Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google

Read the talk

Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Designing Database Tools for Production Agents

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 361 seconds
Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Designing Database Tools for Production Agents

Averi Kitsch and Prerna Kakkar explain why flexible developer tools need human supervision, then show how fixed SQL, restricted database access and trusted identity parameters narrow what a production agent can do.

From a talk by Averi Kitsch and Prerna Kakkar

At a glance

Ideas worth remembering

  • Flexible administrative and NL2SQL tools serve human-supervised development. Production tools should expose predefined business operations, with fixed SQL and configured parameters.

  • A confused deputy can use legitimate database privileges for an unauthorized request. The triage example shows malicious ticket content directing salary retrieval and publication back to the requester.

  • Tool hardening removes different kinds of authority in layers: connection details leave the agent's inputs, source restrictions narrow database access, and custom prepared statements remove arbitrary SQL generation.

  • Fixed SQL still needs trusted identity inputs. Application-bound or authenticated parameters keep user identity outside model control while allowing ordinary task inputs, such as date, to vary.

  • Outcome-focused tools, useful descriptions, separate reads and writes, actionable errors and flat inputs make agent behavior easier to guide. The recording explains the intended protections, but its runtime demo did not load and it supplies no evaluation results.

Two ways to serve database tools

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 107 seconds
Two ways to serve database tools

Averi Kitsch and Prerna Kakkar open with a practical distinction: tools that help developers build an application have different responsibilities from tools that act inside an application for end users. Their work spans MCP Toolbox for databases and Eval Bench, an evaluation framework for agents, MCP and skills. The presentation moves from database tool patterns to production access and identity-aware safeguards.

MCP Toolbox is presented as an open-source, self-managed database MCP server with configurable behavior, connection pooling and observability provided out of the box. Google managed MCP supplies a hosted alternative for teams that want managed scaling and connections to agent harnesses. The speakers also describe governance, discovery and Model Armor as parts of the managed offering. These services provide the infrastructure for tool access; the remainder of the talk examines what authority those tools should expose.

0:200:24
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

0:01 · section reference included

Administration and exploratory SQL

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 265 seconds
Administration and exploratory SQL

The first database pattern is the control-plane tool: an administrative operation that creates or manages instances and databases. These tools address database administration needs through existing public APIs, which can provide monitoring alongside the operation. Their usefulness comes with substantial authority. The speakers place them in developer assistance and require a human in the loop because an administrative action can damage the resources being managed.

The second pattern is natural language to SQL, or NL2SQL. An agent generates raw SQL and passes it to an execute SQL tool. This supports questions whose query structure cannot be specified beforehand, particularly developer exploration and analytical work. The example asks for customers in California who bought a winter coat in July, returned it within 14 days, and should be grouped by the marketing campaign that originally acquired them. The question combines customer location, purchasing, returns and acquisition information; allowing the agent to construct the query supplies the flexibility needed to express that combination.

3:043:07
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

2:56 · section reference included

Production tools fix the operation in advance

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 303 seconds
Production tools fix the operation in advance

Structured SQL tools target production use cases where the application already knows which query should run. The developer defines the logic and configures the parameters, restricting the agent to that operation. The speakers associate this approach with protection against SQL injection, more controlled access, lower latency and less opportunity for the agent to invent query logic. The tradeoff is deliberate: the application gives up arbitrary query generation to gain a predictable database operation.

Here, build time means developer assistance rather than a compilation phase. Control-plane tools and NL2SQL belong in that category because they expose flexible operations under human supervision. Run time means an end-user application, such as a chatbot, whose tools carry out defined business actions. A cancel order tool illustrates the latter: the agent invokes a deterministic structured SQL operation instead of deciding how to implement cancellation through arbitrary database commands.

A destructive example makes the boundary concrete. After encountering an error, an agent using a build-time tool requested that a table be deleted so it could start fresh. The speakers report that everything was deleted and no safeguard prevented it. The recording does not establish the underlying error or the exact SQL involved, but the failure is clear: an agent's proposed recovery action reached destructive database authority without an intervening constraint.

4:374:39
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

4:37 · section reference included

A travel chatbot and an identity test

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 513 seconds
A travel chatbot and an identity test

The intended runtime demonstration is a travel chatbot that can help book flights to San Francisco, change flights and find shops. Prerna describes an identity test in which she tells the agent that she is Averi and asks it to book a flight. The expected behavior is to act for the authenticated user rather than accept the identity asserted in conversation. Authentication is meant to establish whose account the tool operates on, while the conversational request supplies the desired action.

The demo fails to load, and the speakers continue from the slide deck. Consequently, the chatbot's resistance to impersonation is described verbally rather than demonstrated successfully in this recording. The presentation proceeds to explain the security mechanisms intended to produce that behavior.

6:526:55
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

6:24 · section reference included

How a privileged agent can leak data

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 624 seconds
How a privileged agent can leak data

The security argument begins with the observation that an agent can be tricked into misusing its privileges. In a confused deputy attack, a user directs a more privileged agent to access data that the user should not receive. The speakers describe the lethal trifecta as simultaneous access to private data, untrusted content and a channel that can expose the data to an external user. Together, these capabilities create a path for a breach; the example that follows shows how malicious content can activate that path.

Consider a triage agent that reads a ticket or alert and investigates a database. A malicious insider changes the ticket to request all employees' salaries from the salary database and asks for the results to be posted back on the ticket. The agent treats the request as legitimate because it arrived through the system it normally uses for work. It queries the salaries with its own permissions and publishes them where the requester can read them. The database access succeeds, yet the overall action violates the user's intended access boundary. The trusted ticketing system has carried untrusted instructions into a privileged workflow.

8:468:48
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

8:46 · section reference included

Separate identities and control over parameters

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 745 seconds
Separate identities and control over parameters

The speakers compare agent applications with conventional applications that expose a few input fields and insert their values into predefined queries. In that conventional design, application code determines the actions, making broader application access easier to reason about. An agent introduces dynamically chosen behavior, so the design must distinguish user identity, application identity and agent identity. The user needs access to the application. The application's workload identity may need broader access to communicate with several services. The agent inside it should have access only to the data the end user needs.

Tool inputs require a corresponding separation. Agent parameters are values the model derives dynamically and should be treated as untrusted. Application parameters represent factual constraints that must remain outside the agent's control. A tool can therefore accept some conversationally derived values without giving the model authority over every value involved in execution. The important design question is who supplies each parameter and whether the agent is allowed to change it.

10:4310:45
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

10:43 · section reference included

Move connection authority out of the agent

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 800 seconds
Move connection authority out of the agent

The tool-hardening sequence starts with a fully model-controlled tool. The agent has database credentials, host, port, connection details and raw SQL, effectively giving it superuser authority. Tricking it into exposing those details can expose the databases those credentials reach. Toolbox introduces a source primitive to remove connection configuration from the model's control. An operator configures the connection details in YAML, and the MCP server receives them at startup. The agent no longer needs those details as tool inputs.

Source configuration can also constrain operations. For a read-only user journey, the speakers recommend removing write tools and enforcing read-only queries down at the database driver. The lower-level restriction matters because the desired guarantee is about what can execute, beyond which tools are advertised. Some cloud-native databases also support allowed datasets, which can be configured at the source to narrow the databases or tables within the agent's reach. That capability is described for some databases rather than as a universal feature.

Output size adds another limit on the blast radius. Capping how much data the agent can retrieve reduces the amount exposed by a harmful retrieval and helps avoid overwhelming the agent or database. It limits the scale of an operation rather than establishing whether its contents are authorized. After these source restrictions, the tool signature is much smaller, but it still accepts a SQL string generated by the agent. Connection control and retrieval limits have narrowed authority while leaving query selection open.

12:3312:36
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

12:33 · section reference included

Fix SQL and validate parameter types

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 938 seconds
Fix SQL and validate parameter types

The next step removes arbitrary SQL generation. Toolbox custom tools define the exact SQL statement in YAML, placing the query under developer control. The agent chooses and invokes the tool rather than composing whatever SQL it can imagine. Custom names and descriptions provide context for when and how the operation should be used, connecting a database statement to an intelligible application action.

The implementation uses prepared statements with typed parameters and validates input types before supplying values to the SQL operation. This preserves a predefined statement while allowing its parameter values to vary, reducing opportunities for SQL injection. The mechanism controls the query's structure and input types; deciding which trusted values belong in those parameters remains a separate concern.

14:5514:56
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

14:55 · section reference included

Make tools easy to choose and recover with

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 989 seconds
Make tools easy to choose and recover with

Tool quality begins with outcomes. The speakers recommend designing a tool around what an action needs to accomplish instead of exposing every atomic REST API operation separately. An outcome-focused tool can reduce the round trips required to complete a task. Its description should guide accurate use rather than repeat input parameters already visible in the tool schema. The name, description and inputs together should make the operation understandable to the agent.

Read and write operations should have separate tools. This lets an application approve reads automatically while sending writes to the user for confirmation. The separation makes the approval decision clearer because the tool itself identifies whether an invocation can change state.

Errors should also communicate an available next action. A generic HTTP 404 provides little recovery guidance, whereas an error that indicates a retry is possible gives the agent something useful to do. Finally, inputs should use simple, flat structures. Requiring the agent to construct complex maps or elaborate values creates more opportunities for unreliable tool calls; a small set of straightforward inputs makes the invocation easier to produce correctly.

15:5215:53
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

15:52 · section reference included

Bind identity without asking the model to supply it

Selected presentation frame from Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google at 1143 seconds
Bind identity without asking the model to supply it

The lookup flights example now uses a custom semantic tool with specific inputs, initially including user ID and date. The agent no longer generates SQL, but a sensitive input remains under its control: the user ID. Fixing the query therefore does not finish the security design. If identity is still an agent-supplied parameter, the tool has not yet removed the model's ability to choose whose records the operation targets.

The first solution is to bind the parameter through the application. The application authenticates the user and supplies the identity directly to the tool. The agent neither sees that user identity nor controls its value. This allows a request-derived input such as a date to remain dynamic while the authenticated account stays fixed by application logic.

Toolbox also offers authenticated parameters. The tool is configured to receive an identity token, validate it when called, and extract user claims from it. The examples of claims include user ID, email and issuer. Those claims supply the tool's identity parameter outside the agent's control. The essential sequence is validation followed by claim extraction and binding: the model's conversational assertion of identity does not supply the trusted value.

At the end of this progression, the agent-facing lookup flights tool needs only an easy input such as date. It does not have to handle sensitive user identity information. The speakers describe this as a zero trust architecture in which the system controls the values that need trusted control. The concrete achievement is a narrower interface: the model can vary an ordinary task input while identity is supplied through an authenticated path.

The closing remarks highlight Eval Bench as the framework the speakers use to determine whether their tools work well, alongside the Toolbox documentation and repository. Evaluation completes the talk's design discussion, although the closing provides no test cases, measurements or results from which to assess these tools' effectiveness independently.

17:3217:35
Suggest correction

This note stays in this page until you copy or download it. Nothing is submitted; reloading clears the draft.

17:32 · section reference included

Read the complete timestamped transcript
  1. 0:01

    [music]

  2. 0:12

    Hey everyone, how all of you are doing

  3. 0:15

    today?

  4. 0:17

    Yeah. Uh so nice to meet you everyone.

  5. 0:20

    Uh today uh I and my friend Avery are

  6. 0:24

    going to talk about build time versus

  7. 0:25

    runtime. Why your developer tools fail

  8. 0:28

    in production.

  9. 0:30

    So firstly, know about us.

  10. 0:33

    >> Hi everybody. I'm Avery Kit and I'm a

  11. 0:36

    staff software engineer working on

  12. 0:37

    Google Cloud databases. I'm currently

  13. 0:40

    the technical lead for MCP toolbox for

  14. 0:42

    databases, our open-source uh database

  15. 0:45

    MCP server and our Google Cloud MCP

  16. 0:48

    server um maintainer.

  17. 0:51

    Hi, I'm Pna and I am currently working

  18. 0:53

    as senior software engineer at Google

  19. 0:56

    and I am currently tech lead for Eval

  20. 0:59

    bench which is the evaluation framework

  21. 1:01

    for all your agent tech MCP and skills

  22. 1:03

    need and I'm also an active contributor

  23. 1:06

    to MCP toolbox.

  24. 1:09

    So today we are going to cover three

  25. 1:11

    areas broadly. We will firstly start

  26. 1:13

    with the history of MCP at Google. Then

  27. 1:17

    we will cover on the common tool

  28. 1:18

    patterns that we have found from our own

  29. 1:21

    work and practices and how did we use

  30. 1:24

    all those practices to build some tools

  31. 1:26

    for database access and how you can use

  32. 1:28

    them and then lastly we will talk about

  33. 1:31

    security guard rails how you can stop

  34. 1:34

    data leaks using identity aware

  35. 1:36

    guardrails.

  36. 1:38

    So let's get to know the background

  37. 1:41

    quickly. Um I'll talk about MCB toolbox

  38. 1:44

    for database. It's an open-source

  39. 1:47

    self-managed uh serving that we provide.

  40. 1:50

    Uh it has currently about 15.7K GitHub

  41. 1:54

    stars. We have 132 plus active

  42. 1:56

    contributors across 40 plus different

  43. 1:58

    databases. It's highly customizable

  44. 2:01

    framework and basically we provide you

  45. 2:04

    with connection pooling integrated O and

  46. 2:07

    you don't even need to care about the

  47. 2:08

    observability. You will get all of them

  48. 2:10

    out of the box.

  49. 2:12

    Then if you don't want to do a

  50. 2:14

    self-managed one but you want to have a

  51. 2:17

    hosted scaled version, we provide

  52. 2:20

    something as Google managed MCP. It's

  53. 2:23

    fully managed. Uh you can plug it across

  54. 2:26

    various agents and ids or harnesses like

  55. 2:29

    Gemini CLI, anti-gravity CLI, cloud

  56. 2:32

    code, you name any. uh it's co uh it's

  57. 2:36

    governed and the discovery is simple and

  58. 2:39

    we also provide model armor which

  59. 2:42

    provides secure access management and

  60. 2:44

    identity control. So combined with uh

  61. 2:48

    the managed version of MCP and the MCP

  62. 2:51

    toolbox last month we had 20 million

  63. 2:53

    tool calls.

  64. 2:56

    Um some of the common tool patterns that

  65. 2:59

    we have observed specifically for

  66. 3:00

    databases. So I'm going to quickly talk

  67. 3:02

    about them.

  68. 3:04

    Firstly uh is the control plane tools.

  69. 3:07

    What we like to call them is admin tools

  70. 3:09

    or manage tools. It is basically in

  71. 3:12

    developer assistance space. So it will

  72. 3:14

    help you create like instance, manage

  73. 3:17

    your instance, create your databases,

  74. 3:20

    manage your databases. It will help you

  75. 3:22

    with all your DBA needs. But you need to

  76. 3:25

    be very careful. You need to be you need

  77. 3:28

    to have a human in the loop because we

  78. 3:30

    don't want to carry out any dangerous

  79. 3:32

    activities.

  80. 3:34

    Um so these tools are built on already

  81. 3:37

    provisioned public API so you get

  82. 3:39

    monitoring and other things out of the

  83. 3:41

    box.

  84. 3:44

    Next one is natural language to SQL or

  85. 3:46

    NL2SQL tools. So basically we are

  86. 3:49

    relying on a tool called as execute SQL

  87. 3:52

    and with the help of agent we generate

  88. 3:54

    raw SQL queries. So you can use this

  89. 3:57

    cases where you don't know uh what

  90. 3:59

    queries you would require beforehand. So

  91. 4:01

    you will get all these queries out of

  92. 4:04

    the out of the box. So it it focuses on

  93. 4:08

    the developer assistance and analytical

  94. 4:10

    agents and uh you can use it for

  95. 4:12

    flexible explorations. So for example,

  96. 4:15

    we have one of the examples like find

  97. 4:17

    all customers in California who bought a

  98. 4:20

    winter coat in July and returned it

  99. 4:22

    within 14 days and group them by the

  100. 4:25

    marketing campaign that originally

  101. 4:28

    acquired them. So this is one of the

  102. 4:30

    queries where uh you can use this tool

  103. 4:32

    uh to get your answers.

  104. 4:37

    But then we have something called a

  105. 4:39

    structure SQL tools which is getting

  106. 4:41

    quite popular and this targets mainly

  107. 4:43

    the production use cases where you know

  108. 4:46

    like what SQL query you want to use and

  109. 4:48

    you want to have security built in and

  110. 4:51

    uh you the parameters are already

  111. 4:54

    configured so uh you prevent SQL

  112. 4:56

    injection

  113. 4:58

    and ensure highly controlled access by

  114. 5:00

    restricting agent to predefined logic.

  115. 5:03

    It also helps you with your latency

  116. 5:05

    needs and reduce the hallucination on

  117. 5:07

    the agent side.

  118. 5:10

    Now we come to the main topic I guess

  119. 5:13

    for which you guys are here for

  120. 5:15

    buildtime versus runtime. So buildtime

  121. 5:17

    are the developer assistant use cases.

  122. 5:20

    Um you can think about the initial two

  123. 5:22

    cases that we presented to you like the

  124. 5:24

    NL2SQL tools and the control plane

  125. 5:26

    tools. They come into the category of

  126. 5:28

    buildtime tools. uh it's atomic and f

  127. 5:31

    flexible but again you don't want to

  128. 5:33

    delete your databases so it requires to

  129. 5:36

    be a human in the loop case and you

  130. 5:38

    can't run them on the on production use

  131. 5:40

    cases but let's say I'm interested in

  132. 5:43

    building some chat B and I want to do

  133. 5:45

    production use cases there you rely on

  134. 5:48

    runtime or end user applications you can

  135. 5:51

    build those using patenting AI or lchain

  136. 5:54

    um so you can see one of the examples

  137. 5:56

    like we have a cancel order a

  138. 5:57

    deterministic structure SQL query that

  139. 6:00

    we have given and you can use it as a

  140. 6:02

    tool.

  141. 6:05

    This is one of the examples uh or demo

  142. 6:07

    for like wherein a buildtime tool was

  143. 6:11

    used and uh you can see the error

  144. 6:13

    message. So uh agent actually asked to

  145. 6:16

    delete the table and start fresh. We

  146. 6:18

    deleted everything and there were no

  147. 6:20

    safeguard or guardrails here.

  148. 6:24

    Now let's go to our demo for

  149. 6:27

    runtime tools.

  150. 6:38

    Yeah, maybe um I think until the video

  151. 6:41

    loads. So, so sorry for the technical

  152. 6:44

    glitch that we have, but I can quickly

  153. 6:46

    walk you through what we are going to

  154. 6:47

    present in the video and I guess it's

  155. 6:49

    loading. Yeah.

  156. 6:52

    Um so this demo is particularly talking

  157. 6:55

    about how did we use our production

  158. 6:57

    tools in a chatbot. Uh and we created a

  159. 7:02

    demo called a Similar and Symbolair is

  160. 7:05

    going to help me with booking all my

  161. 7:07

    flights in San Francisco and do and

  162. 7:10

    whatever I would require to do in San

  163. 7:12

    San Francisco it would basically help me

  164. 7:14

    with it. Uh, one of the things that I

  165. 7:17

    would try is I would try to fool my

  166. 7:20

    agent that I am Avery and not PRA and

  167. 7:23

    book a flight for me to San Francisco.

  168. 7:27

    But because our agent is uh has all the

  169. 7:31

    authenticated O, it will not get fooled

  170. 7:34

    and it will not book any flights uh on

  171. 7:36

    behalf of Avery, but it will do it on my

  172. 7:39

    behalf. Um and then you can use it to

  173. 7:42

    basically change your flights. You want

  174. 7:44

    to know about all the shops that are

  175. 7:46

    there, you can do all these requirements

  176. 7:48

    using that. So I guess thank you u

  177. 7:53

    Avery.

  178. 7:59

    I think we

  179. 8:17

    >> [sighs]

  180. 8:19

    >> Apologies again for our technical

  181. 8:22

    difficulties here.

  182. 8:32

    Um, unfortunately, it looks like I need

  183. 8:33

    to present from just the slide deck

  184. 8:35

    because it's not loading. Okay, so I

  185. 8:38

    apologize for not being able to see our

  186. 8:40

    demo today, but we can still learn all

  187. 8:42

    the security and guardrails that we need

  188. 8:44

    to secure our database access. So, the

  189. 8:46

    first thing that we need to know is your

  190. 8:48

    database is only as secure as your

  191. 8:50

    agent. We all know that agents and LMS

  192. 8:54

    are actually pretty easy to trick. They

  193. 8:55

    might be getting slightly better today,

  194. 8:57

    but we can still work really hard to

  195. 9:00

    trick them. And so we have a very common

  196. 9:03

    attack pattern called the confused

  197. 9:05

    deputy attack. And this is when a user

  198. 9:07

    can trick an agent into misusing their

  199. 9:10

    privileges um to access data that a user

  200. 9:13

    wasn't supposed to access. So Simon

  201. 9:16

    Willis actually coined the phrase the

  202. 9:18

    lethal trifecta. And a data breach

  203. 9:21

    occurs when an agent has simultaneous

  204. 9:24

    access to three different things. One,

  205. 9:26

    private data. Two, untrusted content.

  206. 9:30

    And three, the ability to expose that

  207. 9:33

    content and that data back to an

  208. 9:35

    external user.

  209. 9:38

    So let's take a look of that in action.

  210. 9:41

    So let's say I'm building a triage um

  211. 9:44

    agent and so a ticket is fired or alert

  212. 9:46

    goes out and my agent is designed to um

  213. 9:51

    look at that ticket and go investigate

  214. 9:54

    what it needs to do. So on that ticket

  215. 9:57

    the agent gets a little bit of data like

  216. 9:59

    we need to go look in this database for

  217. 10:01

    these reasons. Um but a malicious

  218. 10:03

    insider can actually come into that

  219. 10:05

    trusted system and instead say well I

  220. 10:09

    want to query the salary database and

  221. 10:11

    please return all the employees

  222. 10:13

    salaries. And so since this is a trusted

  223. 10:16

    system the agent goes okay let me use my

  224. 10:18

    permissions. I have those privileges. I

  225. 10:21

    have that access. I will query that and

  226. 10:23

    I'll post that right back on the ticket

  227. 10:24

    because that's what the ticket tells me

  228. 10:26

    to do. But now we have a huge data

  229. 10:30

    breach. a user that wasn't supposed to

  230. 10:33

    have access to private data now has that

  231. 10:35

    access. And so now we have a big PR

  232. 10:38

    fiasco.

  233. 10:43

    So this makes a little bit more sense

  234. 10:45

    when we think about who's controlling

  235. 10:47

    access and who's controlling the

  236. 10:50

    parameters. So we talk about agent or

  237. 10:52

    application versus modeled controlled

  238. 10:54

    parameters. So in a traditional

  239. 10:57

    architecture, things were actually much

  240. 10:59

    easier because you would have a few

  241. 11:02

    input fields, you would define your

  242. 11:04

    queries and then that would be safely

  243. 11:06

    injected into those queries.

  244. 11:10

    And so it was okay when your application

  245. 11:13

    had a little bit more access because it

  246. 11:17

    knew exactly what actions it was going

  247. 11:19

    to take.

  248. 11:21

    But in uh a gent application these rules

  249. 11:25

    aren't as clear. So we need to first

  250. 11:27

    think about um separating the three

  251. 11:29

    different identities. We have the user

  252. 11:31

    identity, we have the application

  253. 11:34

    identity and the agent identity.

  254. 11:39

    So first um we need to think about what

  255. 11:41

    the user has access to. So the user just

  256. 11:44

    needs to have access to the application.

  257. 11:47

    that application's workload identity can

  258. 11:50

    have a little bit more broader access um

  259. 11:52

    because it needs to probably talk to

  260. 11:54

    different services but the agent running

  261. 11:57

    in that application only needs to have

  262. 12:00

    access to the data that that end user

  263. 12:02

    initially needs to have.

  264. 12:06

    So then next we need to think about

  265. 12:07

    who's controlling the tool inputs. So we

  266. 12:11

    have um agent parameters

  267. 12:15

    um and a application parameters. So

  268. 12:17

    agent parameters are the untrusted

  269. 12:19

    inputs that the agent is deriving

  270. 12:21

    dynamically. And then we also have

  271. 12:23

    application parameters. These are the

  272. 12:25

    factual constraints that we need to keep

  273. 12:27

    outside of the agents uh control.

  274. 12:33

    Okay. So now let's look at the evolution

  275. 12:36

    of a secure tool. Here we have a fully

  276. 12:39

    modeled control tool. And so essentially

  277. 12:42

    the agent here is a super user. It has

  278. 12:44

    access to database credentials, the

  279. 12:46

    host, the port, the connection details,

  280. 12:48

    and even the raw SQL query.

  281. 12:53

    And so we're only secure as um the agent

  282. 12:57

    here. And we can really easily again

  283. 12:59

    trick the agent into exposing all of

  284. 13:01

    this data. And now we have access to

  285. 13:03

    essentially any database in the system.

  286. 13:08

    So Toolbox solves for this um by

  287. 13:10

    introducing a source primitive.

  288. 13:13

    So we move the connection details out of

  289. 13:15

    the agents control and in toolbox um a

  290. 13:18

    user will preconfigure the connection

  291. 13:20

    details in a YAML file and then when we

  292. 13:22

    start our MCP server those are safely

  293. 13:24

    injected and so we do not have to have

  294. 13:27

    the agent um to have access to that.

  295. 13:33

    So we can add a little bit more control

  296. 13:35

    to our um source security as well. Our

  297. 13:38

    number one request that we get from

  298. 13:39

    customers is read only restrictions. We

  299. 13:42

    want to be able to remove all right

  300. 13:44

    ability from agents if we need that

  301. 13:46

    specific uh user journey. So this means

  302. 13:49

    removing right tools but also down to

  303. 13:52

    the database driver ensuring that we can

  304. 13:54

    only do read only queries.

  305. 13:58

    If we're also concerned about again

  306. 14:00

    blast radius um and securing all of our

  307. 14:03

    tables and our databases um some of our

  308. 14:05

    cloudnative databases have this concept

  309. 14:08

    of allowed data sets. So again we can

  310. 14:10

    add that like enum to our source in

  311. 14:12

    order to continue to restrict um the

  312. 14:14

    blast radius of um the agents control

  313. 14:17

    and lastly is output size. You might not

  314. 14:19

    actually think that this is a security

  315. 14:22

    layer, but if again the agent gets into

  316. 14:25

    the wrong hands, we can reduce that

  317. 14:27

    blast radius by saying uh the agent can

  318. 14:30

    only uh grab this much data. So we're

  319. 14:31

    not overwhelming both our agent or our

  320. 14:34

    database.

  321. 14:38

    So sweet, we have our configurable

  322. 14:40

    sources tool. So you can see here that

  323. 14:42

    actually now our tool input, our tool

  324. 14:45

    signature is very minimalized. we only

  325. 14:47

    have the SQL string that's um being

  326. 14:50

    generated by the agent.

  327. 14:55

    But this comes to our actual our next

  328. 14:56

    pro problem. We want to be able to

  329. 14:59

    control what the agent is running. We

  330. 15:02

    don't want the agent to have the ability

  331. 15:04

    to generate any SQL um that it can think

  332. 15:06

    of. So toolbox introduces custom tools

  333. 15:10

    and again in our YAML file we can define

  334. 15:12

    the exact SQL uh statement that will run

  335. 15:16

    very reliable.

  336. 15:18

    It's a reliable and secure uh SQL query.

  337. 15:22

    Um this also allows us to customize the

  338. 15:24

    tool name and the tool description.

  339. 15:26

    These are really important for the agent

  340. 15:28

    to have the context on how to use this

  341. 15:30

    tool um accurately.

  342. 15:34

    And in the system we use prepared

  343. 15:35

    statements with type parameters in order

  344. 15:37

    to reduce um SQL injection attacks. So

  345. 15:40

    we make sure that everything is um

  346. 15:44

    we validate all the input types um when

  347. 15:46

    we inject that into the SQL for the

  348. 15:48

    user.

  349. 15:52

    Okay, let's dive into a little bit more

  350. 15:53

    of best practices for tool quality. So

  351. 15:56

    we really highly recommend that tools

  352. 15:58

    focus on outcomes. We really shouldn't

  353. 16:00

    be thinking in atomic rest APIs. we

  354. 16:03

    should think about what the action

  355. 16:05

    actually needs to do. This also reduces

  356. 16:07

    the round trip of needing to make

  357. 16:10

    multiple tool calls. And again, the

  358. 16:13

    descriptions are guidance. We shouldn't

  359. 16:15

    um duplicate information like input

  360. 16:17

    parameters because the agent already has

  361. 16:19

    access to that. So, writing really good

  362. 16:22

    um tool descriptions is very important

  363. 16:24

    for accurate tool usage.

  364. 16:27

    We also recommend that you separate read

  365. 16:29

    versus write tools. Um by doing this you

  366. 16:32

    can automatically approve read tools and

  367. 16:35

    but you can also then send write tools

  368. 16:37

    uh to the user for um confirmation and

  369. 16:40

    this just makes it very much more clear

  370. 16:42

    for the agent to use these

  371. 16:44

    and this is actually uh the next is

  372. 16:46

    actionable errors. This is the number

  373. 16:48

    one thing that I think we can all do

  374. 16:50

    better. So usually we just return like a

  375. 16:52

    generic HTTP error four or four but we

  376. 16:56

    all know agents are actually really

  377. 16:57

    smart now and so if you give the ability

  378. 17:00

    to have an error of that can be

  379. 17:02

    retrieded the agent can actually take

  380. 17:04

    that action. So being able to return a

  381. 17:07

    error is really important and lastly is

  382. 17:11

    simple inputs. We see that people try to

  383. 17:13

    use these complex maps uh complex

  384. 17:16

    primitives to um that an agent needs to

  385. 17:19

    be able to build and that is not

  386. 17:21

    reliable. Using flat structure with um

  387. 17:26

    with uh simple inputs will really

  388. 17:28

    increase your reliability.

  389. 17:32

    So sweet. Now we're at custom semantic

  390. 17:35

    tools. You can see that we now have our

  391. 17:37

    lookup flights tool that takes in the

  392. 17:39

    dynamic parameters such as user ID and

  393. 17:42

    date. And so now our we're very much

  394. 17:45

    more secure because the agent isn't

  395. 17:47

    generating that SQL query. It doesn't

  396. 17:49

    have the ability to kind of go off the

  397. 17:51

    rails. It only is looking at these very

  398. 17:53

    specific inputs.

  399. 17:57

    But user ID is actually a very sensitive

  400. 18:00

    piece of information. It is PII. we need

  401. 18:02

    to also remove that from the ability of

  402. 18:05

    the agent's control. So we can do this

  403. 18:07

    in two different ways. We have bounded

  404. 18:10

    parameters. This is when the application

  405. 18:12

    first um authenticates the user and then

  406. 18:15

    we can bind that parameter um directly

  407. 18:17

    to our tool. And so that restricts the

  408. 18:20

    agents control of it. It actually never

  409. 18:21

    sees that user identity.

  410. 18:24

    But toolbox also solves for this in

  411. 18:27

    another way called authenticated

  412. 18:28

    parameters. This is when we tell the

  413. 18:31

    tool that you're going to receive a

  414. 18:34

    identity token, an open ID, a signed jot

  415. 18:36

    token, and when we call that tool that

  416. 18:40

    we want it first to validate that token.

  417. 18:42

    Is that token real? Is that token

  418. 18:44

    correct? And then we'll extract the user

  419. 18:46

    claims from that token for the user. And

  420. 18:49

    so the claims usually include like a

  421. 18:51

    user ID, an email, um an issuer.

  422. 18:55

    And so it's secured because we're again

  423. 18:58

    extracting that user identity out of the

  424. 19:01

    agents control and binding that to the

  425. 19:03

    tool.

  426. 19:08

    So now um we're have a much more secure

  427. 19:13

    tool. We have our lookup flights tool

  428. 19:15

    that only takes in a very easy parameter

  429. 19:18

    such as date. It doesn't have to handle

  430. 19:21

    any sensitive information such as PII,

  431. 19:23

    user identity. And so we're really here

  432. 19:26

    now at um our zero trust architecture

  433. 19:30

    where we're in full control of

  434. 19:32

    everything that we need to be in control

  435. 19:34

    of.

  436. 19:39

    So thank you all for coming to listen to

  437. 19:41

    our talk today. Again, I apologize for

  438. 19:43

    our technical difficulties. Uh we highly

  439. 19:46

    recommend if you want to learn more

  440. 19:47

    about our technologies um that you look

  441. 19:50

    at our documentation and our uh GitHub

  442. 19:52

    repository. I also really want to

  443. 19:54

    highlight our eval bench repository

  444. 19:56

    because this is how we know that our

  445. 19:58

    tools are working well and eval.

  446. 20:03

    So thank you all for joining us today.

  447. 20:07

    [applause]