Your Agent Just Authorized What?! — Jay Mok & Ben Coumes, Paypal

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What an Agent Is Allowed to Authorize

Jay Mok and Ben Coumes explain how human consent, scoped permission, and evidence change as agents move from reversible coding tasks to payments between unfamiliar parties.

From a talk by Jay Mok and Ben Coumes

At a glance

Ideas worth remembering

  • Human consent, permission at execution time, and later proof are separate requirements. The strength of each mechanism should follow the action’s stakes and the counterparty relationship.

  • The coding example combines connector consent, allow/ask/deny tool policies, and logs with reversible changes. The payment example combines vaulted credentials, OAuth access, scoped mandates, and transaction logs within a shared trust boundary.

  • For unfamiliar counterparties, the proposed selective disclosure JWT separates provider credentials, user-signed instructions, and an agent-signed autonomous layer. Merchants and processors verify the portions relevant to their responsibilities.

  • PayPal’s approval token moves approval ahead of item discovery and carries amount, expiry, and merchant constraints. Its opaque, PayPal-specific approval mechanism is distinct from the proposed independently verifiable approach, and its launch was still prospective at recording time.

  • Reversibility is a central assumption in choosing evidence. The speakers suggest extending stronger verification to medical orders, electronic signatures, and securities trading because these actions can be hard to undo.

An agent with access to your wallet

Jay Mok opens with Terminator, then brings the threat down to a more immediate scale: an agent takes your wallet and goes shopping. The example introduces the practical problem of agent authorization. Giving software the ability to act creates a need to distinguish what it can do from what a human has actually permitted it to do.

Mok introduces his work in product management for PayPal’s agentic payments, and Ben Coumes introduces his role as a staff software engineer on its enterprise payments team. Their aim is to offer a mental model for safeguarding agent actions, using payments as the concrete setting.

0:160:18
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Consent, permission, and proof

Selected presentation frame from Your Agent Just Authorized What?! — Jay Mok & Ben Coumes, Paypal at 99 seconds
Consent, permission, and proof

The framework starts with three questions: did the human authorize the action, is it allowed right now within this scope, and can that authorization be proved later? These questions separate the initial act of consent from the limits on subsequent execution and from the evidence needed after something goes wrong.

In payments, Mok gives a passkey as one possible mechanism for human authorization. Permission can be expressed through a time-bound token, an amount, and potentially a merchant or product intent. Those constraints give execution a narrower meaning than general permission to spend: the agent’s authority applies within a particular time and transaction scope. Later proof matters when a dispute raises the question of whether the human authorized the transaction.

The answers depend on two aspects of context: the stakes of the action and the relationship between counterparties. An open or closed ecosystem describes whether the parties already know one another. Mok discusses this distinction alongside KYA, or know your agent, and uses agents that generally know their merchants as an example of a more closed payment ecosystem. The relevant property is the existing relationship, rather than the mere presence of an agent.

His analogy is badging into an office. Once admitted through the front desk, an employee ordinarily does not badge into every room. People inside the building can draw some confidence from having crossed the same trusted boundary. That shared admission explains how a closed ecosystem can support interactions without each encounter establishing trust from scratch; the analogy offers an element of trust, rather than a guarantee about everyone inside.

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Reversible coding actions

Selected presentation frame from Your Agent Just Authorized What?! — Jay Mok & Ben Coumes, Paypal at 302 seconds
Reversible coding actions

Mok organizes the examples into a stakes-and-evidence matrix. Stakes and counterparties describe the setting; authority and evidence describe how the three authorization questions are answered. The first example is a coding agent connected to tools such as GitHub, Jira, or Linear. During connector setup, the human authenticates with those applications and supplies consent for the agent to interact with them.

Tool permissions provide a second layer of control. A tool can be allowed, denied, or configured to ask the human before use. This makes permission granular: connecting an application establishes access, while the tool policy determines which actions can proceed and which need another approval.

For this coding scenario, the speakers consider the stakes relatively low because the ecosystem is closed and changes can be reverted. System logs can provide evidence of what happened, and reversal provides a way to recover from a bad action. They therefore do not require cryptographic proof of authorization here. That judgment rests on the example’s reversibility and trusted setting; it does not establish that every action performed by a coding agent has low consequences.

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Payments inside a shared trust boundary

The next example raises the stakes because money moves, even though the parties operate within a known ecosystem. A travel company has data it wants to monetize, such as occupancy information or reviews. Buyer agents become customers for that information, creating a machine-payment use case in which an agent pays for access to data.

Mok describes a partner using two primitives from Braintree or PayPal enterprise infrastructure: a vault and OAuth access. The vault stores payment credentials on behalf of buyer agents. Storage alone does little to create the ecosystem; access to those credentials is then offered to merchants through OAuth. Combining custody with controlled access brings buyer and seller agents into a more trusted environment.

The human authorizes the payment arrangement, typically using a commercial card shared with the buyer or travel agent in this example. A mandate carries associated scopes, which provide controlled authority for the agent’s use of the payment method. The authorization arrangement thus includes both the payment credential and limits on its use.

For dispute handling, this arrangement uses existing transaction logs rather than cryptographic authorization proof attached to each request. Mok’s reason is the closed ecosystem: the participants can rely on records within the shared system. Money movement makes the scenario more consequential than the coding example, but the existing trust boundary reduces the need for proof that an unfamiliar counterparty can verify independently.

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Verifiable authority between unfamiliar parties

Selected presentation frame from Your Agent Just Authorized What?! — Jay Mok & Ben Coumes, Paypal at 657 seconds
Verifiable authority between unfamiliar parties

Coumes begins by explaining where the medium-stakes example gets its trust. Both parties operate in the same system, and they borrow trust from its operator: the buyer agent is expected to follow the human’s instructions, while the seller can feel comfortable accepting payment from another participant. Autonomous payments become a different problem when the parties are unknown to one another and have not been vetted within a common system.

For that high-stakes setting, Coumes argues that the industry should converge on FIDO verifiable intents and AP2 mandates. He summarizes the proposed mechanism as a multilayered selective disclosure JWT. A trustworthy credential provider creates the first layer, with PayPal offered as a prospective provider. The second layer contains the user’s instructions to the agent, signed by the user with their private key. For autonomous payments, an optional third layer is signed by the agent.

The benefit of selective disclosure is that each participant can verify the portion relevant to its responsibility. A merchant verifies that the checkout is correct; a payment processor verifies that the payment mandate is correct. The signatures separate the provider’s credential layer, the human’s instructions, and the agent’s autonomous action, while disclosure lets different parties examine the parts they need. Coumes presents this as a way to transact without requiring an existing relationship among the participants.

This is an architectural recommendation for payments at scale. The explanation establishes who creates or signs each layer and what merchants and processors would verify, but it does not specify the complete validation procedure. Its premise still includes a trustworthy credential provider; eliminating prior relationships between transaction participants does not eliminate the need for a trusted source of credentials.

9:439:46
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Approving instructions before checkout

Coumes next describes the PayPal approval token, a primitive that changes the order of the purchase flow. Historically, he says, PayPal orders have been synchronous: the user finds an item, opens PayPal to approve the purchase, and completes the flow. The approval token lets the user start the order process with an agent before that agent has found an item at a merchant.

In the new sequence, the user starts with the agent and is redirected to PayPal to confirm the instructions given to it. PayPal then returns a JSON payload carrying an amount, an expiry, and the merchant with which the agent is supposed to transact. Approval therefore precedes the agent’s completion of the shopping task, while the returned authorization expresses constraints on the eventual transaction.

The merchant constraint leaves an important boundary in the explanation: the agent can begin before finding an item, but the returned payload is described as identifying the merchant it should use. Coumes does not explain how that merchant is established in the earlier approval step. The supported capability is advance approval of constrained agent instructions; the description does not establish unrestricted authority to choose any merchant.

Coumes explicitly distinguishes the approval token from verifiable intent. Although the concepts are similar, he describes the token as an opaque string that only PayPal can approve at that time. It consequently retains a PayPal-specific approval boundary rather than providing the independently verifiable mechanism described for unfamiliar counterparties. He says it is about to ship into production for an agent integration using PayPal as a payment method; this is a launch expectation at recording time, rather than evidence of subsequent availability.

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Hard-to-reverse actions need stronger evidence

Selected presentation frame from Your Agent Just Authorized What?! — Jay Mok & Ben Coumes, Paypal at 834 seconds
Hard-to-reverse actions need stronger evidence

Returning to the matrix, Coumes emphasizes the assumptions behind its first two levels. In the low-stakes example, connector access and granular permissions are comfortable because actions can be reversed or redone. In the medium-stakes example, money moves between parties within the same system boundary, and both rely on a third party to enforce the payment mandate. The evidence requirement follows the combination of consequences, recoverability, and available institutional trust.

At the highest level, the user delegates an autonomous task without knowing whom the agent will eventually transact with. Those counterparties need verifiable proof that the agent has permission for the transaction. Coumes says the speakers have not really seen this scenario in production yet and points again to verifiable intents and AP2 mandates as the expected approach. The claim is a proposed direction for that setting, with a production limitation explicitly attached.

Coumes extends the model beyond payments to high-stakes actions that are hard to reverse. He names medical orders, electronic signatures, and securities trading. The proposed connection is the difficulty of undoing the agent’s action: stronger evidence of delegated authority could matter wherever an incorrect or unauthorized action has lasting effects. These are suggested applications of the framework, rather than demonstrated implementations.

Mok closes by returning to the badge analogy. Inside the office, admission through a shared boundary supplies some trust. On the street, encountering a stranger who shows a badge is probably insufficient; the evidence needs to be more verifiable and supported by a verifiable standard. The point is to choose proof that works in the actual encounter, so the counterparty can establish that a human authorized the agent. He ends by bringing the wallet warning back into view: useful autonomy depends on making that authority checkable.

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Read the complete timestamped transcript
  1. 0:01

    [music]

  2. 0:12

    >> Hello everybody. How are you doing?

  3. 0:15

    Um

  4. 0:16

    Does anybody remember the movie

  5. 0:18

    Terminator?

  6. 0:20

    Uh anyways, it's one of my favorite uh

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    movies when I was growing up as a kid.

  8. 0:24

    And it imagines a world where the

  9. 0:26

    machines have taken over, right? And uh

  10. 0:30

    uh the nightmare scenario here though in

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    in 2026 is not that the machines are or

  12. 0:37

    the agents are launching nukes, but

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    rather

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    uh they've uh taken your wallet and

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    they've gone on a shopping spree.

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    And they buy like a bunch of crypto and

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    new bunch of bunch of spanks for you.

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    Um

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    but the basically today we're talking

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    about how we safeguard against that and

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    uh and uh hopefully we can kind of share

  22. 0:58

    a a mental model that you can use when

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    you're thinking about agent

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    authorization.

  25. 1:04

    Uh my name is uh Jay Mock. I'm a product

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    manager over at PayPal in agentic

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    payments. And

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    >> Hi everyone. I'm Ben Cooms. I am a staff

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    software engineer on the

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    payment PayPal enterprise payments team.

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    >> And together we're going to share kind

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    of like some knowledge with you. Um so

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    hopefully

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    uh you find it helpful. Okay.

  35. 1:26

    So uh the the key questions that we kind

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    of like uh start off with is uh in terms

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    of like agent authorization is uh did

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    the human authorize this?

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    Um is this allowed right now in this

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    scope and can we prove it later, right?

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    And we we kind of like try to make it

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    general, but in our world of payments,

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    yeah, did the human authorize this? Uh

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    that could be like a passkey or of of

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    that nature. Uh is this allowed right

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    now in this scope? It's generally going

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    to be a time bound um

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    you know you know token.

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    Um and an amount and possibly could be

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    identified like a merchant or a

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    the actual product intent. Lastly, can

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    we prove it later? This is like if

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    something goes wrong, right? And in our

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    world of payments it's generally has to

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    do with like the disputes and

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    in that case and how do you can you

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    prove that

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    you know the the human generally

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    authorized that transaction. Right? Um

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    But we think the way that you actually

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    answer these three questions is really

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    dependent on the context. You know,

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    context is a overused term, but in this

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    case what we what we mean is

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    um

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    you know, is it a low stakes or high

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    stakes kind of

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    scenario?

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    Um and

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    is this a kind of like open ecosystem or

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    closed ecosystem? Do the parties like

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    know each other? You know, people use

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    the term KYA a lot. Know your agent, but

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    you know, what we think about in this

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    scenario is is is really about is it

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    like an open or closed ecosystem, right?

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    And in a payments context it could be

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    like, "Hey, you know, ChatGPT or Gemini,

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    right?" That's like kind of like a more

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    of like a closed ecosystem because you

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    know, the those agents know the merchant

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    generally. Um

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    I like to use a an analogy.

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    I like analogies. And the analogy I I

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    like to use is kind of like the you

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    know, badging into work. You badge into

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    work in the front desk. You basically

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    are are then led into the building or

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    you know, let's say it's a set of

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    buildings. You don't need to like badge

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    in every single time to every other or

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    for every single room because you're

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    already within that trusted boundary,

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    right? So then when you meet someone in

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    within that within your your office

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    building, uh, you kind of have some

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    element of trust, or hopefully you have

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    some element of trust, uh, because

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    you're both, uh, employees at the same

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    company that badged in, right? So, um,

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    that's kind of like the analogy I may I

  102. 4:02

    may use later in the presentation.

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    Okay, so based on those key questions,

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    we kind of think about like, "Hey,

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    what's the mental model that we can

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    build off of this, right?" And we have

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    this like stakes and evidence matrix,

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    and we're going to talk about, uh, these

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    three different scenarios.

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    Um, and so, uh, we're going to first uh,

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    and you'll see at the top it's kind of

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    like the stakes and counterparty part

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    that I was just talking about the

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    context, right? Counterparty is like the

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    open or closed ecosystem. And then

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    authority and like evidence is really

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    about how you answer those those those

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    three questions I had shared in in the

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    prior slide, right? Um, so we'll talk a

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    little bit first about like cloud code

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    since that's what most people are very

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    familiar with, and, uh, basically, you

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    know, when you as a human you're going,

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    you know, using your cloud code, uh, you

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    know, you might be, uh, then setting up,

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    uh, your your connectors with your

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    GitHub or or, um, you know, Jira or

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    whatever, uh, linear or whatever uh,

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    tool you're using. And, um, you know,

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    you're as part of that process you're

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    kind of like authenticating, so that's

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    how you kind of like get that that human

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    authorization and consent um, with those

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    those applications and to for the for

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    cloud container act with them.

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    Um, in terms of the, uh,

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    actual like, uh, scopes, right? The the

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    example here would be that about, you

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    know, cloud's like, uh, tool

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    permissions. Like people are very

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    familiar probably with, uh, the fact

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    that you can allow cloud cloud to to use

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    certain tools, um, uh, deny or ask cloud

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    to ask you, uh, before for before doing

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    something, right? And then in terms of,

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    uh, the action of like a cloud, uh, we

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    generally think, um, because it's a kind

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    of closed ecosystem and it's like you're

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    coding, uh, the stakes are relatively

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    low here. And so in terms of the

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    evidence or proof, you don't really need

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    to have like that cryptographic proof

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    um, at that point in time. You can kind

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    of just look at like system logs in

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    order to to or you have the ability to

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    just revert revert your changes, right?

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    So, that's kind of like an example of

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    applying like this mental model

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    and using cloud code in terms of that

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    scenario.

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    Okay, so the next

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    example we're going to talk about is

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    a more medium stakes

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    scenario and why

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    why we're calling this medium stakes

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    even though it's within a known or kind

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    of closed ecosystem is because it has to

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    do with money and and payments. And so

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    that's like the shared vault and OAuth

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    scope example.

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    So, in this example where the use case

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    is is like hey you're like a let's say

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    a merchant or Trip Advisor, right? And

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    you have

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    a travel travel company and you have a

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    lot of great content that you want to

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    monetize. It could be occupancy data, it

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    could be like reviews, what have you.

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    And you have a new customer now. You

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    have like a trap like travel agents or

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    like you know agents that that are buyer

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    agents that are are coming to you and

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    you want to be able to monetize

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    monetize your data, right? Through

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    machine payments.

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    So, we work with a partner and Never

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    mind to be able to enable that that that

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    use case and leveraging our

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    they're leveraging our infrastructure.

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    Right? So, there is two pieces of

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    infrastructure that they

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    that I like to kind of to call out or

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    primitives that they use that

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    as part of the Braintree or PayPal

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    enterprise

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    infrastructure. One is like the vault,

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    right? And the vault by itself, which is

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    storing all these like

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    payment credentials on behalf of the

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    on behalf of the buyer agents,

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    on itself doesn't really do much, but in

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    order to create

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    what nevermind creates is a a more

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    eco closed ecosystem, they then off

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    you're able to um

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    offer

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    uh or offer access to those payment

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    credentials through

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    OAuth, right? To all those merchants.

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    So, in our example before we talked

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    about that that travel travel um travel

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    company, right? So, by doing so, they're

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    able to then create like an ecosystem um

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    of buyer agents and seller agents

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    uh and have a more trusted

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    environment, right? So,

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    um

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    in the in the just kind of talking more

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    about the use case, like the human then

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    is then going to be authorizing

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    authorizing their their payment.

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    Usually, this is a commercial card

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    commercial use case. So, you're using

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    like a commercial card, they share it

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    with the buyer agent, travel agent. Um

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    then that uh it it also has

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    scopes associated with that mandate. So,

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    that's how you're able to do controlled

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    authority, but in terms of like the

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    actual like dispute handling, we really

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    uh don't have like a we're not using

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    like

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    cryptographic proof that's being sent as

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    part of that that request, right? At the

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    end of the day, they can since it's more

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    of a

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    closed ecosystem,

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    they're able to leverage like the just

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    the existing

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    transaction logs.

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    Right? So, that's kind of an example of

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    like a medium stakes and

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    use case or scenario, and

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    we we believe it's medium stakes because

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    of the fact that it is a more closed

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    ecosystem and doesn't require all like

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    the

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    you know, evidence in terms of

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    or proof, right? So,

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    that's kind of like my part. I'll going

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    to turn it over now to Ben and uh take

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    it from here.

  253. 9:40

    >> Uh thanks, Jay.

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    Yeah, so the last slide that Jay talked

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    about, um

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    you know, we're kind of going over the

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    medium stakes example.

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    Uh um

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    In that scenario, um

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    you know, both parties know each other.

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    Uh they're acting within, you know, the

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    same system. They they know

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    you know,

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    they're borrowing trust from, you know,

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    Nevermind to

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    make sure that, you know, the buying

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    agent is falling within, you know, the

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    instructions that a human has given it.

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    Um

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    and then the selling agent that's also

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    on Nevermind can feel comfortable taking

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    a payment um

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    from another user of of Nevermind. And

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    And so, what we want to talk about next

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    is what happens when the parties are are

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    not known to each other and they're not

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    vetted. Um

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    And so, like we think, you know, we

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    believe that the best option for that,

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    you know, is actually do these

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    autonomous payments, um

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    where, you know,

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    you know, not everyone's known. Like you

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    know, the stakes are high. You know, we

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    think that the industry should converge

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    on the FIDO verifiable intents and AP2

  287. 10:46

    mandate. Um

  288. 10:48

    You know, the TLDR of that is, you know,

  289. 10:49

    it's a a multi-layered selective

  290. 10:52

    disclosure jot. Uh

  291. 10:54

    The first layer is, you know, created by

  292. 10:56

    a

  293. 10:57

    trustworthy credential provider. You

  294. 10:59

    know, in this case, hopefully it would

  295. 11:00

    be PayPal. Um The second layer, you

  296. 11:02

    know, encapsulates the user's

  297. 11:04

    instructions to the agent. Um

  298. 11:07

    The user signs that with their private

  299. 11:08

    key. And then the third layer, if

  300. 11:10

    there's going to be a third layer, is

  301. 11:12

    when um

  302. 11:14

    we're doing autonomous payments. So,

  303. 11:15

    that case, the agent would, you know,

  304. 11:17

    sign that third layer. And And so, the

  305. 11:21

    where that's powerful is that, you know,

  306. 11:25

    party involved in a transaction can can

  307. 11:27

    verify the part that's, you know,

  308. 11:29

    important to them. So, merchants can

  309. 11:32

    verify that the checkout is correct. Um

  310. 11:34

    Um payment processors can verify that

  311. 11:36

    the payment mandate is correct. Um

  312. 11:39

    And no one has to have any relationship

  313. 11:40

    to each other.

  314. 11:42

    Um

  315. 11:43

    And so, like I think, you know, if

  316. 11:45

    there's going to be a ton of payments,

  317. 11:47

    you know, at scale, we think that that's

  318. 11:49

    going to be the best um way to

  319. 11:50

    accomplish it.

  320. 11:52

    Uh

  321. 11:53

    pictures on the screen are depicting our

  322. 11:56

    PayPal approval token.

  323. 11:57

    Um

  324. 11:58

    This is a new primitive that allows

  325. 12:01

    users of PayPal to

  326. 12:03

    basically start the order process with

  327. 12:05

    an agent um for that agent has actually

  328. 12:07

    found an item at a merchant to transact

  329. 12:09

    with. Uh historically, PayPal orders

  330. 12:12

    have been synchronous.

  331. 12:14

    Um

  332. 12:15

    You know, users on

  333. 12:16

    checkout, they find their item, they go

  334. 12:19

    to their PayPal app, they approve it, um

  335. 12:21

    and it's done. Uh here, it's a little

  336. 12:23

    bit different, you know.

  337. 12:24

    Users on their agent,

  338. 12:26

    um

  339. 12:27

    they get redirected to PayPal to confirm

  340. 12:29

    the instructions that are given to the

  341. 12:30

    agent, and then

  342. 12:32

    uh PayPal hands back this JSON payload.

  343. 12:35

    Um you know, similar to the verifiable

  344. 12:36

    intent, uh includes the

  345. 12:39

    amount, the expiry, uh the merchant that

  346. 12:42

    is supposed to be transacted with. Um

  347. 12:45

    Similar concept, but not quite the same.

  348. 12:47

    Um

  349. 12:48

    it's an opaque string that only PayPal

  350. 12:50

    can approve right now.

  351. 12:51

    Um

  352. 12:52

    But we're about to ship this into

  353. 12:53

    production, um

  354. 12:55

    and users of Jet and I that pick PayPal

  355. 12:57

    as a payment method will will use this.

  356. 13:02

    Um so, going to our last slide, um

  357. 13:05

    you know, we showed this slide earlier.

  358. 13:07

    It we didn't have the two columns filled

  359. 13:08

    out on the right-hand side. Um

  360. 13:11

    You know, we wanted to reinforce this

  361. 13:12

    mental model where,

  362. 13:14

    you know, starting at the top, we have,

  363. 13:15

    you know, the low-stakes scenario, you

  364. 13:17

    know, you're you're using Claude, you've

  365. 13:19

    given it access to connectors, you know,

  366. 13:21

    granular permissions to do things on

  367. 13:22

    your behalf.

  368. 13:24

    Um you feel comfortable doing that

  369. 13:25

    because the stakes are low. You know,

  370. 13:27

    you can reverse those actions or redo

  371. 13:29

    them. It's not a big deal if Claude

  372. 13:30

    produces, you know, the wrong output.

  373. 13:33

    Uh going down a level, we have the

  374. 13:35

    medium stakes scenario. You have

  375. 13:37

    two parties that know each other that

  376. 13:39

    are acting within the same system's

  377. 13:40

    boundary. Um

  378. 13:42

    you know, the

  379. 13:43

    the actions are a little bit higher

  380. 13:44

    stakes. You know, there is money

  381. 13:45

    movement here, but both parties can can

  382. 13:48

    feel comfortable, you know, transacting

  383. 13:49

    with each other because they're relying

  384. 13:51

    on this this third party to enforce uh

  385. 13:54

    the payment mandate.

  386. 13:56

    And then the third level, you know, the

  387. 13:58

    highest stakes one um that we haven't

  388. 14:00

    actually really seen in production yet,

  389. 14:01

    it's, you know, the user's giving an

  390. 14:03

    agent some

  391. 14:05

    instructions to do something on their

  392. 14:06

    behalf autonomously, and you don't know

  393. 14:08

    who they're going to interact with, who

  394. 14:09

    they're going to transact with. Um and

  395. 14:11

    those parties need some verifiable proof

  396. 14:14

    that the agent has permission to do the

  397. 14:16

    transaction. And so, we believe that

  398. 14:18

    that will be um

  399. 14:20

    either verifiable dents and and AP2

  400. 14:23

    mandates.

  401. 14:24

    Um

  402. 14:25

    I think the interesting thing is

  403. 14:27

    it's also our belief that, you know,

  404. 14:28

    this is a model that can't won't just be

  405. 14:31

    used for payments, but we think it could

  406. 14:33

    be for any sort of high-stakes action

  407. 14:35

    that's hard to reverse. So, medical

  408. 14:37

    orders, e-signatures, securities

  409. 14:39

    trading, um you know, basically any

  410. 14:41

    hard-to-reverse agent action.

  411. 14:45

    That's all I have.

  412. 14:46

    >> Yeah, I mean, I think um if we could

  413. 14:47

    just go back to analogies, uh

  414. 14:50

    you know, like in the low stakes is kind

  415. 14:51

    of like, "Hey, you're within the the

  416. 14:53

    building. You've uh put a badge in and

  417. 14:55

    you're within the building." Whereas in

  418. 14:57

    the um high stakes is kind of like, "You

  419. 15:00

    are on the street and you meet

  420. 15:01

    somebody." And uh you know, you need a

  421. 15:04

    way to be able to uh get comfort that

  422. 15:07

    that's someone you can trust, right? Um

  423. 15:09

    is a badge is them showing you their

  424. 15:12

    badge good enough? Uh probably not. You

  425. 15:14

    need to have something that's a little

  426. 15:15

    bit more um you know, verify verifiable.

  427. 15:19

    Or I guess at a verifiable standard. So,

  428. 15:21

    um you know, just kind of like using

  429. 15:23

    that analogy and like how to think about

  430. 15:25

    like the you know, what you need to do

  431. 15:28

    in order to

  432. 15:30

    prove the that the human authorized the

  433. 15:33

    agent. Hopefully that that helps and now

  434. 15:36

    you have kind of like a tool set to use.

  435. 15:39

    So you can kind of prevent Skynet from

  436. 15:41

    taking over your wallet. So, thank you

  437. 15:43

    very much for your for listening. Hope

  438. 15:46

    that helps.

  439. 15:49

    >> [applause]

  440. 16:04

    [music]