually wired a little bit differently.
- 13:38
They're there to build the company.
- 13:40
They're there for the equity. They want
- 13:41
to roll up their sleeves. They want to
- 13:42
contribute. They're not necessarily as
- 13:44
motivated just by commission and by a
- 13:45
W-2. So, you can get away with it really
- 13:47
for the first two or three sales hires.
- 13:49
Eventually, you're going to want to hire
- 13:52
kind of more coin-operated enterprise
- 13:54
sellers. They're very motivated by the
- 13:56
cash compensation, and so eventually
- 13:58
you'll need to put in a comp plan. So,
- 14:00
just I get this question a lot, so I
- 14:02
just wanted to put it out there on how
- 14:03
to think about building out comp plans.
- 14:05
Simpler is better, but have upside for
- 14:08
out-performers.
- 14:10
Um so, I love this slide. I saw this
- 14:12
early in my career in sales, and I just
- 14:14
think it's um it's a really great
- 14:17
reminder of what you're actually
- 14:18
selling. You're not selling your tool.
- 14:21
You're not selling your product. You're
- 14:23
selling what that tool or that product
- 14:25
does to your champion or your buyer. And
- 14:27
this is where I do think humans are
- 14:29
still very helpful. They're very good at
- 14:32
value selling, and I think AI does still
- 14:34
have some ways to go on value selling.
- 14:36
So, until we totally crack that, I do
- 14:37
think we're going to need those steak
- 14:38
dinners, and we're going to need those
- 14:39
humans to sell value.
- 14:42
All right. So, that's me. You can grab a
- 14:43
one-pager of this with that QR code. Um
- 14:46
also really easy to find on LinkedIn.
- 14:48
I'm the only one with my crazy spelling
- 14:49
of a name with A L I I S A. Feel free to
- 14:52
reach out if you have questions, and it
- 14:53
looks like I have a couple minutes for
- 14:55
Q&A here.
- 14:55
>> Okay. How First question right here.
- 14:58
>> Yeah, I uh
- 15:00
Can you hear me?
- 15:00
>> I can.
- 15:01
>> Okay. Yeah, I was just curious about um
- 15:03
you talked about the POCs and pilots
- 15:06
should be the exception, but then
- 15:08
there's also the self-serve first
- 15:09
motion. How do you reconcile that?
- 15:11
Because
- 15:12
you know, the POC or pilot then becomes
- 15:14
just do they get help when they go off
- 15:16
and do self-serve?
- 15:17
And they need your help to be
- 15:18
successful.
- 15:19
>> Great question. I am sort of thinking of
- 15:21
PLG, so people coming and self-serving
- 15:23
and just using your product is very
- 15:24
different from a POC, which is usually a
- 15:28
contracted period of time where they
- 15:30
have access to your product and they
- 15:31
have support and resources from your
- 15:33
team and you're giving them sort of
- 15:34
services and support along the way. So,
- 15:36
you're right. That is access like
- 15:38
self-serve access to your product is
- 15:40
totally fine and great and you can stage
- 15:43
gate that or limit that with
- 15:45
um consumption,
- 15:47
uh time box it, um or um
- 15:51
uh feature gate it and those are all
- 15:53
really valid ways to have people sort of
- 15:55
build a natural PLG funnel into your
- 15:56
product. When I talk about POCs, I'm I'm
- 15:59
specifically referring to more handheld
- 16:00
services uh oriented POCs that require a
- 16:03
sales engineer or salesperson to sort of
- 16:06
supervise.
- 16:08
>> Hey Alyssa Roy. Um
- 16:10
quick question on forward deployed
- 16:12
engineers. How do you think about them
- 16:14
fitting into the sales cycle?
- 16:17
>> Yeah. I mean, in an ideal world, we
- 16:18
wouldn't need them. Uh eventually,
- 16:20
hopefully we get continual learning and
- 16:21
these models can just figure out the
- 16:22
inner organization and how to just
- 16:24
immediately become smart. Uh I do think
- 16:27
for now, the thing with a forward
- 16:28
deployed engineer is on the one hand,
- 16:30
they're expensive, they're hard to hire.
- 16:32
I think there's something like 55,000
- 16:33
job wrecks for forward deployed
- 16:34
engineers right now and about 5,000
- 16:36
people who know how to do that job. So,
- 16:38
they're hard to hire. If they're you
- 16:39
know, they're you're getting more and
- 16:40
more of them available.
- 16:42
The positive is they make the product
- 16:44
really sticky cuz once you've invested
- 16:46
in that sort of services element of
- 16:48
we're going to have someone come and
- 16:49
help you uh integrate the product, your
- 16:53
customer is unlikely to go anywhere soon
- 16:54
because they feel like they've got a
- 16:55
customized tool that works uniquely for
- 16:57
them. So, I would say obviously the in
- 16:59
an ideal world, your product works
- 17:01
without the forward deployed engineering
- 17:03
uh cuz they are very hard to get right
- 17:04
now, but the the positive is then you
- 17:06
have a you have a sticky customer who's
- 17:08
with you for a long time. So, if you can
- 17:10
if you can find good forward deployed
- 17:11
engineers, they they certainly do pay
- 17:13
dividends.
- 17:17
>> Hi Alyssa. Um
- 17:19
for startup working on like their first
- 17:21
10 customers, would you go like the clay
- 17:24
route or would you do something else?
- 17:27
>> Uh I'm sorry, when you say the clay
- 17:28
route, what do you mean specifically?
- 17:29
>> Like using something like clay for
- 17:31
automated outbound.
- 17:32
>> Got it. No, your first 10 customers are
- 17:34
going to be different. Um they're going
- 17:35
to be really more design partners. Um
- 17:37
and they're going to need to be much
- 17:38
more handheld. So, I I'm talking a
- 17:40
little bit more when you're beyond the
- 17:41
first sort of design partners and you
- 17:43
have some product market fit and you're
- 17:44
starting to scale the organization. For
- 17:46
those first partners, you want to be
- 17:48
very particular and picky about who you
- 17:49
choose. On the one hand, it's it's sort
- 17:51
of a gift to a company to let them be
- 17:53
your design partner. There's exclusivity
- 17:54
to it, there's scarcity to it. They
- 17:56
really help give you a lot of feedback
- 17:57
on your product, but you want someone
- 17:58
who's going to work well with you, who's
- 18:00
going to understand this is
- 18:01
realistically where my product is. This
- 18:03
is where my enterprise features are. Um
- 18:05
so, you want to be thoughtful about who
- 18:07
those first few customers are. One
- 18:09
tactic I love to do on the design
- 18:10
partner side is go to a company that has
- 18:12
a great logo, but work on like their
- 18:14
internal product or some sort of product
- 18:16
that's not their main production, so
- 18:18
that they're willing to take a little
- 18:19
bit more risks with you and bypass some
- 18:21
security processes, but then you get the
- 18:23
logo on your site and you can go to
- 18:24
companies and say, "Hey, I work with
- 18:25
this company." And it opens the door to
- 18:27
potentially sign a bigger agreement with
- 18:28
that company over time.
- 18:31
And I think we're at time here. Sorry.
- 18:35
Ideally, they're relationships you
- 18:37
already have, either companies you've
- 18:38
worked with or your investors are
- 18:39
introducing you or they're you know,
- 18:41
friends at at companies cuz you want
- 18:43
these to be very friendly uh uh
- 18:46
uh processes and experiments in the
- 18:48
beginning.
- 18:49
Great. All right. Thank you.
- 19:08
>> [music]