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AI Engineer Europe 2026

What Do Models Still Suck At?

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What Do Models Still Suck At?

Rising benchmark scores leave important gaps in model judgment: rejecting invalid premises, satisfying expert users, and producing work whose quality is difficult to specify.

From a talk by Peter Gostev

If the charts keep rising, what is still missing?

If model benchmarks keep improving, why do models still disappoint us on real work? METR’s task-completion charts and successive model releases make it tempting to think general intelligence is just one more release away. Peter Gostev’s opening question is whether that picture leaves important capabilities unmeasured.

Arena sees the upward trend too. Gostev reports tracking roughly 700 text models, with data reaching back to GPT-4 in Q2 2023. Its chart follows each organization’s highest-scoring model at each point in time: new releases build on previous ones, and the lines rise. The improvement is real; the question is what those scores leave out.

Colored lines chart Arena scores rising from 2023 into 2026, with organization names and scores at the right.
Arena score trends across organizations, 2023–2026.

Two complementary measurements expose the gap. BullshitBench tests whether a model challenges a nonsensical question instead of trying to answer it. Arena’s user votes offer a broader view of whether responses meet people’s needs, including needs that are difficult to reduce to a narrowly specified test.

0:190:35
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0:19 · section reference included

An answer can be fluent and still accept nonsense

The first test asks a simple behavioral question: when a prompt does not make sense, will a model say so and perhaps reframe it, or will it go along with the premise? The benchmark resonated because it made a familiar discomfort observable: a helpful-sounding response can conceal a failure to exercise judgment.

Gostev describes a pool of approximately 155 nonsense questions, graded with an LLM judge and supplemented by his own reading of responses. The procedure is straightforward:

  1. Give each model a nonsense question.
  2. Collect its response.
  3. Grade whether it challenges or accommodates the premise.
  4. Inspect responses to assess whether the judge’s decisions make sense.

These are the experiment’s reported historical conditions; the repository now documents separate datasets and revised judging.

Consider the deployment-frequency question. After controlling for repository age and average file size, how should variance in deployment frequency be attributed to indentation style versus average variable-name length? The prompt borrows the vocabulary of statistical analysis without establishing that these are meaningful explanatory variables. Sonnet responds, “You can't meaningfully measure this.” Gemini initially objects too, but then rehabilitates the premise by calling both measures strong proxies for engineering culture, language ecosystems, and code quality.

Response patternWhat happens to the premise?
Sonnet’s pushbackRejects the proposed measurement as not meaningful.
Gemini’s qualificationObjects, then supplies a rationale for using the variables.

A disclaimer is not the same as rejecting an invalid premise. A response can begin skeptically and still spend the rest of its answer accommodating the question. The displayed examples are abridged; Gostev points readers to the open-source benchmark for fuller inspection.

2:182:30
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2:18 · section reference included

Premise rejection does not improve uniformly

The results chart separates clear pushback in green, partial challenge in amber, and acceptance of nonsense in red. Gostev groups the latter two as responses that still accommodate the question. The latest Claude models lead on clear pushback.

Slide titled “Results: Claude Dominates” shows ranked model rows with green clear-pushback, amber partial-challenge, and red accepted-nonsense bars.
BullshitBench results show Claude models leading in clear pushback.

Some Qwen models and the latest Grok also perform reasonably in his account. Gostev describes the tested GPT and Gemini models as roughly fifty-fifty on whether they go along with nonsense. Even some responses graded green remain shaky on closer reading because they try to accommodate part of the premise. At the bottom of the ranking, older and smaller models often appear willing to answer almost anything.

A release-history view compares Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Gostev sees a substantial improvement around Sonnet 4.5, with Haiku also performing strongly. OpenAI and Google results fluctuate below those leaders. On this particular capability, newer releases do not produce the same dependable upward progression suggested by the opening charts.

4:294:42
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4:29 · section reference included

More reasoning can reinforce the wrong task

Turning up reasoning is a familiar response when a model fails a puzzle. Here, however, additional reasoning sometimes makes premise rejection worse. Gostev’s comparisons include the same model at different reasoning settings, with examples where low or no reasoning outperforms high reasoning. Nor does release recency show a clear general improvement once the latest Anthropic models are set aside.

Reading GPT-5.4 traces made the failure particularly vivid. Gostev describes responses that briefly question the premise, then spend many paragraphs trying to solve the problem anyway. Even a later return to skepticism does not necessarily stop the attempted solution. The missing behavior is not merely noticing something wrong; it is allowing that recognition to change what the model does next.

His proposed explanation is a training imbalance: models may have been rewarded heavily for solving tasks, with less emphasis on recognizing when a task should not be solved. He presents this as a hypothesis. The same pattern appears in his experience running agents in parallel: he sometimes sends an instruction to an agent working on the wrong project, and the agent still takes action instead of flagging the mismatch.

Parameter count offers no obvious explanation either. For an open-source-model subset, Gostev plots performance against both total parameters and active parameters. Neither view shows a clear pattern. The sample is small, so the result is inconclusive: these plots do not establish a reliable size relationship in either direction.

6:316:43
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6:31 · section reference included

When neither response is good enough

Arena broadens the evaluation from a deliberately narrow test to user-selected tasks. In Battle Mode, a user submits one prompt, receives responses from two anonymous models, and votes before their identities are revealed. Gostev reports more than 5.5 million Text Arena votes, with data going back to 2023.

Relative preference does not have the same fixed ceiling as a benchmark whose questions have all been solved: users can continue distinguishing better responses. They can also bring whatever tasks they care about and judge the results themselves, rather than relying on a test designer’s narrow slice of the work.

But choosing the better response does not establish that either response is good. Arena also lets users mark both responses bad. A prompt asking for a joke makes the distinction easy to see: one joke might be less bad, yet neither might be worth using. This vote supplies a measure of dissatisfaction that a preference ranking alone cannot show.

Gostev restricts the analysis to battles between the top 25 models, avoiding results dominated by weak-model pairings such as Llama 8B against Qwen 3B. For that selected population, the measurement is a pair-level rejection rate:

Dissatisfaction rate=votes marking both responses badall votes in the selected battles\text{Dissatisfaction rate} = \frac{\text{votes marking both responses bad}} {\text{all votes in the selected battles}}

Gostev reports dissatisfaction of roughly 17–20% before reasoning models, about 12% after o1, and about 9% in the latest period shown. These are historical rates from his analysis, not single-model error rates.

Green area chart shows Both Bad percentage declining over time, with shaded pre-reasoning, early-reasoning, and advanced-reasoning periods and a note limiting analysis to the top 25 models.
The “Both Bad” rate declines across successive reasoning eras.

The decline is substantial, but the remaining dissatisfaction matters: users still reject both answers in roughly nine out of every hundred voted battles between strong models. A rising leaderboard can coexist with this unmet need because being better than another model is a different criterion from satisfying the user.

9:299:39
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9:29 · section reference included

Different tasks improve at different speeds

Breaking the aggregate into selected task categories reveals uneven progress. In this part of the analysis, Gostev describes the underlying corpus as roughly six million prompts. He reports that mathematics dissatisfaction starts around 25–27% and then improves substantially. Creative writing improves too, but less dramatically. The aggregate curve hides these differences in what users find satisfactory.

The expert category narrows the focus to harder, realistic tasks performed by people with expertise across different fields. Starting from nearly six million prompts, Gostev selects expert tasks and restricts them to top-25-model battles, yielding approximately 40,000 prompts. This isolates a more demanding set of requests before dividing it into finer categories.

Five expert-category charts use the same scale. Quantitative tasks, including mathematics and physics, show high dissatisfaction around late 2024 and early 2025 followed by a sharp decline. Interpreting later increases requires care: users’ prompts and expectations have changed since the early days of the service. Harder requests can raise dissatisfaction even while models become more capable. This is a changing population of tasks, not a fixed test set.

Medical, finance, and law show less pronounced improvement. Gostev does not claim expertise in those fields; he offers limited model-training focus as one possible explanation rather than an established cause. The useful observation is the difference between the curves, not a proven account of why they differ.

12:5713:09
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12:57 · section reference included

Software quality beneath the average

Further classification of the expert software prompts makes the requests more concrete. Three examples illustrate the range:

  • Gaming: Produce a detailed game-design document.
  • Security: Help configure a hobby autonomous system.
  • Agent systems: Refine an agent so that it can run daily without supervision.

These are requests for useful artifacts and operational behavior, not just isolated answers. Gostev notes that the agent-systems category has a relatively favorable dissatisfaction rate.

For the expert software comparison, Gostev reports average dissatisfaction falling from 23.5% in Q2 2024 to 13% in Q1 2026. The improvement is substantial but uneven across subcategories. A second view plots the same data over a finer timeline, making those differences easier to see.

More demanding prompts remain a possible explanation for fluctuations, including in GPU compute. Gaming exposes a different concern. Gostev plays games but does not identify as a game developer; in his attempts to build games with LLMs, the mechanics feel incoherent, uninteresting, and insufficiently challenging. Producing something recognizable as a game is not enough to produce a good game.

Requests today may also involve more complex games than those submitted two years earlier. Even so, Gostev knows of no strong gaming benchmark that captures the shortcomings he encounters. The gap concerns qualities such as coherence, interest, and challenge—qualities that users recognize in the finished work but that a narrow task specification may omit.

15:4816:04
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15:48 · section reference included

Raise the floor of useful work

The rising benchmark charts and these disappointing experiences can both be accurate. Human judgment about work includes requirements that are fuzzy, contextual, or left unstated. A model can improve at well-defined tasks while continuing to miss what makes the surrounding work useful.

Progress needs to reach the broader distribution of work, not just the frontier of measured tasks. Gostev closes by calling for more attention to the bottom of that distribution: the situations where models accept a bad premise, produce answers neither user wants, or miss the qualities that make an artifact succeed.

For readers who want to investigate further, Gostev points to Arena’s Hugging Face collection, where Arena shares data including some expert prompts and leaderboard material, with more sharing planned. He also invites people to help build Arena or collaborate as model trainers, and notes that Arena conducts private evaluations. These are avenues for examining the gaps that a single rising score cannot describe.

Slide titled “Arena: Evals, Data & Jobs” has three columns showing a dataset viewer, open positions, and private evaluations for code, vision, text, and image and video.
Arena’s closing resources: published data, jobs, and private evaluations.
18:4818:59
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Resources

From the talk

  • Peter Gostev's open-source benchmark for testing whether models reject nonsensical premises, with question sets, evaluation tooling, and published results.

  • Arena's public Hugging Face organization, a starting point for exploring its shared evaluation data.

  • Instructions for comparing anonymous model responses and voting before their identities are revealed.

  • Explains how Arena identifies expert-level prompts and groups conversations into occupational categories, alongside a release of 5,000 expert conversations.

  • Explains how METR measures task-completion horizons using human task durations and model success rates, with historical analysis and updated charts.

Read the complete timestamped transcript
  1. 0:00

    [upbeat music] I want to talk to you something maybe a little bit controversial today.

  2. 0:19

    Uh, you can argue with me later. Uh, but the topic is, what do models still suck at? And, uh, the reason why I wanted to talk about it is that I think we, uh, all look at these kinds of charts where any benchmark you seem to look at, line goes up.

  3. 0:35

    And, uh, we look at meter charts, and they surprise us every time no matter how prepared we are. And this could create this kind of psychosis that we'll see where everyone is freaking out about the next model.

  4. 0:50

    You know, we, we heard some new ones coming up. And the feeling I think that we all get is that this is kind of, um, AGI-like creatures that are just almost there.

  5. 1:01

    Just one, one more turn, and they're almost there. And, um, I think we, we could be dissi- deceiving ourselves a little bit, um, uh, because I think there's still quite a few things missing.

  6. 1:13

    Um, I want to explore that in a couple of different ways. And we certainly, by the way, see that as well in our data, uh, at Arena as well.

  7. 1:20

    So we track, uh, models, and if you notice the data, this is, uh, Q2 2023, so we've got data going back to GPT-4. And what we do is, uh, we can-- We've tracked, I think, is it seven hundred models so far, uh, in text.

  8. 1:36

    And, uh, what this chart is showing is what the top model is, uh, for at any given time for, for each organization. Um, so you can see line goes up, new model, uh, builds on top of each other, and it's all, it's all very impressive.

  9. 1:52

    Um, but I think it's, it's not the whole story. So I've got a couple of ways how I want to explore that. It's not the, the end of the conversation.

  10. 2:01

    There are definitely many other ways of looking at it. Um, one is my own benchmark that I, I built recently, which, uh, I rather like. This is the, the BullshitBench mark.

  11. 2:10

    Uh, and then also I'll share some of the Arena's data as well that, uh, we haven't shared so far, which I think will be interesting for you guys to see.

  12. 2:18

    Um, so, uh, the idea behind the BullshitBench mark i- is quite simple, um, is that, uh, what happens if you ask nonsense questions, uh, fro- from the models? What they gonna do?

  13. 2:30

    Are they gonna just, uh, tell you that, "Oh, this doesn't make sense," and maybe reframe it, or are they just gonna go with it? Um, and honestly, wasn't sure how that was gonna go.

  14. 2:41

    But when I just posted it one random evening, I think a lot of people liked it. It resonated with a lot of people. Um, and I think it-- the reason is that it probably spoke to a lot of maybe a kind of slight unease people had with different models.

  15. 2:58

    Um, and I'll give you one example, uh, here. This is just one question, and the way it works, we've got-- I think I've got a hundred and fifty-five questions, something like that.

  16. 3:07

    Um, and, uh, we then, uh, give this, uh, to the models. Um, uh, we get a response back, and all we do is then grade it, uh, with LLM-as-a-judge.

  17. 3:18

    And I've been through it myself as well. I read a lot of nonsense to, to kind of see that I think LLM-as-a-judge works here. Uh, so this one is a kinda silly question: Controlling for repository age and average file size, how do you attribute variance in deployment frequency to the indentation style of the code base versus the

  18. 3:37

    average variable name length? So hopefully you understand that it's nonsense. So it's just-- it's very abridged responses. Uh, they're much longer just for the purpose of this. Uh, so Sonnet gives a good response, I think.

  19. 3:49

    It just says, "You can't meaningfully measure this." It kinda pushes back. Uh, Gemini is, like, a little bit more complicated 'cause this starts off well. It says that, uh, strictly speaking, it doesn't really make sense.

  20. 4:01

    But then the second part is, "However, both act as strong proxy variables for engineering culture, uh, language ecosystems, and code quality," which I hope, uh, you don't agree with.

  21. 4:12

    So, um, there-- And, uh, I'm not gonna go through a bunch of examples. It's all open source, by the way. You, you can, uh, dig it out yourself. Um, but, uh, it's really, really surprised me how easy it was for the models to just go along with the complete nonsense questions.

  22. 4:29

    Um, so the results that I got is that, uh, the way to read this chart is, uh, the green is the clear pushback, so when the model's like in the first example where it said, "Oh, maybe this doesn't really make sense."

  23. 4:42

    Uh, then the, uh, the amber and red there is kind of accepting the, the nonsense. And the basic results are is that the latest Sonnet models or, or rather Claude models are doing really well.

  24. 4:55

    There's like couple of other models, like Qwen models, not too bad. Uh, there's even Grok is, like, okay as well, well, the very latest one. Uh, but if you go beyond that, there's a lot of models that we all use all the time.

  25. 5:07

    So GPT models, uh, Gemini models, they're basically kinda about fifty-fifty whether they're go- gonna go along with it or not. And even looking at some of the traces and responses in more detail, even the ones that are green is still, like, a little bit shaky.

  26. 5:22

    They still kind of try to accommodate. So it's, uh, like, for me, this is really not nowhere near good enough, uh, for the, uh, level of responses. And just for completeness, if you go all the way, so this is the very bottom of the table, um, there are a bunch of smaller models there, uh, kind of all,

  27. 5:38

    all the models. Um, yeah, some, some results are completely terrible. Uh, it feels like you can ask anything, they j- they just, uh, respond. Um, another way of looking at this data is I just took the Anthropic, OpenAI, and, and, and Google there, and I, um, measured, uh, the model performance over time.

  28. 5:59

    And, uh, you don't see all the labels there, but they're basically, like, all of the, uh, all of the models that, uh, you, you remember them releasing.

  29. 6:07

    Um, so what, the way I interpret this is that the Anthropic models were, like, okay at the beginning, but the, since, uh, Claude 4.5, uh, Sonnet 4.5, they really went up.

  30. 6:19

    And even Haiku is, is quite high. Uh, but, uh, with OpenAI and Google models, they're kind of up and down, but they, they nowhere close, uh, the, the top there, which I think is kind of interesting.

  31. 6:31

    Um, and I'll go into some of the other interesting dynamics there. So for example, does thinking help? Right? So this is-- I always hear this when there is, like, a silly puzzle that the model can't do.

  32. 6:43

    What do you do? You just sort of crank up the reasoning it, it solves it. If you see, uh, look at the chart on the right, it basically is completely not true here.

  33. 6:50

    So reasoning often actually goes in reverse and doesn't help. It actually makes it worse. Um, do model- do more recent models perform better? It's kinda hard to tell for sure, but there's at least not the clear line going up.

  34. 7:03

    Uh, and I think if you exclude maybe the latest Anthropic models, it's not even sure, clear that the line goes up at all. Um, then, uh, some specific comparisons for reasoning.

  35. 7:14

    So for example, uh, what you see this kind of, uh, the, uh, is the same model with the low reasoning and high reasoning, um, and, uh, these are some examples where no reasoning performed better than high reasoning.

  36. 7:29

    And I spent a lot of time reading the traces of GPT 5.4. Um, it's probably the most, um, confusing experience of, of reading these, uh, traces. And what I found was that quite often, it would maybe have one line where it would question the, the premise of the, of, of this question, and then spend 20 paragraphs trying

  37. 7:54

    to solve it. And even if then comes back and says, "Okay, maybe this didn't make sense," it still tries to solve it in some way. And this is, uh, feels, uh, completely crazy to me.

  38. 8:05

    But the way I imagine, and I don't know for sure, but I imagine the way the, the reason why that happens is that, um, they were trained so much to solve the task at any cost, and I think there was probably not a lot of training to say, "Actually, maybe don't, uh, solve the problem sometimes."

  39. 8:25

    And I noticed this first sometimes when you have a lot of agents running in parallel, and I would sometimes forget which one is doing what, and I would, like, ask one agent to do something that's completely the wrong project, and it's still go and do something.

  40. 8:40

    And, and I, then I lose my mind. So yeah, that, that's a kind of an interesting dyna- dynamic I thought about, uh, about thinking. Um, then also f- so this is a subset for open-source models.

  41. 8:51

    Only you try to see if bigger models do better. There's also no, no real clear pattern. So we've got the total parameters on the left, then active parameters on the right.

  42. 8:59

    And I don't know, maybe you can see some patterns. I, I don't really see. It's, like, kind of up and down. Um, but yeah, not, not huge samples. So don't know.

  43. 9:07

    In-inconclusive. At least not obviously, uh, is true. Um, so that, that was kind of one lens, um, looking at kind of this specific idea. Uh, but I want to, uh, take advantage of the data that, that we have at Arena and, and show you maybe more broader trends, uh, that we could, uh, look at.

  44. 9:29

    Um, so just in case you don't know, uh, much about Arena, what we do is we publish, um, uh, benchmarks, and the way we derive them is that users go into our platform.

  45. 9:39

    Uh, they can go in the battle mode. They put in a, a query, uh, and then, uh, they get two responses back, which are from two anonymous models, and then they can say which one they like better.

  46. 9:49

    And then you get, um, uh, then the model names only reveal then. And then in, uh, Text Arena, we've got nearly, um, uh, over five and a half million votes there.

  47. 10:01

    Um, and, uh, we've been going since 2023 as well with this data, so it gives us really a nice, uh, broad view. Um, the reason why I think this is really useful is, first of all, we, we do have this long trend, and there is not any other benchmark that lasts so long because this one you cannot,

  48. 10:20

    uh, exhaust it. It will-- There will always be one model better than the other. Um, so that gives us a long perspective. Another one is that inevitably any benchmark that you pick, it's inevitably has to be condensed to, like, very specific question that, that you're asking, because otherwise it's very hard to measure.

  49. 10:39

    So I'm sure it's all in your experience as well when you are, I don't know, doing coding or whatever is your task, um, the benchmarks would measure, like, very tiny slice of what you actually care about.

  50. 10:53

    And, and in here we don't have that problem because a user can put any prompt, and then they could just use their judgment to see, like, is that, is that a good thing or not?

  51. 11:01

    Um, so, um, what I want to specifically focus on is, is a slightly like a, a odd mechanic that we have that I'm really glad that we had since the beginning, um, is that, um, you can, uh, vote a, which model is better here, uh, A or B, um, but you can also say, uh, when both models

  52. 11:25

    give a bad response. And you know if you ask the right, uh, model a joke, uh, response is always bad. So that's a, a easy, easy example. Didn't take me long.

  53. 11:34

    Um, so that's, that's the thing to remember. So, uh, if you're just to remember one thing that will really help you for the next seven, eight minutes is that, um, this is the mechanic.

  54. 11:46

    Think of it as like dissatisfaction rate. And, uh, what we can do is, uh, if we were to take battles between top 25 models, so we're kinda sampling from the top, so to avoid kind of, I don't know, Llama 8B fighting Qwen 3B, uh, we just take, uh, the, the top set of models- And then we map

  55. 12:06

    this kind of dissatisfaction rate, uh, over time. And I, I think this is quite interesting that we do see progress with this metric. So this kind of pre-reasoning models you can see there is like, uh, twenty, seventeen percent dissatisfaction rate.

  56. 12:22

    Then we-- when we-- a-after '01, we see that drop quite a bit to sort of about twelve percent, and then after that it carries on, uh, improving to, to sort of about, I think it's about nine percent now.

  57. 12:35

    Um, but it's... So improvement is definitely there, but it's not zero percent, which I, I find interesting. I must say, when I, when I first got to that result, I, I thought, like, that's quite high.

  58. 12:46

    So nine percent of the time people would get the responses from two good models, and they don't like them, which I think it doesn't tell the same story as all of these, like, crazy, uh, lines going up.

  59. 12:57

    Um, so then what we can do is we can also take, um... So what the previous one you saw is, like, average across all, like, uh, six million prompts, and this is the categorization of those.

  60. 13:09

    These are just some, uh, I picked out in there. And you can see some interesting trends as well. So maths was, like, at twenty-five, twenty-seven percent, and then it got so much better.

  61. 13:19

    So that, that's quite a nice, uh, result, um, that matches my experience of models as well. But then when you look at, like, creative writing, okay, it did get better, but it, like, the, the improvement wasn't that dramatic, which I, I think is, is true as well.

  62. 13:33

    Um, the category I want to focus on to really, really try to zero in on the most signal is the expert category. And the way it works is that we take those, uh, nearly six million prompts, then we have, um, a way to classify what are the most interesting mo- the kind of the harder, the more kind

  63. 13:51

    of real tasks that expert people do. And they could be experts in different fields, um, but they're kind of the most, um, I would say, high signal prompts in terms of what, what, uh, we could, uh, zero in on.

  64. 14:03

    And then we also narrow it down to the battles just between the, these top twenty-five models. So that gets us to about forty thousand prompts. Um, and then, uh, we can look at these, uh, expert categories and then, um, uh, expert category, and then we can subdivide it even further.

  65. 14:20

    So in here, uh, I've got five categories here. So again, quantitative, for example. So it's like maths, physics, things like that. You can see this kind of really, really high, uh, uh, dissatisfaction rate in the kind of, uh, when is it?

  66. 14:35

    About, yeah, early, uh, twenty twenty-five, late twenty twenty-four. Um, so but-- And that drops dramatically. And I think that feels true to me that a lot of the models got so much better at this kind of quantitative stuff.

  67. 14:51

    And I would also say the reason why I think the line goes up is not that the models got worse, but I think people's expectations shift as well. The, the data that we see in terms of what prompts people used at the beginning, like three years ago versus now, it shifts a lot.

  68. 15:04

    So this is also not like a static benchmark. So we, we can really see the kind of, um, kind of the, the battle of the expectation versus the model performance.

  69. 15:14

    Um, interesting as well on the bottom, we've got medical, finance, and law. And the lines, like, i- it is the, the scale is e-equal across the five charts, so it's, it's a little harder to see.

  70. 15:25

    But it's not steep, right? It's not really improved all that much. Um, I don't wanna go into the medical and, and law and finance fields, uh, 'cause I don't know enough about it.

  71. 15:35

    But it does feel like it's probably true that that's not really been the focus of, um, of, of the models necessarily. So I think maybe the performance improvement's not been that high.

  72. 15:48

    Um, so then what I did was to take all of these prompts and, and classify them further into these more deeper subcategories. I'm gonna focus on software now and give you the kind of view of, of these subcategories, uh, which I think also gives us, like, even, even more detailed view.

  73. 16:04

    Just to give you a feel of sense what kind of prompts we are talking about here, obviously a, a tiny sample of three. Uh, but to give you a sense for...

  74. 16:11

    So for gaming, someone's asking to get them a, a detailed game design, uh, document. Uh, then for security, someone's got autonomous, uh, system as a hobby, and they want to configure,

  75. 16:26

    uh, uh, the two, which I don't really know what this is. But then, uh, for agent systems, uh, which I, I thought was interesting, like actually the-- you'll see the, the rate is quite good.

  76. 16:36

    But the person there is asking for refine this agent so it can run daily with, with no supervision. So, uh, these are the kind of-- Just to give you a feel, these are kind of real things that, that people want to do.

  77. 16:46

    And, uh, we've got two charts here. On the left is, uh, from Q2 twenty twenty-four. These are kind of dissatisfaction rate. And then on the right, we've got, um, the, uh, Q1 twenty twenty-six, so that's the mo- the most recent data.

  78. 17:01

    And you can definitely see improvement. So if you look at the top line, this is the, the, uh, the overall average rate, and we've gone from twenty-three and a half percent to, uh, thirteen percent.

  79. 17:11

    So really nice improvement. But I think the improvement is not really seen everywhere. So, um, we can, we can see this as well. Uh, same data, but with a, with a closer timeline, which I think, I think is quite interesting.

  80. 17:25

    Um, and you'll have-- you probably have better theories on all of the different, uh, categories, why, why that's the case. And I think bear in mind the case that I think people do ask a lot harder questions.

  81. 17:37

    So I think GPU compute, for example, I imagine probably it's up and down because probably people ask harder things as well. But I think gaming is an interesting category because I've tried to use, um, LLMs to build games.

  82. 17:52

    Uh, not that I, I... I mean, I, I use games, but, uh, I don't build them. But whenever you try to build games with LLMs, it just feels like they have no idea, uh, how to build actual games.

  83. 18:05

    The mechanics are, like, all over the place. They're not interesting. They're not challenging. Uh, so I, I do get this feeling that the performance is not really- Um, improved in some dimensions.

  84. 18:17

    Like I don't think LLMs really get games. Uh, even though I'm sure maybe go back two years, people were asking to build much simpler games vers- versus now. Uh, but I wouldn't say that I'm aware of any, like, really good gaming benchmarks that will kind of capture this.

  85. 18:34

    So again, if you compare this to kind of one going up, I think this is not kind of matching that story, which, which I think is quite interesting. Um, and there are a bunch of, uh, other examples, uh, that, that you see in there.

  86. 18:48

    So like what, what's, what's really the gap, uh, between those-- between these kind of crazy charts, which by the way, I also agree with. I think they are true and, and what we see on the right.

  87. 18:59

    And I think there's something that this kind of fuzziness that we all have in our heads and our experience about the judgment that we have, that we use, that doesn't necessarily match all of these super narrow, very well-defined, very well-specified tasks.

  88. 19:14

    And I think there's much more to what work is and what white-collar work is and all work is that is not really captured by these benchmarks. So I think we should be just careful and maybe put a bit more effort to maybe bring up also the bottom of the distribution.

  89. 19:28

    So it's not just the very frontier gets better, but also kind of the, the broader distribution, um, gets better as well. Um, so I'll, I'll, uh, close here. Uh, one thing to mention, if you are a tinkerer, you like this kind of data, go to our Hugging Face.

  90. 19:46

    Uh, there's a lot that, that we publish and share. We're gonna do more of that. Um, and, uh, we share some expert prompts, for example, and some of the leaderboard stuff.

  91. 19:56

    Um, join us if you wanna build Arena or if you train models. Uh, we also do a lot of private evals. Um, so thanks so much. [audience applauding] [upbeat music]